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CORPORATE VERSUS CONTRACTUAL MUTUAL
FUNDS: AN EVALUATION OF STRUCTURE AND
GOVERNANCE
Wallace Wen Yeu Wang*
Abstract: This Article develops an analytic framework to evaluate the comparative merits
of the structure and governance of the two dominant types of mutual funds-the Corporate
Fund (the U.S. model) and the Contractual Fund (the German, Japanese and British models).
The former is characterized by centralized decision-making functions, while the latter
employs a more decentralized structure. The semi-hierarchical structure of the Corporate
Fund leads to significant transaction costs such as influence, intervention and collective
decision-making costs. Specifically, the board of directors is not effective in negotiating
performance-related terms (e.g., fees), and shareholder suits based on fiduciary duties do not
adequately address the thorny issue of who monitors the monitor. In addition, although
shareholder voting on specific issues may be desirable, the concept of voting for directors is
contrary to the realities of the mutual fund business. Therefore, the Corporate Fund has
placed too much reliance on the board's discretion.
A conceptual analysis of the Contractual Fund demonstrates that its structural design and
underlying rationales are fundamentally sound. Of the two Contractual Fund proposals
considered by the SEC, the Unitary Investment Fund should be rejected because it provides
no effective substitute for the board's oversight. The Unified Fee Investment Company
proposal is a better alternative not only because competitive forces would provide adequate
discipline with respect to its simplified fee schedule, but also because the investment manager
would be better motivated to coordinate a mutual fund's operations. This proposal can be
further improved by shifting the regulatory focus to the investment manager and by replacing
the board of directors with institutional monitors such as a trustee. Accordingly, the SEC
should implement the proposal to promote organizational competition with the Corporate
Fund.
,
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I. INTRODUCTION
Mutual funds, a type of collective investment vehicle, pool money
from public investors and invest in a variety of securities.' In simplified
terms, they "split ownership into capital supplying and investment, and
professionalize[] the investment function." 2 In the United States, the vast
majority of mutual funds take a "corporate" form. While the law does
not expressly require that mutual funds be organized as corporations, it
does impose requirements that assume the standard structure of corporate
democracy: a board of directors, whose function is to oversee the
operations of the mutual fund and review contractual arrangements with
outside service providers (e.g., investment advisers); and shareholder
voting to elect board members and approve fundamental changes. In this
Article, such an organizational structure of mutual funds is referred to as
the "Corporate Fund Model," or simply as the "Corporate Fund."3
Over the years, commentators have expressed skepticism about the
effectiveness of boards of directors and the value of shareholder voting
in governing the Corporate Fund. Some have argued that boards of
directors are not effective monitors of the service providers. Others have
asserted that costs incurred in complying with shareholder voting
requirements outweigh any benefits to shareholders. While some
commentators have called for improvements to ourrent governance
arrangements, others have advocated alternative governance
arrangements as ways of streamlining investment company governance
requirements and reducing operating costs.
4
I. Collective investment vehicles are not limited to mutual fimds. Other vehicles include
commodities pools (i.e., pools containing futures contracts or exchange-traded commodity options as
assets) and real estate pools, mortgage and asset-backed pools, which are beyond the scope of this
Article. For an introduction to the regulation of collective investment vehicles, see generally
Stephen K. West, The Investment Company Industry in the 1990's 42-51 (1990) [hereinafter West
Report]. For an introduction to the regulation of commodity pools, see generally Philip McBride
Johnson & Thomas Lee Hazen, Commodities Regulation (2d ed. 1989).
2. See Robert Charles Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment
Management Treatises, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 561, 564 (1981).
3. It is important to distinguish the structure of the Corporate Fund from that of other hierarchical
structures such as publicly-held corporations. After all, the Corporate Fund is merely a "corporate
anomaly." Leland E. Modesitt, The Mutual Fund-A Corporate Anomaly, 14 UCLA L. Rev. 1252
(1967); see also infra part I.A.
4. See, e.g., Advance Notice and Request for Comment on Mutual Fund Governance, Investment
Company Act Release No. 12,888, 47 Fed. Reg. 56,509 (Dec. 10, 1982); Richard M. Phillips,
Deregulation under the Investment Company Act-A Reevaluation of the Corporate Paraphernalia
of Shareholder Voting and Boards of Directors, 37 Bus. Law. 903 (1982),
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From a comparative institutional perspective, the plea for an
examination of alternative governance arrangements is warranted. After
dealing with the Corporate Fund Model for more than fifty years, people
have come to accept the corporate structure as the natural scheme for
mutual funds. It is not. In fact, in Europe, Japan, and most other
countries, Corporate Funds are in a decided minority compared to a form
of organization established under contract or trust law.5 While such a
form of mutual funds shares some similar structural features with the
Corporate Fund, it offers no centralized control mechanism and provides
limited, if any, investor voting. Because these arrangements are
predicated on the belief that a mutual fund is more suited to a contractual
arrangement than to corporate democracy, they can be categorized as the
"Contractual Fund Model," or simply as the "Contractual Fund."6
We have thus witnessed two different forms of mutual funds operating
in the global financial markets, which nevertheless perform essentially
the same economic functions. If the primary goal of a business
organization is to achieve systemic efficiency or to economize on
transaction costs, then what are the comparative merits between the
Corporate Fund Model and the Contractual Fund Model? Which type of
collective investment arrangement can maximize efficiency and
minimize opportunism? To answer these questions, it is necessary to
undertake an institutional analysis, studying markets, hybrids and
hierarchies together! Since the Corporate Fund and the Contractual
Fund are intermediate forms of business organizations, together they
offer an interesting subject for comparative institutional analysis.'
Such a comparative study involves more than a pedagogical inquiry.
It has tremendous implications for the regulation of both domestic and
foreign mutual funds. The globalization of securities markets is
beginning to put American mutual funds in competition with foreign
mutual funds that have a different organizational structure.9  Such
5. For a discussion of contractual mutual funds, see infra part lI.B.
6. For an explanation of the term "Contractual Fund," see infra notes 93-96, 386-90 and
accompanying text.
7. As argued by Williamson: "Mhe Logic of economic organization becomes more evident when
markets, hybrids, and hierarchies are studied together." Oliver Williamson, Economic Institutions:
Spontaneous and Intentional Governance, 7 J.L. Econ. & Org. 184 (1991).
8. Comparative institutional economics is an important research tool in understanding the law and
economics of business organizations. Such analysis is made possible through theoretical tools such
as transaction costs economics. Simply put, transaction costs economics seeks to explain the
existence of firms, organizations within which markets were replaced by hierarchy and command.
See infra part III.D.
9. See infra part V.D.2.
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competition might not only be between products, but might also be
between the different organizational structures. In addition, to promote
international trade of financial services, it is necessary to remove trade
barriers in cross-border transactions of mutual ftads. 10  Thus, even
assuming the Corporate Fund and the Contractual Fund are equally
competitive investment vehicles, regulators must still come to grips with
the question of how to regulate foreign contractual funds operating in the
United States, taking into consideration principles such as investor
protection." In light of such significant implications, a study of their
comparative merits takes on a sense of urgency.
Against this background, the Division of Inves',aent Management
("Division") of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
completed a comprehensive report 2 which examined, among other
issues, the feasibility of the existing governance model of the Corporate
Fund. The purpose was to analyze whether changes could be made to the
existing structure that would increase the effectiveness of the board of
directors in monitoring conflicts of interest and to provide shareholders
with more meaningful voting opportunities. 3 After comprehensive
review of the structure of the Corporate Fund, the Division concluded
that the governance structure of the Corporate Fund is "fundamentally
sound" and should be retained, with some modifications. 4
. The SEC Report also considered the feasibility of permitting two
proposals derived from the Contractual Fund Model: the "unitary
10. There has been a great deal of debate on how best to increase cross-border sales of investment
company shares. See generally SEC Request for Comments on Reform of the Regulation of
Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 17,534, 55 Fed. Reg. 25,322,
25,324-38 (June 15, 1990). For a discussion of the business aspects of internationalization, see, e.g.,
Heidi Fiske, The Environment for the Investment Company Industry in the 1990s 61-67 (1990).
11. For instance, the current U.S. regulatory framework on mutual funds presents a challenge to
foreign mutual funds seeking to market its securities in the United States. Specifically, § 7(d)
prohibits a foreign investment company from making a public offering of its shares in the U.S.
unless the SEC issues an order permitting it to register under the Investment Company Act of 1940
("Act"). Under this section, the SEC must find that "by reason of special circumstances or
arrangements, it is both legally and practically feasible effectively to enforce the provisions of [the
Act] against such company and that the issuance of such order is otherwise consistent with the public
interest and the protection of investors." Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(d)
(1994). In doing so, it is necessary to understand the structure and goemance of foreign mutual
funds.
12. Division of Inv. Management, U.S. See. and Exch. Comm'n, Protecting Investors: A Half
Century of Investment Company Regulation (May 1992) [hereinafter SEC Report].
13. Id. at 253.
14. Id. at 263-82.
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investment fund" (UIF)' 5 and the "unified fee investment company"
(UFIC).' 6 The UIF has two predominant features: a single fee to cover
all management expenses and the elimination of the governance structure
(e.g., the board of directors and shareholder voting). The Division
recommended against implementation of the UIF because it believed that
the UIF "would raise significant investor protection concerns, would not
reduce costs substantially, and would not significantly promote
internationalization."' 7  However, in an effort to streamline the fee
structures of the Corporate Fund, the Division recommended the
implementation of the UFIC proposal. The UFIC proposal would
incorporate the single fee aspect of the UIF while retaining the
governance structure of the Corporate Fund. 8
How do we go about assessing the validity of these policy analyses
and recommendations? Since the Corporate Fund and the Contractual
Fund are driven by different organizational designs and underlying
rationales, it is difficult to evaluate their comparative merits without a
unified analytic framework. For example, with respect to the Corporate
Fund, the Division argued that the oversight function performed by its
board of directors has served investors well, at minimum cost. Lacking
an analytic framework, however, the Division had to base this conclusion
on an oversimplified costs calculus, rather than on a systematic
framework that permits detailed analysis of transactions among the
various constituencies of the mutual fund. 9 In addition, without an
explanation of the rationales underlying the Contractual Fund Model, it
is unclear why the UIF should be rejected and the UFIC implemented.
In fact, some commentators have presented their arguments at such a
high level of generality that an assessment of their positions is very
difficult." Therefore, to meaningfully evaluate the Corporate Fund and
the Contractual fund, it is necessary to adopt a unified framework.
15. See infra part VI.B.I.
16. See infra part VI.B.2.
17. SEC Report, supra note 12, at 289.
18. See infra notes 379-94 and accompanying text.
19. Some scholarly works have applied an analytic framework to analyze the governance structure
of publicly-held corporations. See, e.g., Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 Yale L.J.
1197 (1984). However, few have adopted a unified transaction costs analysis to the mutual fund
context.
20. For instance, one opponent of the UIF noted that the contractual type of mutual funds may not
be suitable for the domestic industry because they were developed "under different conditions and in
different environments." Letter from Debevoise & Plimpton, Counsel to the Independent Trustees of
the Fidelity Funds, to Jonathon G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Oct. 10,
Washington Law Review
This Article attempts, from within the law-and-economics tradition, to
evaluate the Corporate Fund and the Contractual Fund from a
comparative institutional perspective. It develops an analytic framework
for the analysis of mutual fund structures and uses this framework to
evaluate the comparative merits of the structure and governance of
various mutual fund models, including the UIF and UFIC.2" Part II
examines the fundamental structure of mutual funds and defines the
"firm" in the mutual fund context. Part III introduces the Corporate
Fund (the U.S. model) and the Contractual Fund (the! German, Japanese
and British models) and then compares their major structural differences.
Part IV adopts the hypothetical contracting approach to consider the
possible control functions that rational and fully-informed parties would
have allocated to the third-party monitor, taking into account the
bargaining attributes and constraints inherent in the matual fund context.
Based on the observations drawn in Part IV, this Article evaluates the
structure and governance of the Corporate Fund and the Contractual
Fund in Part V and Part VI, respectively. Part V first examines the
board's effectiveness from an organizational perspective and considers
its performance with respect to each assigned responsibility. After
assessing the SEC's reform proposals regarding the governance of the
Corporate Fund, Part V concludes by assessing the role of the board of
directors as Coordinator-Monitor. Since the Contractual Fund is not a
well understood arrangement, Part VI begins with a conceptual analysis
of the Contractual Fund. Part VI then evaluates the UIF and the UFIC
proposals and offers some suggestions for improvement. This Part
finally examines the relationship between monitoring arrangements and
governance structure and recommends that the UFIC be permitted as an
optional form to promote organizational competition.
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE OF THE MUTUAL FUND
This Part provides the practical and theoretical background necessary
for evaluating the structure of different forms of mutual funds.22 Section
1990) (on file with author). Yet this opinion made no efforts to identitr, let alone examine, such
different conditions and environments.
21. See infra part IV.
22. This Article focuses on mutual funds. The reasons are threefold. First, mutual funds. are by
far the dominant investment companies in the U.S. market (95% of industry assets) and the global
market. See, e.g., Investment Co. Inst., 1991 Mutual Fund Fact Book at 55-58 (1991) [hereinafter
ICIFact Book]. Second, in many important jurisdictions these are the cnly form permitted in the
securities markets. A comparative study of business organizations will be more meaningful if
confined to organizations that share as many common features as possible. Third, because of its
Vol. 69:927, 1994
Mutual Fund Structures
A introduces the economic functions of mutual funds. Section B
analyzes the contractual relationship between the investment adviser and
the investors. Section C examines the concept of segregated assets in the
mutual fund context and the role of the third-party monitor. Section D
defines the object of inquiry.
A. Economic Functions of the Mutual Fund
"Mutual funds" are financial intermediaries which pool money from
investors and entrust such money to professional managers to make
investments on behalf of the investors. A mutual fund is an open-ended
company, in which the public may purchase interests representing pro
rata portions of the pooled assets' average net assets.' It engages in a
continuous offering of its shares, and investors have the right to redeem
their shares at their current average net asset value.24
Mutual funds offer two primary benefits. First, by pooling the
financial resources of dispersed investors, they allow investors to gain
lower-cost access to the expertise of professional managers. What is
professional management? Mutual funds make financial investments in
the securities markets. Successful investment management requires
judgment and specialized knowledge. In selecting the securities in which
to invest, the investment adviser first performs extensive economic and
financial research.' The aim of this research is to develop data so that
intelligent decisions can be made about securities in the fund's portfolio.
However, unlike "real" investments, securities are mere intangibles
that represent something else (e.g., intrinsic value), but that something
else is itself extraordinarily complex.26 Moreover, since mutual funds
invest primarily in secondary markets, investment management
redemption right feature, the mutual fund provides an excellent stylized model for the evaluation of
organizational structures.
23. The term "open-ended company" is defined as a management company that is offering for
sale or has outstanding a redeemable security that it issues.
24. Mutual fund investors can cash in all or part of their shares at any time and receive the current
value of their investment See 1 Tamar Frankel, The Regulation of Money Managers 336-41 (1978).
25. Security analysis involves the application of complex models such as a capital asset pricing
model. Portfolio managers use sophisticated portfolio management theories (e.g., risk-reward, stock-
picking, efficient market hypothesis and indexation) to conduct securities analysis. See William F.
Sharpe & Gordon J. Alexander, Investments 134-93 (4th ed. 1989).
26. The value of a common stock is the present value of some long-term, future stream of
business income, which itself often defies meaningful calculation. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon &
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 761 (1985).
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inevitably calls for predictions as to what these markets will do.27 Such
uniqueness was captured in Keynes's often quoted observation that
investment management resembles a newspaper beauty contest.23
Second, mutual fund investors gain low-cost access to the advantages
of wide diversification of ownership in the securities market. According
to modem finance theory, an efficient portfolio is one that secures the
maximum return for a given level of risk.29 It follows that the riskiness
of a portfolio depends on the co-variance (the extent to which asset
prices move together) of its holding, not on the average of the risks
associated with its individual investments. In other words, a lot of risky
bets might together prove low-risk, as long as their return did not move
in the same direction at the same time.3" Thus, diversification is essential
to eliminating what appears to be demonstrably unproductive risk taking
in specific securities (unsystematic risk).31 For most individual investors,
cost alone generally precludes achieving adequate diversification.
Diversification, therefore, is at the very heart of mutual investing.
In addition to professional management and diversification, mutual
funds provide other benefits. In jurisdictions that impose no officially
fixed commission rates, mutual funds provide the benefit of lower
transaction costs resulting from volume discouxats on brokerage
commissions.32 Moreover, to keep attuned to investor needs, mutual
fund industries in some countries have adapted and expanded their
27. However confident the investor may be as to the soundness of her valuation, success depends
largely on what measure of value the prospective buyer will adopt. See, e.g., Louis Lowenstein, Is
Speculation "The Essential Native Genius of the Stock Market"?, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 232 (1992)
(reviewing Walter Werner and Steven T. Smith, Wall Street (1991)).
28. In this contest the winners are the ones
whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole;
so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those
which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of other competitors, all of whom are looking at the
problem from the same point of view .... We have reached the third degree where we devote
our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be.
John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money 156 (2d ed. 1973).
Thus, security analysis involves the study of business fundamentals as well as crowd psychology.
29. Sharpe, supra note 25, at 154-93.
30. Only Perform: A Survey ofInvestment Management, Economist, Nov. 27, 1993, at 8.
31. Sharpe, supra note 25, at 119-34.
32. Specialized mutual funds play other functions too. For instance, some mutual funds have the
power to turn illiquid investments such as municipal bonds, junk bonds, or small-company stocks
into highly liquid ones. To sell some not so liquid municipal bonds, an investor might have to wait
days or take a lower-than-market price from a dealer. But that same invetor can usually sell shares
in a municipal-bond fund that very day at a price equal to net asset value, without having to give up a
dollar on price.
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services to suit investors' needs. For instance, many mutual funds offer
automatic reinvestment programs, automatic withdrawal, 33 exchange
privileges34 and other services. Automatic reinvestment programs allow
investors to have dividends and capital gain distributions from their
mutual fund investment turned back into the fund, automatically buying
new shares and expanding their current holdings.35
An important addition to the family of mutual funds is the money
market fund. This type of mutual fund invests in very high quality short-
term debt (money market) instruments such as Treasury bills,
commercial paper, and bank certificates of deposit. There is some
fluctuation in the market value of these securities, but because their
maturity is typically less than six months, the change in the market value
is sufficiently small that these funds allow their shares to be redeemed at
a fixed value. In addition, any changes in the market value of these
securities are included in the fund pays. Because these shares can be
redeemed at a fixed value, they usually allow shareholders to redeem
shares by writing checks above some minimum amount (e.g., $500) on
the fund's account at a commercial bank.36 In this way, shares in money
market funds effectively function as checkable deposits that earn market
interest rates on short-term debt securities."
33. Automatic withdrawal means investors can make arrangements with the fund to automatically
send them checks from the fund. This system works well, for instance, for retirees who want to
receive regular supplements to their other income. Investment Co. Inst., Directory of Mutual Funds
7 (1992) [hereinafter Directory].
34. For a discussion ofexchange privileges, see infra notes 205-206 and accompanying text.
35. Directory, supra note 33, at 7.
36. As of May 1992, money market funds accounted for 41% of the mutual fund industry's assets.
SEC Report, supra note 12, at xix. In contrast to the "stand-alone" funds, some money market funds
are offered as one part of a comprehensive financial product. One example is the Cash Management
Account Program (CMA Program) offered by Merrill Lynch. The CMA Program, the first "central
asset account," offered participants a unique package that, through a sophisticated computer system,
combined (a) the CMA Money Fund, (b) a traditional securities brokerage margin account, and (c) a
VISA debit card and checking privileges. Reports on each account were combined in a
comprehensive monthly statement. See generally Merrill Lynch, Cash Management Account
Program Description (Sept. 17, 1991); Merrill Lynch, CMA Money Fund, CMA Government
Securities Fund, CMA Tax-Exempt Fund, Prospectus (July 29, 1991).
37. It is important to note that some mutual funds are market index funds. They construct
portfolios to mirror a specific market index. "These index funds are expected to provide a rate of
return over time that will approximate or match, but not exceed, that of the market which they are
mirroring. Index funds offer a number of investment choices that include various stock market
indexes or indexes of international or bond portfolios." Directory, supra note 33, at 13. Because the
managers of index funds do not make investments based on their own investment research, investors
essentially employ the administrative services, instead of the management services, of these
managers.
937
Washington Law Review
The economic organization of mutual funds offers several efficiency
gains. The theory of the firm emphasizes the costs of markets and points
out that when non-market structures can accomplish desired results at
lower costs, people will organize themselves into such
structures-firms-in order better to achieve those results.38 A mutual
fund is also a firm-an aggregation of human assets (i.e., fund
management service) and capital assets (investment funds) for a
sufficient period of time to permit greater specialization. According to
transaction-cost economics, this arrangement reduces the costs associated
with repeated learning and haggling for management services. Thus, the
mutual fund arrangement is to some extent sheltered from market forces
in an effort to take advantage of these efficiency gains.
Mutual funds play a very significant role in the financial markets and
the overall economy. Entrusted with $2 trillion of savings, mutual funds
are altering the way Americans save and invest, offering a menu of
investments unthinkable a decade ago.39 "By channeling the savings of
millions of consumers into hundreds of billions of dollars of investments,
mutual funds are reshaping the U.S. financial landscape and the economy
itself."'4 For example, they have lowered the cost of capital for industry
and government alike. During a period when banks and other
institutions have been shrinking in importance, mutual funds have been
providing the capital for financially strapped companies to rebuild their
balance sheets. In addition, the managers of mutual funds, through their
control of billions of dollars of individual investors' assets, carry
enormous clout with the management of the companies in whose stocks
and bonds they invest.4"
38. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937).
39. It has been reported that "I in 4 Americans owns mutual funds directly or through group
plans; half the families have incomes of less than $50,000, making funds the primary financial asset
of the middle class." John Greenwald, The Siren Call of Mutual Funds, Time, Nov. 8, 1993, at 59.
40. Jeffrey M. Laderman & Geoffrey Smith, The Power of Mutual Funds, Bus. Wk., Jan. 18,
1993, at 62.
41. In their capacity as institutional shareholders, mutual funds can assess corporate managers'
performance and influence corporate actions. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents:
The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 811 (1992); Mark J. Roe, Political
Elements in the Creation of Mutual Fund Industry, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1469 (1991); Edward B.
Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 Geo. L.J.
445 (1991).
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B. The Adviser-Investor Contractual Relationship
Despite the size and growing variety of investor services, the typical
mutual fund remains a bilateral relationship. Stripped to its essentials,42
it involves two parties-an Investment Adviser43 ("Adviser") and a group
of dispersed investors. 4 The Adviser, a functionally autonomous
business organization,45 is typically the one who puts a mutual fund
together for investors. This is why the prospectus and other selling
documents of the mutual fund invariably set forth not only the name but
the management make-up of the Adviser so that investors can decide for
themselves whether to employ its portfolio management service.46
The Adviser-Investors contractual relationship is similar to a cluster of
contracts entered into between the Adviser and each individual investor.
It is to the Adviser that the investor looks for the management of his
money. The total range of enforceable expectations and understandings
in the bilateral arrangement is matched by corresponding responsibilities
and duties of the Adviser.47 In this sense, the mutual fund is truly the
42. Bilateral mutual funds do exist in the marketplace. One example is the collective investment
funds created and managed by trust companies or the trust departments of state and national banks.
For a discussion of such investment vehicle, see, e.g., West Report, supra note 1, at 42-44.
43. In this Article, the term "Adviser" is used to refer to the firm who provides portfolio
management service to a mutual fund. Unless otherwise specified, the term "Adviser" is sometimes
interchangeable with other terms such as "investment adviser" or "management company." For a
legal definition of the term, see infra note 81 and accompanying text.
Although the Adviser-investors bilateral relationship is the norm in the mutual fund industry, a
number of mutual fund groups have "internalized" management service. One notable example is the
Vanguard Group, which is owned by the shareholders of its mutual funds. Under such ownership
structure, Vanguard provides its management services at cost. See, e.g., Jonathan Clements, Fidelity
Takes a Swipe at Rival Vanguard, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 1992, at CI.
44. Different jurisdictions use different terms to denote investors of mutual funds. They include,
for example, shareholders (in the U.S.), unit holders (in the United Kingdom) and beneficiaries (in
Japan). See infra parts m.A-B. This Article will use the term "investors" to refer to the suppliers of
mutual fund capital. Where appropriate, however, technical terms such as shareholders (in the U.S.)
or unitholders (in the United Kingdom) will be used. Thus, the term "investors" is interchangeable
with "shareholders" or "unitholders.'
45. It is important to distinguish the Adviser as an institution from its individual portfolio
managers-specialists employed by the Adviser to conduct investment management activities. See,
e.g., Carole Gould, Mutual Funds: Where is the Manager's Money?, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1992, at
F16; see also infra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
46. For instance, one item of disclosure reads as follows: "Fidelity is one of America's largest
mutual fund companies in the country, and is known as an innovative provider of high-quality
financial services to individuals and institutions." Fidelity Magellan Fund, Prospectus 9 (May 20,
1993).
47. Nathan D. Lobell, Rights and Responsibilities in the Mutual Fund, 70 Yale L.J. 1258, 1265
(1961).
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matrix of two social drives (of the Adviser anc. of the investor)
expressing themselves in a bilateral advisory relationship.48
There are certain differences, however, between a mutual fund and a
simple investor-adviser relationship. Because of the central
administration of the pooled assets, the fund management cannot confer
with individual investors in making investment policy. Fund investors
with similar preference patterns are expected to select themselves by
investing in a particular fund. This is achieved by the fact that the fund's
policy, portfolio, and record are disclosed to each potential investor,
giving him the opportunity to select the fund whose objective is closest
to his own. In determining whether to purchase the shares of a mutual
fund, investors need to decide whether to employ the investment
management services of a particular adviser. Thus, from the investors'
perspective, the mutual fund is a collective investment vehicle, with each
investor owning a proportionate interest in an undivided aggregate of
assets.
The bilateral arrangement embodies the major terms of the mutual
fund. In establishing a mutual fund, the Adviser stipulates the
investment objectives of the mutual fund in the prospectus and other
selling documents. The investment objectives of the mutual fund are
important to both the Adviser and the investors. The Adviser uses them
as a guide when choosing investments for the fund's portfolio. Investors
use them to determine which funds are suitable for their needs.
Investment objectives are usually described in terms of one or more main
goals, with different risk and return level. These may include
stability-protecting the principal from loss; growth-increasing the
value of the principal; and income-generating a continuous flow of
income through dividends.49  Thus, a mutual fund's investment
objectives cover a wide range, from higher risk in the! search for higher
returns to immediate income from more stable investments. 50
The bilateral contract also stipulates and describes a list of the
fundamental features. These enumerated features cannot be changed
without shareholder consent. The required features on which a
fundamental choice has to be made and disclosed include: whether the
48. Id. at 1263.
49. In the United States, the Investment Company Institute classifies mutual funds into 22 major
categories of investment objectives. See ICIFact Book, supra note 22, at 2,--26.
50. For an introduction to the regulation and development of mutual funds in other major
countries, see Managing Money: A Legal Guide to the World's Investment Fund Markets, Int'l Fin.
L. Rev. (1990) (hereinafter World's Investment Fund].
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fund is open- or closed-end and diversified or non-diversified, whether
the issuance of senior securities will be permitted, and whether the fund
will concentrate its investments in a particular industry or group of
industries. In addition, the contract may prohibit or limit certain
investments and practices. For example, it may prohibit margin
purchases, joint trading accounts, short sales and activities as a
distributor of its own securities. Finally, whether and how much to pay
in dividends, a recurrent policy problem for corporate directors, is
usually pre-determined in a mutual fund operation."
In exchange for creating and managing such a collective investment
vehicle, the Adviser's costs include writing up the terms of the deal,
bearing the initial costs of the fund, and providing the management
service. The Adviser's efforts to set up a mutual fund involve potential
risk and return. If the mutual fund cannot be established successfully or,
after it is established, the Adviser's income does not cover the operating
expenses, the Adviser will be forced to bear all of the initial and
operating costs. In return, the Adviser expects to be compensated for the
services he provides, and the prospectus and other selling documents
therefore contain statements of any fees charged by the fund.
To summarize, a mutual fund involves an Adviser-Investor
contractual relationship. It presents key elements of an economic
contract: the investment objectives and policies, risk and return,
compensation for the service, the termination or withdrawal (redemption)
right, etc. The terms in the arrangements are contracts because their
value (or detriment) is reflected in price,52 even though the Adviser may
use its discretion in devising certain features of a mutual fund and in
effect say to potential investors "take it or leave it."
C. The Investment Pool and Third-Party Monitor
As an investment vehicle, a mutual fund aggregates investment capital
from investors. To obtain expert management, each investor of a mutual
51. In fact, in the United States, in order to avoid being taxed on dividends and gains, most mutual
funds commit in advance to pay out dividends and gains. Under subchapter M of the Internal
Revenue Code, in order to avoid federal taxation at the investment company level, a United States
registered investment company must, among other things, distribute to its shareholders at least 90%
of its gross income derived from sources such as dividends and interests. Similar rules apply to
ordinary income and capital gains. See id. at 67-74.
52. These contracts may not be negotiated. However, the pricing and testing mechanism are all
that matter, as long as there are no effects on third parties. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
R. Fisehel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 16-17 (199 1).
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fund delegates the disposal right to the Adviser so that systematic
investments can be made. By aggregating all the assets, the pooled fund
can diversify and achieve economies of scale, makinog investments in a
more efficient way. Because the Adviser is an independent business
entity with its own assets, it is advisable to segregate the pooled assets
from the Adviser's assets. 53 Thus, we may actually identify a pool of
definable assets which is segregated from both the Adviser and the
Investors for the purpose of making investments ("Investment Pool").
Because the Investment Pool is organized and operated by the
Adviser, there is obvious potential for conflict between the interests of
the Adviser and the interests of the Investors. This is especially the case
because, unlike "search" goods such as clothing, investment services are
"experience" goods whose quality cannot be ascertained in advance.5
An inherent feature of investments is that their risk cannot be adequately
assessed on the basis of existing information about ':hem because risk
also depends on the integrity and skill of those who will be managing the
investment in the future. Hence, it is important to monitor the behavior
of the Adviser.
How can the Investors align the Adviser's objectives with their own?
According to principal-agent theory, because the Investors and the
Adviser are well aware of the opportunities for cheating, shirking or even
stealing, they must undertake some measures, such as placing the
Adviser on an incentive plan, to minimize potential conflicts of interest.55
Even under an optimal incentive scheme, however, the Adviser will put
some weight on its own objectives at the expense of those of the
Investors, so that conflicting interests remain. "Agency costs" arise
because the interests of the Adviser and the Investors can conflict; thus,
both the Adviser and the Investors must employ different mixes of
bonding devices, monitoring devices, and residual costs of this
divergence of interest. 6 The trick is to hold the total costs of these items
(i.e., agency costs) as low as possible.
53. See infra part VI.A.3.
54. A. C. Page & R. B. Ferguson, Investor Protection 37 (1992).
55. Principal-agent theory recognizes conflicts of interest between different economic actors,
formalizing these conflicts through the inclusion of observability problems and asymmetries of
information. Pursuant to this theory, it is impossible for the owners to implement their own profit-
maximization plan. See, e.g., Bengt Holmstrm, Moral Hazard and Obser.ability, 10 Bell J. Econ.
74 (1979); Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10
Bell J. Econ. 55 (1979).
56. Following the usage established by Jensen & Meckling, the conmbination of monitoring,
bonding and residual costs will be referred to as agency costs. Agency costs include the costs of
structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests.
Vol. 69:927, 1994
Mutual Fund Structures
Minimizing agency costs is complicated by the fact that shareholder
monitoring of the Adviser's actions will often be compromised because
of the collective action problem. Monitoring the Adviser is an example
of what economists call a collective good; that is, it benefits all investors
whether or not they pay for it. Rationally, investors would prefer to "free
ride" on the efforts of others rather than subscribe to their pro rata share
of the costs of monitoring the Adviser. 7 Moreover, since individual
investors hold only small proportions of claims entitled to control and,
more significantly, no investor has enough wealth invested in the mutual
fund to make it worthwhile to devote time to review and monitor the
behavior of the Adviser, no individual investor has either the power or
incentive to monitor the Adviser efficiently. 8 This is the case even
though monitoring is worthwhile for all investors taken together.
Ideally, the advisory relationship would be governed by specific rules
that dictate how the Adviser should manage the asset in the Investors'
best interest. However, because asset management necessarily involves
risk and uncertainty, the specific behavior of the Adviser cannot be
dictated in advance in a "contingently complete contract."59 In addition,
since disputes may occur in the future it may be necessary to include a
dispute resolution mechanism." Therefore, to mitigate investor apathy
and free rider problems, it is desirable to appoint an independent
"Monitor" to assume monitoring functions.
Agency costs also include the value of output lost because the costs of full enforcement of contracts
exceed the benefits. Among such costs, monitoring costs are the most important because
transactions involving joint production such as mutual funds require careful monitoring so that each
actor's contribution can be assessed. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 308-10
(1976).
57. For every mutual fund investor, the benefits to be gained from monitoring must be weighed
against its costs, e.g., the opportunity costs of diverted time that could be expended on other profit-
seeking activities. This is particularly the case where the number of investors is likely to be large,
thereby making it difficult for them to communicate and to agree on objectives. For a discussion of
collective action problems, see, e.g., Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods
and the Theory of Groups 55-56 (2d ed. 1971); Russel Hardin, Collective Action (1982).
58. See Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law 389-400 (1986).
59. In the parlance of economists, the term "incomplete contract" describes any contract short of
the ideal of a complete contingent contract, which has been drafted with all contingencies in mind
and provides for optimal performance on every contingency. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L.J. 729 (1992);
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87 (1989).
60. See Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, in The Nature of the
Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development 141 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sydney G. Winter eds.,
1991).
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The term "monitoring" is an intentionally vague term-it is used to
connote various activities in addition to its disciplinary connotation." It
could include a variety of functions, some active, some passive. One of
the active finctions can be called the "control" function; that is, the
power to exercise a controlling influence over the management or
policies of a business association. In its broadest sense, control can be
defined as "the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or
cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether
through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise."'62
One of the passive functions is the "gatekeeper" function, which
connotes duties imposed on private parties who a-:e able to disrupt
misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers. 3
Pursuant to this function, the Monitor may be charged with the
responsibility to monitor the Adviser's compliance with all applicable
laws and regulations. This watchdog function is sometimes imposed on
third parties, such as accountants and lawyers, to detect frauds on their
clients. A related function is the corrective function. As an example of
this function, if the Adviser made an inadvertent mistake, the Monitor
may be authorized to "ratify" such a mistake.
Structural issues, such as the role to be played by the Monitor, are by
no means the natural byproducts of specialization in a business
organization."4 Since the severity of such problems varies with each type
of economic organization, it is wrong to assume that the interests of
managers in an industrial organization diverge in the same way as those
of the Adviser of a mutual fund. For instance, because mutual fund
61. According to Alchian & Demsetz, the term "monitor" connotes measuring output
performance, apportioning rewards, observing the input behavior of inputs, and giving assignments
or instructions in what to do. See Arman A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777,782 (1972). For a discussion of the role
of monitoring in business arrangements such as secured financing, see, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson &
Anthony T. Kronnan, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Crediors, 88 Yale L.J. 1143
(1979).
62. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1993). The term control" assumes an important role in the regulation of
business organizations. For instance, a basic concept running through all of the statutes administered
by the SEC is that of control. See generally A. A. Sommer, Jr., Who's "In Control"?-S.E.C., 21
Bus. Law. 559 (1966).
63. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy,
2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 53 (1986).
64. For instance, commenting on the political perspective of corporate agency problem, Grundfest
argued that "the form, nature, and severity of corporate agency problem will reflect the push and pull
of political considerations as much as the flow of economic events." Joseph A. Grundfest,
Subordination ofAmerican Capital, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 89, 110 (1990).
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investors hold fluctuating claims," the monitoring problems they face
may be different from those of the bank depositors66 or corporate
shareholders. 67 Thus, the allocation of monitoring functions reflects the
bargain made as to the other elements as well as the underlying economic
realities those bargains reflect and create.
D. Defining the Object of Inquiry: The Mutual Fund as a Trilateral
Arrangement
To undertake an inquiry on the structure and governance of the mutual
fund, it is necessary to first define the object of inquiry, i.e., what kind of
business organization or economic relationship are we dealing with? In
other words, what is the "firm" which constitutes the object of this
inquiry?6 It is said that the-continuum of possible business structures is
anchored by two extremes, one pure contract, the other pure
organization.69 On the contract end of the continuum, parties use arm's-
length contracts to organize production. These contracts specify the
terms on which the entrepreneur can acquire services from the other
factors under all possible future circumstances. On the organization end
of the continuum, "few arm's-length contracts are specified: the
entrepreneurial factor buys up ... the other factors. The firm vertically
integrates."7"
The study of American corporate governance concentrates on the
structure of a single firm, say, General Motors. People tend to define the
"firm" as including only the wholly-owned subsidiaries of the core firm.
This "entity approach" is a convenient device for communication,
especially with respect to complex socio-economic organizations. For
65. See infra part IV.B.4.
66. Depositors typically hold fixed claims against the depositary bank. See, e.g., Helen A. Garten,
Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors to Control Bank Risks, 4 Yale J. on Reg. 129, 129-35
(1986).
67. Corporate equity holders are residual claimants because they get paid last, after debt investors,
employees, and other investors with fixed claims. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, supra note 52, at 10-11.
68. The theory of the firm involves a three-tier inquiry: (1) what is the firm, that is, how do we
define the boundary between market and hierarchy; (2) what is the efficient boundary of the firm,
and what activities should be undertaken within it; and (3) how are decisions made and monitored
within the firm (that is, the traditional corporate governance problem)? See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson &
Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and
Industrial Organization, 102 Yale L.J. 871, 883 (1993).
69. Id. at 884-85.
70. Id. at 885.
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instance, when a large, publicly-held corporation raises new equity
capital, we often speak of it as "selling" common s:ock to the public.
Similarly, a mutual fund invariably has an identification, say, the Fidelity
Magellan Fund.
Because mutual funds are large and centrally managed pools of assets,
they invite analogies to vertical integrations such as those in industrial
corporations. However, as some theorists have argued, reification of a
business firm can be misleading.7' The mutual fund is often equated with
the fund's Investment Pool, especially in the case where the Investment
Pool is an incorporated entity or assumes the standard structure of
corporate democracy.72 Thus, the Fidelity Magellan Fund should not be
understood as a functionally autonomous entity and therefore a "firm." It
is the Fidelity Investments Group, a separate autonomous entity, which
provides the Fidelity Magellan Fund with expert management and other
related services. By investing in the Fidelity Magellan Fund, the
Investors are, in effect, doing business with the Fidelity Investment
Group.
This Article therefore takes as the structure that requires
understanding not a single legal entity in isolation (e.g., the Adviser or
the Monitor), but the trilateral arrangement consisting of the Adviser, the
Investors and the Monitor. Pursuant to such trilateral arrangement, the
Investors provide the investment capital, the Adviser expert
management, and the Monitor monitoring functions. The mutual fund
should thus be considered as a hybrid mixed mode-a business
association that is characterized by an interlocking web of contracts. It is
the trilateral, interlocking web of contracts that gives rise to the "firm" of
the mutual fund.
Our definition of the mutual fund will not be affected by the fact that a
mutual fund often involves third-party service providers other than the
Monitor. For example, mutual fund shares are sometimes sold through
broker/dealers at net asset value plus a sales charge.73 Other service
providers, such as transfer agents and underwriters,74 also get involved in
71. As Jensen & Meckling argue: "The firm is not an individual .... The 'behavior' of the firm is
like the behavior of a market, i.e., the outcome of a complex equilibrium process." Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 56, at 311.
72. See infra part I.A.
73. See ICI Fact Book; supra note 22, at 34; see also Amy Dunkin, Funds: Don't Ignore the In-
House Brand, Bus. Wk., Nov. 8, 1993, at 102.
74. The transfer agent performs the investment record-keeping services. It will issue new shares,
and distribute dividends and capital gains to shareholders. See ICI Fact Bo,1k supra note 22, at 11.
The principal underwriter arranges for the distribution of the fund's share to the investing public. Id.
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the operation of a mutual fund.75 Such services could be considered as
"operations at the periphery" in the sense that the functions they provide
could either be carried out within the firm (e.g., by the Adviser, the
Monitor, or their affiliates) or across the market through arm's-length
transactions. In other words, they raise the following question
concerning the theory of the firm: what is the efficient boundary of the
firm-that is, what activities should be undertaken within the mutual
fund? As such, the second-tier inquiry has no direct bearing on how we
define the firm of the mutual fund.76
To summarize, the mutual fund can be defined as a trilateral
arrangement among the Adviser, the Investors and the Monitor. Rather
than focusing on a single business entity in isolation, this Article takes
the entire structure-the interlocking webs of contracts among the three
economic actors-as the "firm" of the mutual fund.
I. THE CORPORATE FUND VERSUS THE CONTRACTUAL
FUND
This part compares the structure and governance of the Corporate
Fund and the Contractual Fund. Sections A and B examine the
regulatory frameworks governing the Corporate Fund Model, as
exemplified by mutual funds in the U.S., and the Contractual Fund
Models in Germany, Japan, and United Kingdom, respectively. Since
the concern here is the structure and governance of mutual funds, this
Article focuses on structural rules-rules that govern the allocation of
decision-making power among the agents (e.g., the Adviser or the
Monitor), the conditions for the exercise of decision-making power, and
the allocation of control over these agents.77 Section C compares the
major structural differences, or structural rules, between the Corporate
Fund and the Contractual Fund. Taking the transaction costs approach,
section D puts the Corporate Fund and the Contractual Fund in a
comparative institutional perspective.
75. Sometimes the Adviser even provides the fund with general administrative services and office
space. See Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds, H.R. Rep. No.
2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1962).
76. This question will be addressed below. See infra part VI.A.1.
77. Corporate rules can be divided into three categories: structural rules, distributional rules and
fiduciary rules. See Melvin Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1461,
1462 (1989).
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A. The U.S. Corporate Fund
In the United States, the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("Act")
and other Federal securities regulations regulate mutual funds as one
category of "Investment Companies.""8 "[T]he Act is not a disclosure
statute; it is a statute that regulates a type of a financial institution, more
akin to banking laws and insurance statutes."79 While the Act does not
expressly require that mutual funds be organized in corporations, it does
impose requirements that assume the standard structure of corporate
democracy: a board of directors, whose function is to oversee the
operations of the mutual fund and police conflicts of interest; and
shareholder voting to elect board members, and to approve or disapprove
fee arrangements and other fundamental changes. These requirements
also apply to mutual funds that are not corporations but are organized in
other forms such as a business trust.80
Like ordinary corporations, the investment company establishes a
hierarchical and centralized management body. The board of directors is
principally responsible for reviewing and evaluating the management and
distribution arrangements of the Adviser. Directors' duties include
monitoring and supervising compliance with the investment objectives
and policies of the fund, its portfolio transaction practices and general
business conduct.
An investment company's assets are typically managed by its
"Adviser,"8' pursuant to a contractual arrangement which is subject to
general review by its board of directors (or its equivalent such as a board
78. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to -64 (1994). In the United States,
collective investment vehicles operating in the securities market are called "Investment Companies."
§ 80a-3. They are classified by the Investment Company Act into thre.. types: (1) face-amount
certificate companies, (2) unit investment trust, and (3) management investment companies. § 80a-4.
Management investment companies are subdivided into "open-end" investment companies and
"closed-end" investment companies. § 80a-5. Among them, the open-end investment company is
the statutory terminology for a "mutual fund," indicating that it stands ready to redeem (buy back) its
shares on a daily basis.
79. Letter from Tamar Frankel, Professor of Law, Boston Universiy, to Kathy MacGarth,
Director, Securities and Exchange Commission I (Jan. 26, 1990).
80. Mutual funds are categorized as management investment companies, which may be structured
as a partnership, trust or corporation. Indeed, the definition of an "investment company' includes
entities organized in any form whatsoever. See §§ 80a-3(a), -2(a)(22,, and -2(a)(8) (defining
"investment company," "issuer," and "company," respectively).
81. The term "investment adviser" is defined as "a person or company." § 80a-2(a)(20). This is
the person or company "who pursuant to contract... regularly furnishes advice... with respect to
the desirability of investing in, purchasing or selling securities ... or is empowered to determine
what securities ... shall be purchased or sold ...." Id.
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of trustees).,2 The Act requires that no more than sixty percent of the
board of directors be affiliated with the Adviser, so as to help assure the
independence of the board. 3 The directors must annually approve the
advisory agreement between the mutual fund and the Adviser. 4
Additionally, the Investment Advisers Act applies to the advisory
contract entered into between an investment adviser and an investment
company.
State laws give shareholders of corporations various rights which
reflect traditional notions of corporate democracy. As an additional
safeguard against self-dealing by the Adviser, the Act accords voting
powers to mutual fund shareholders beyond those required by state
corporation law.86 For instance, the management contract must be
approved initially by a majority of the mutual fund's voting shares; 7
subsequent changes to the contract also must be approved by
shareholders. 8 In addition, the Act requires that shareholders elect a
board of directors. Section 16(a) generally prohibits any person from
serving as a director unless elected by a majority of the mutual fund's
voting shares. An exception to this requirement, however, permits
vacancies in the board to be filled in "any otherwise legal manner" if,
82. Some contracts are technically "management" contracts under which the manager makes
buying and selling decisions subject to report to the board of directors or trustees. Others are
technically "advisory" contracts in which the manager makes recommendations to the board.
83. Section 80a-10(a) requires that at least 40% of the board of directors of a registered
investment company consist of individuals who are not "interested persons," as defined in § 80a-
2(a)(19). This Article refers to such individuals as "independent directors."
84. This agreement should be approved by a majority vote of the shareholders of the mutual fund
or by a majority of the board of directors. § 80(a)-15(a)(2).
85. All of these forms of securities pools, unless grandfathered, must have a group of persons that
operate in a way similar to corporate directors. However, the requirement of shareholder voting has
decreased following the 1986 SEC interpretive position that the Act does not require annual
meetings to elect directors and related changes in state law following that pronouncement. John
Nuveen & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
78,383 (Nov. 18, 1986).
86. Section 1 requires that, with limited exceptions, every share of mutual fund stock must be
"voting stock and have equal rights with every other outstanding voting stock." § 80a-18.
87. § 80a-15(a); 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-l(b)(1) (1994). Shareholders are also required, under
§§ 80a-15(a)(3) and -15(a)(4), respectively, to approve a new management contract following the
board's termination of a management contract and to approve any assignment of the contract.
§§ 80a-15(a)(3), -15(a)(4). Under regulation 15a-4, this vote must occur within 120 days after the
termination or assignment. 17 C.F.R. § 270.15a-4.
88. § 80a-15(a); 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-l(b)(4). Either shareholders or the board must annually
approve multiyear advisory and principal underwriting contracts. §§ 80a-15(a), -15(b). In addition,
taken together, §§ 8(b) and 13(a) effectively require a mutual fund to adopt fundamental policies
with respect to certain key investment activities, which policies are changeable only by shareholder
vote. § 80a-8(b), -13(a).
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after the vacancy is filled, at least two-thirds of the directors are
shareholder-elected. 89
The Act contains numerous provisions designed to prevent self-
dealing and other conflicts of interest, maintain the integrity of fund
assets, and prevent the fund and its shareholders from paying excessive
fees. In addition, it also imposes broad prohibitions against transactions
by a mutual fund with its affiliates and joint transactions involving both
the mutual fund and its affiliates. Conflicts of interest regulated by the
Act can be divided into two types: (1) transactions in which the affiliated
persons are on the other side of the bargaining table from the mutual
fund; and (2) transactions in which the affiliated persons and the
investment companies are on the same side of the bargaining table. One
example of how the Act regulates the first type of transactions is section
17 of the Act, which prohibits affiliated persons of a mutual fund from
transacting business with that fund without advance approval from the
SEC.90
In addition to the Adviser, a mutual fund usually contracts with a
custodian, a transfer agent, a principal underwriter, a sales force, and
other third-party service providers to distribute fund shares. Under the
Act, principal underwriting contracts are subject to similar board
scrutiny. Such contracts and any renewals must be evaluated and
approved by the independent directors. 91 Multiyear contracts also must
be approved annually by the board or by a majority shareholder vote. 92
B. Three Models of the Contractual Fund
This section focuses on Contractual Fund Models in three
jurisdictions: Germany, Japan and United Kingdom. Although these
types of mutual funds may be constituted under either contract or trust
law, this Article groups them in the same categor. The difference
between "contract" or "trust" merely reflects two perspectives from
which to view the similar structural arrangement. From an
organizational perspective, a mutual fund that is orgtaized as a trust can
89. § 80a-16(a). In addition, under § 16(b), shareholders are required, with certain exceptions, to
elect independent directors for a period of three years following the assgnment of a management
contract, if the vacancy occurs in connection with the manager's reliance on the safe harbor provided
by § 15(f)(1)(A). § 80a-15(f)(1)(A).
90. For a discussion of the regulation of affiliated transactions, see, e.g, Robert Pozen, Financial
Institutions: Investment Management 297-320 (1977).
91. § 80a-15(c).
92. § 80a-l5(b)(1).
Vol. 69:927, 1994
Mutual Fund Structures
still be viewed as a contractual being as long as it is non-hierarchical in
structure.93 From a property rights perspective, a mutual fund organized
under a contract may involve the "trust" concept. Since the Investment
Pool of a mutual fund has to be segregated from both the Adviser and the
investors, it often conjures up the trust metaphor.94
The term "Contractual Fund," contrasted with "Corporate Fund,"
emphasizes the structural differences between decentralization and
centralization. The term "Contractual Fund" captures this important
feature of decentralization because "the nature of contract was to
disperse decision making widely."9' It is important to note that the term
"contract" is used in a broader sense, in much the same way that
economists would use that term.96 For example, we enforce the terms of
a trust arrangement even though its beneficiaries had no say in their
framing. This arrangement can be considered as a contract because its
value is reflected in price.
1. The German Model
In Germany, the Domestic Investment Company Act (KAGG) governs
the organization and supervision of mutual funds. The principal
regulatory body charged with the application and implementation of this
law is the German Federal Banking Commission (BAKred). The
BAKred's principal duties are the supervision of management companies,
including the determination of the necessary qualifications of the two
93. Note that the creation of a business trust in some states of the United States is regulated by
statute. See, e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 182 (Law. Co-op. 1987). For these business trusts, the
"corporate" requirements such as a board of directors still apply. § 80a-2(a)(20)(h). Since these
trusts are characterized by centralized management and control, they should not be considered as
Contractual Funds; rather, they can be regarded as a type of the Corporate Fund.
94. The division of the legal and equitable interest is unique to trusts. A trust is a "fiduciary
relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title to the property is held
to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another person, which arises as a result
of a manifestation of an intention to create it." Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2 (1959). As
indicated by the definition, the trustee holds the legal title of the property for the benefit of another
person, who has an equitable interest in the trust.
95. James Willard Hurst, Law and Economic Growth: The Legal History of the Lumber Industry
in Wisconsin 333 (1964). The term "contractual" fund is preferable to "trust" fund. For instance, it
was argued that the concept of trust is not helpful for understanding commercial relations compared
to a more calculating behavior paradigm. See Oliver Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and
Economic Organization, 36 J.L. Econ. 453 (1993).
96. To an economist, an implied contract is one that is enforced through marketplace mechanisms
such as reputation effects rather than in a court. For a discussion of the different conceptions about
"contracet" between lawyers and economists, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of
Corporation Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1549, 1549-50 (1989).
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required managing directors of such companies. It also closely
supervises the activities of these companies and the establishment and
operation of the individual funds they establish.97
Mutual funds in Germany have to be constituted according to contract
law-in other words, as a mutual fund managed by a management
company.9 Under this scheme, the investor acquiiing a mutual fund
share enters into a contract with a manager whereby he acquires a
participation in a certain asset pool. The management company is the
entity that issues shares in the asset pool, and the investor is entitled to
require the repurchase of those units by the manager.99 The management
company must keep the fund's assets separate from its own assets and
those of other funds it controls.
For a better understanding of the structure of German mutual funds, it
may be helpful to recall that the German Model of investment funds is
not based on the U.S. Corporate Fund Model. As Car] Hardenberg notes,
[T]he German concept may be described as a contractual type of
arrangement where the money contributed by the unit holder and
the securities bought therewith do not form part of the investment
company's own assets but are treated as separate finds bought by
the investment company.., in the form of fractional co-ownership
(securities funds) for the unit holder."°
Such a collection of segregated assets, called Sondervermoegen, is a
separate estate; it has no legal personality or existence.' Unlike
97. See World's Investment Fund, supra note 50, at 101.
98. The manager of a mutual fund is generally a corporation founded by a group of experienced
investment advisors who are the sole shareholders of the management company. The manager has
its own equity capital arising solely from the subscriptions of its shareholders. A manager may be
organized only as a stock corporation or as a limited company. Pursuant to German law the manager
is called a Kapitalanlagegesellschaft (translated as "investment company"). Even if they are
organized, which is the rule, as GmbH, they must have a two-tier structure like any AG. In other
words, in addition to a management board they must have a superviso-y board. An investment
company must have a minimum registered share capital of DM5m. See generally Jurgen Baur,
Investmentgesetze: Kommentar zum Gesetz fiber Kapitalanlagegesellschaften (KAGG) und zum
Gesetz fiber den Vertrieb ausllindischer Investmentanteile (AusllnvestmG) (1970).
99. In Germany, pure closed-end funds, in which the investor enjoys -io such right, may not be
organized. In addition, it is impractical to organize a corporate mutual fund. This is primarily
because German corporate law is based on the concept of fixed par value saares. See Bruce Butler &
Michael Thoma, The Role of the Depotbankfor a Mutual Fund Doing Business in Germany, 26 Bus.
Law. 1604 (1971).
100. Carl Graf Hardenberg, Amendment of German Investment Fund Laws, 18 Int'l Bus. Law.
224,224 (1990).
101. Union-Investment Gesellschaft m.b.H., Investment Company Act Release No. 12,863, 47
Fed. Reg. 57,179 (Dec. 1, 1982).
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investment companies in the U.S., it is an unincorporated collection of
assets. It has no employees, cannot transact business, and can neither sue
nor be sued. The assets have to be kept with, and must be supervised by,
a custodian bank-called Depotbank-which must be a German banking
institution subject to the supervision of the BAKred.1°2 These two
devices-the creation of a Sondervermoegen and the appointment of a
Depotbank-are the primary legal safeguards for investors of a German
fund. 3 All money invested becomes part of the Sondervermoegen
which is safeguarded by the Depotbank. The investor does not become a
shareholder of the manager but has merely a joint interest in the
Sondervermoegen, represented by a certificate.
The management company, as the enterprise organizing and managing
the segregated assets, conducts transactions in its own name but for the
investors' account. The custodian bank is responsible for the
safekeeping of the fund's assets. In addition, it sells and redeems
certificates representing an interest in the Sondervermoegen.'°  The
custodian bank acts solely in the interest of investors, but is subject to
instructions by the manager unless these instructions are in violation of
applicable law or the conditions of the contract with the investors. The
appointment of such a bank requires approval by the regulatory
agency-BAKred. In addition, the BAKred may under certain
circumstances order the appointment of a custodian.
German law provides substitute safeguards for independent directors.
It imposes a duty on management to act in the interest of fund
shareholders, and it provides for independent review of management by
the fund's custodian bank and by the BAKred, both of which may bring
suit against the manager for management's failure to so act. The BAKred
may also dismiss a manager who is unfit professionally or who violates
laws regulating mutual funds.0 5
2. The Japanese Model
The primary law governing investment trusts, the functional
equivalents of mutual funds in Japan, is the Securities Investment Trust
102. In addition, a manager is required to qualify as a banking institution and is therefore subject
to all banking supervisory regulations. In practice, the most important requirement is the
appointment of two qualified individual managers, who must not simultaneously be linked to the
custodian bank. See World's Investment Fund, supra note 49, at 101.
103. Butler & Thoma, supra note 99, at 1604-05.
104. Id. at 1605.
105. World's Investment Fund, supra note 50, at 102.
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Law.1 16 The law sets standards for the licensing and operation of the
investment trust management company, describes the rights of
beneficiaries, specifies terms to be set forth in a "contract of trust"
between the management company and the trustee, provides for
supervision of the management company, and requires the establishment
of a self-regulated Investment Trust Association.0 7
A license from the Ministry of Finance is required before a company
may engage in the business of investment trust management. In
reviewing applications for licenses, the Ministry will consider whether
(1) the applicant is sufficiently qualified to engage in management of an
investment trust in light of its personnel structure and experience in
securities investment; (2) the applicant's business prospects are
sufficiently bright; and (3) the applicant's engagement in the investment
trust business is "necessary and appropriate in light of the existing
condition of the securities investment trust business and the securities
markets." In addition, the applicant must show that he has at least 50
million Japanese Yen in capital.'08
Mutual funds in Japan are of the contractual type. A mutual fund
comprises three primary parties: a management company, a trust
company, and the investors. Under the Japanese investment trust
scheme, the manager gives direction for the management of trust
properties, while the trust company administers and keeps custody of the
properties. The manager and the trustee enter into a trust agreement in
accordance with a trust deed approved by the Ministry of Finance.
The manager has a fiduciary responsibility in relation to the fund
assets. Its main responsibilities include executing trust deeds,
concluding investment trust agreements with trustees, issuing beneficiary
certificates which are authenticated by the trustee, and giving directions
to the trustee for investment of the mutual fund.'09 The trustee of a
mutual fund must be a trust company or bank engaged in the trust
business, which requires a license. The benefits accruing from trusts
established under these arrangements are distributed among, and
106. It should be made clear that investment trusts in Japan are unique to Japan. Professor Hideki
Kanda, a law professor at Tokyo University and head of an advisory commission on mutual funds,
recently commented that Japanese investment trusts are structured so they are similar to a deposit,
with a face value and an expected fixed return. James Stermgold, A New Leaffor Japan's Mutual
Funds?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1994, at F13.
107. See World's Investment Fund, supra note 50, at 106.
108. Id. at 107.
109. The Investment Trusts Association in Japan, Investment Trusts in Japan 6 (1990)
[hereinafter Japan Trusts].
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acquired by, the investors. Cash and other assets are transferred to the
custody of the trust company, and the funds thus acquired are given the
status of unincorporated independent trust property.!10
3. The British Model
The mutual funds industry in the United Kingdom is regulated by a
system of controls established under the Financial Services Act of
1986."' Conceived originally as a system of self-regulation, it has
become instead a quasi-statutory model of detailed and rigid rules. The
Department of Trade and Industry is responsible for supervision of the
regime."' It has delegated most of its powers to a non-governmental
body known as the Securities and Investment Board (SIB). The SIB has
produced a rule book which is designed to achieve investor protection,
containing detailed requirements for players in the financial services
arena. Five industry associations known as Self-Regulating
Organizations (SROs) have been established. All persons who
participate in the operation or marketing of investment funds in the
United Kingdom are regulated.
In the United Kingdom, the functional equivalent of a mutual fund is
called a "unit trust," which is constituted under trust law." 3 A unit trust
is a collective investment scheme with property held in trust for
participants and is typically evidenced by a trust deed between a trustee
and a manager. To qualify as an "authorized unit trust," a trust has to
comply with detailed regulations which cover such matters as its
constitution, the powers and duties of the manager and the trustee,
scheme particulars, investment and borrowing powers, and pricing and
valuation."'
The manager manages the assets of the unit trust, but the trustee has
custody and control of it and holds it in trust for the participants. The
manager and the trustee must be independent of each other. The trustee
bears the prime responsibility for ensuring that the manager adheres to
the statutory and other rules in his administration of the scheme." 5
110. Id. at 11.
111. See World's Investment Fund, supra note 50, at 88.
112. Id.
113. Investment funds in the U.K. are mainly comprised of "investment trusts" and "unit trusts."
An investment trust is a closed-end company with its share listed on the International Stock
Exchange of the U.K. and the Republic of Ireland. See id. at 88-89.
114. Id. at89.
115. John W. Vaughan, The Regulation of Unit Trusts 38 (1990).
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Physical custody of the documents of title to the scheme's property may
be entrusted to a third party by the trustee, and such person may also
become the registered holder of the property. Restrictions on the power
to delegate exist to protect the trust." 6
C. Major Structural Differences
Now that the structural rules governing the Corporate Fund and the
Contractual Fund have been introdued, it is opportune to summarize the
structural differences between the two. The focal point here is how these
two funds differ in allocating decision-making power and control among
the three economic actors (e.g., the Adviser, the Monitor, and the
investors). In addition, we are interested in determining what conditions
are necessary for the exercise of such decision-making power and
control. It is important to note that, since the Corporate Fund and the
Contractual Fund are driven by different organizational designs and
underlying rationales, the differences summarized here are stylized. As
such, they carry limitations: to highlight the structural differences,
simplifying observations must be made. In fact, because the
globalization of securities markets is beginning to put American mutual
funds in competition with foreign mutual funds, the structural differences
of these models appear to be converging."'
1. Pool-Centered Versus Adviser-Centered Regime
In both the Corporate Fund and the Contractual Fund, the relation of
the Adviser to the Investment Pool is regulated to some degree, but the
result is quite different. In the case of the Corporate Fund, the operation
and structure of the Investment Pool is the focus and the board of
directors has the ultimate responsibility for coordination and
management of the mutual fund. Like an ordinary industrial corporation,
the Corporate Fund establishes a specialized decision control structure, a
decision hierarchy, in which the board ratifies and monitors the decision
initiatives of the manager and evaluates its performance." 8 Under this
structure, the Adviser invariably is required to "make investment
decisions.., and supervise[] the acquisition and disposition of securities
116. Id. at34.
117. See infra part VI.B.
118. For a discussion of the concept of decision hierarchy, see, e.g., Alchian & Demsetz, supra
note 61.
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by the fund, all in accordance with the Fund's investment objective[s]
and policies and under the general supervision of the Fund's Board of
Directors.",".9
As a business association the typical Corporate Fund is unique from
the moment of its inception. Promoters or sponsors ("Sponsor") 20
engaging in the mutual fund business are likely to proceed in a manner
different from promoters interested in establishing other types of
business associations. They may already be in the investment
management business through the X advisory company, licensed as an
investment adviser under the 1940 Investment Advisers Act. They will
try themselves, or through an affiliate or separate broker-dealers, to form
the Y mutual fund, owning its initial shares, often a minute fraction of
those which will eventually be issued. Together they will cause the
directors to be elected. The board of directors, including independent
directors, will review many contracts, including the investment advisory
contract. Eventually, it is the Y fund which will offer shares to the
public, but the actual management of that fund will be the work of the X
management company.' 2
In contrast, in the case of the Contractual Fund, the Adviser or its
equivalent' is the focus. The Contractual Fund is a contractual entity
which is not independent of its Sponsor or Adviser. It is more like a
proprietary financial product because its design and operation and
success or failure are entirely the responsibility of its Adviser. The
Contractual Fund is premised on the belief that the design and operation
of a fund and its success or failure are the responsibility of the Adviser."2
119. Emerging Markets Growth Fund, Inc., Prospectus 15 (Dec. 2, 1991).
120. The term "Sponsor" is not a defined term under the Act. According to common usage, the
Sponsor, or promoter, of a business organization performs a useful economic service. The Sponsor
contributes business imagination, plus the judgment and skill necessary to execute the idea. As the
entrepreneur, the Sponsor's function is to encounter risks and to confront uncertainty. For a
discussion of the role of the Sponsor in ordinary corporations, see William Cary & Melvin
Eisenberg, Corporations 130-40 (1990).
121. For instance, a group of engineers seeking their fortune in the electronics business normally
will form an electronics company and contribute their money and services in exchange for stock.
That company will be the organization through which they will manufacture and sell electronics
devices. They will hold shares in the company and, if they invite the public to join in financing the
business by purchasing stock, they will share their ownership with members of the public. See
generally James K. Sterrett I, Reward for Mutual Fund Sponsor Entrepreneurial Risk 58 Cornell
L.R. 195 (1973).
122. The counterpart of the Adviser in the Contractual Fund context is called the "Investment
Manager." See infra part VI.A.1.
123. For instance, the Financial Services Regulation of the United Kingdom provides that:
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As such, the Adviser should not be subjected to the organizational
control of any hierarchical superiors. The Adviser is responsible for all
services necessary for the operation of the mutual fund, with the possible
exception of the custodial services. The Adviser, therefore, must either
perform these services itself or contract with third parties to provide
them. From an investor's perspective, a Contractual Fund is like a "pay-
as-you-go" vehicle. Most costs of operating the fund and distributing its
shares will be financed by the Adviser out of a pre-set fee or its own
resources.
2. Hierarchical Discretion Versus Contractual Rules
Mutual funds are relatively recent innovations, but the main problem
that they deal with-the optimal control of discretionary power
possessed by those who act on behalf of others-is an old one. Since
discretionary power is susceptible to abuse, it may be efficient in many
circumstances to counteract it with rules. The major feature of a rule is
that it leaves no discretionary power to the decision-maker. In other
words, a rule prevents the use of the decision-maker's own information,
which may or may not be private or superior information. Rules are
impersonal and may involve a loss of useful information.
In regulating the behavior and decisions of agents, what is the perfect
mix of rules and discretion? Every business association is characterized
by a certain mix of rules and discretion. 4 A few scholars have studied
the comparative merits of rules versus discretion in the context of
business organizations. For instance, Oliver Williamson noted that debt
governance works mainly out of rules, while equity governance allows
much discretion." He argued for the use of debt (rule) to finance
redeployable assets and the use of equity (discretion) to finance non-
redeployable assets."2 6
It is the duty of the manager to manage the property of the [mutual fund] and it is his right and
duty to make decisions as to the constituents of that property from time to time in accordance
with... the trust deed, [the laws and regulations], and the most recently published [prospectus].
Financial Services (Authorized Unit Trust Schemes) Regulation § 4.01 (1988), in Vaughan, supra
note 115, at 34.
124. For example, Lewis & Sappington argued that rules arise when ta agent has "countervailing
incntives" to misrepresent private information. See Tracy R. Lewis & Sappington, Inflexible Rules
in Incentive Problems, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 69 (1989).
125. This is because a rule-governed regime may force liquidation in the event of a breach of the
rules. See Oliver Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corporate Goverrance, 43 J. Fin. 567 (1988).
126. Id. at 575-82.
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Two examples will illustrate this point. One type of business
arrangement characterized by hierarchical discretion is the board of
directors of an ordinary corporation, which interposes a centralized
management system. Under such a model the board of directors is
charged with open-ended responsibilities such as reducing management
shirking and evaluating the management's performance. In contrast, a
business arrangement characterized by contractual rules is the "indenture
trustee" associated with a bond offerings.'27 The function of the
indenture trustee is to monitor the bond issuer's compliance with the
indenture on behalf of corporate and municipal bondholders. 2 '
The Corporate Fund and the Contractual Fund also have different
rules/discretion mixes. The Corporate Fund is characterized by broad
delegation of discretionary authority. As discussed above, the board has
primary responsibility under the Act for evaluating the reasonableness of
a number of different fees and charges for investment advice,
distribution, and administration. The Act and its rules also make the
board responsible for policing various operational conflicts, and gives
the board the authority to permit various types of transactions to go
forward without prior Commission review of individual exemptive
applications. As such, the board of the Corporate Fund is empowered
with considerable discretionary power and is charged with the
responsibility for making many business judgments.
Contrary to the Corporate Fund, the Contractual Fund relies more on
rules than on discretion. The typical mutual fund contract comprises
standard terms or rules, with allowances for variations (i.e., discretion)
only in exceptional cases. To ensure the performance of the contract
terms, the Monitor (e.g., trustee or custodian) is charged with the
responsibility to "take reasonable care to ensure that the [fund] is
administered by the manager in accordance with [the management
contract, regulations, and the prospectus]."' 29  Hence, instead of
interposing a hierarchical board, the contractual fund interposes a
Monitor who takes instructions from the Adviser and simultaneously
monitors the Adviser's performance.
127. The role played by a bondholder trustee is governed by the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-bbb (1976) (setting forth requirements for bonds, debentures, notes, and other debt
securities offered to the public by mail or in interstate commerce and requiring a qualifying
indenture and trustee).
128. For the evolution of the trustee's standard of conduct, see Victor Brudney & Marvin A.
Chirelstein, Corporate Finance 139-50 (3d ed. 1987).
129. Vaughan, supra note 115, at 34.
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Procedures for the replacement of the Adviser (or the manager in
Contractual Fund jurisdictions) will illustrate this difference. With
respect to the Corporate Fund, the board of directors is required to
review the management contract annually. However, no decision rules
or guidelines are provided to the directors. In a British unit trust, by
contrast, the trustee may serve written notice on the manager causing its
removal only in one of the six events stipulated in the regulations. They
include, for instance, the manager going into liquidation or a receiver
being appointed for any part of the manager's activities. 3 In addition,
instead of making the trust responsible for policing various operational
conflicts, Contractual Fund jurisdictions often impose direct
requirements on prohibited or permitted transactions. Thus, the Adviser
or its equivalent normally would not engage in activities that rely on
rules conditioned on the Monitor's oversight.
3. Investor Participation in Fund Governance
When ownership of a business organization is shared among a class of
investors, a method for collective decision-making, such as voting, is
often devised.13' Voting serves two distinct purposes. First, voting is
most commonly thought of as a method of making allocation decisions,
that is, choosing among various alternatives ("Issue Voting"). In
contractual terms, it is used to supply or renegotiate substantive terms in
the contract. The second type of voting serves as a means of controlling
the behavior of agents ("Election Voting"). 3 1 Viewed from a contractual
perspective, the right to vote in a mutual fund is the right to make all
130. One legal commentator argued that the regulation "does not seem to impose a duty on the
trustee to remove the manager in the event of one of these situations arising, but it is likely that one
exists nonetheless." Id. at 36.
131. As Richard Buxbaum notes, "there are conceivable forms of investment in which owners
would have no participation rights. The pure trust... is a possible example." Richard M. Buxbaum,
The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1671, 1672 (1985).
Buxbaum goes on to note that "[t]he fullest argument for this passive form is that of G. Roth, Das
Treuhandmodell Des Investmentrechts 172, 332 (1972) (arguing that the pure trust, which involves a
higher fiduciary responsibility and recognizes the need for external legal mforcement, better controls
management than the corporate form of ownership with its myth of small investors supervising and
controlling management.)." Id. at 1672 nA.
132. Shareholder participation is an important tool in monitoring managers. For example, a
properly functioning "market for voice," which in turn is predicated upon effective shareholders'
voting rights in a merger or takeover context, is an essential underpinnng of the entire efficiency-
monitoring concept. See Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1981).
Vol. 69:927, 1994
Mutual Fund Structures
decisions not othenvise provided by the bilateral contract.'33 Since
elected agents (e.g., board of directors) typically have different interests
than the electorate, the threat of removal potentially limits the divergence
between a representative's actions and her electorates' interests.1
34
To what extent are the investors of a Corporate Fund afforded such
participation rights? The Corporate Fund provides extensive Issue
Voting and Election Voting 35 because state laws give shareholders of
corporations various voting rights. 36  Furthermore, as an additional
safeguard against self-dealing by the manager, the Act grants voting
powers to mutual fund shareholders beyond those required by state
corporation law.
With respect to Issue Voting, management contracts must be approved
initially by a majority of the mutual fund's voting shares; 37 subsequent
changes to the management contract also must be approved by
shareholders.13 1 In addition, taken together, sections 8(b) and 13(a)
effectively require a mutual fund to adopt fundamental policies with
respect to certain key investment activities, and these policies may be
changed only by shareholder vote. 139  With respect to Election Voting,
the Act requires that shareholders elect a board of directors. 4 '
133. Although "[v]otes may not look much like contracts, the structure of voting . . . is
contractual." Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 52, at 63.
134. See Buxbaum, supra note 131, at 1671-78.
135. Section 18 requires that, with limited exceptions, every share of mutual fund stock must be
"voting stock and have equal voting rights with every other outstanding voting stock." 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-18(i) (1934).
136. The Act also imposes these rights on non-corporate forms such as trusts. All of these forms
of securities pools, unless grandfathered, must have a group of persons that operate in a way similar
to corporate directors. However, the requirement of shareholder voting has decreased following the
1986 SEC interpretive position that the Act does not require annual meeting to elect directors and
related changes in state law following that pronouncement. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., supra note 85.
137. § 80a-15(a); 17 C.F.RL § 270.12b-l(b)(1). Shareholders are also required, under § 80(a)-
15(a)(3) and -15(a)(4) respectively, to approve a new management contract following the board's
termination of a management contract and to approve any assignment of the contract. Under
regulation 15a-4, this vote must occur within 120 days after the board termination or assignment. 17
C.F.R. § 270.15a-4.
138. § 80a-15(a); 17 C.F.1L § 270.12b-l(b)(4). In addition, either the shareholders or the board
must annually approve multiyear advisory and principal underwriting contracts. § 80a-15(a)(2)-
(b)(1).
139. § 80a-8(b), -13(a). In general, the activities that must be governed by a fundamental
investment policy deal with those elements of capital structure, permissible investments, and
investment strategies that significantly affect the investment characteristics and the risk-reward
profile of the securities issued by a mutual fund. See SEC Report, supra note 12, at 261-62.
140. Section 16(a) generally prohibits any person from serving as a director unless elected by a
majority of the mutual fund's voting shares. § 80a-16(a)
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Compared to the Corporate fund, Contractual Funds depend much less
on investor voting. However, the role of investor voting varies with each
jurisdiction. For instance, investors in Germany 14' ;and Japan 42 do not
have voting rights. In the United Kingdom, investors of unit trusts have
some limited voting rights. Specifically, British investors at a duly
convened meeting are allowed to vote on four things: (a) to sanction any
modification, alteration, or addition to the provisions of the trust deed
which shall be agreed to by the trustee and the manager; (b) to approve a
manager's departure from a policy, a statement of which has been
included in scheme particulars (i.e., prospectus); (c) to remove the
manager; and (d) to approve an arrangement for the amalgamation of the
scheme with another body or scheme.
143
In the absence of a comprehensive collective decision-making
mechanism, the parties must use other means to fill contractual gaps and
resolve disputes. One such means is provided by the bilateral contract
between the Adviser and the investors, which is more detailed in the case
of the Contractual Fund than that of the Corporate Fund.'" Another is
found in the "vetting system" in Contractual Fund jurisdictions, which
serves to ensure the integrity of mutual fund operation.
145
D. Comparative Institutional Analysis
The study of the economics of organizations has focused on several
questions: what determines the boundary between organizations and
markets? How does what happens within organizations differ from what
happens between actors in markets? Ronald Coase provided the classic
answers to these questions: markets and organizations differ in the
manner in which transactions occur, and the boundary between the two is
determined so as to minimize transactions costs.146 What lay beyond the
learning and haggling costs that, according to Coase, are a major
component of market transactions? Oliver Williamson has offered the
deepest and most far-reaching analysis of these costs.
141. See World's Investment Fund, supra note 50, at 101-102.
142. See Japan Trusts, supra note 109, at 6.
143. See Vaughan, supra note 115, at 76.
144. See infra part VI.A.1.
145. See infra part VI.D.1.
146. See generally Coase, supra note 38.
147. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985); Oliver
E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (1975); see also infra
notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
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In addition to transaction costs economics, other theories offer
alternative theoretical perspectives from which to view the firm. For
instance, the principal-agent theory recognizes conflicts of interest
between different actors, formalizing these conflicts through the
inclusion of observability problems and asymmetries of information.
This theory develops the idea that these agency problems are foreseen,
and are addressed ex ante through efforts to align the incentives of
managers and shareholders.'48 Another school of theorists views the firm
simply as a nexus of contracts. Viewing the firm as a nexus of contracts
draws attention to the fact that contractual relations are an essential
aspect of the firm.
49
Recent research on the theory of the firm begins with the premise of
incomplete contracts: with complete contracts, all contingencies are
taken care of, and it makes little difference whether the transaction
occurs within a firm or between firms. The transaction cost treatment of
the firm has been developed more rigorously in the context of
comparative incomplete contracting. For instance, viewing the firm as a
set of property rights, Grossman and Hart focus attention on the role of
physical, that is, non-human, assets in a contractual relationship. Just as
traditional theory emphasized the "residual rights to profits" that were
vested in the ownership of firms, they emphasize the "residual rights of
control" that are vested in ownership. 50 Another perspective emphasizes
that unforeseen contingencies provide different incentives to various
parties to take actions; however, the costs and benefits of taking action
may be affected by the organizational structure. Thus, organizational
forms can be viewed as forms of making commitments.''
148. For a discussion of incentive arrangements adopted in the mutual fund context, see infra part
IV.B.3.
149. The nexus of contract theory is often associated with Jensen and Meckling. See Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 56, at 310-11 (1976).
150. See generally Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:
A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 691 (1986).
151. As North writes, "[a] commitment is credible in either of two senses, the motivational or the
imperative. A commitment is motivationally credible if the players continue to want to honor the
commitment at the time of performance. In this case it is incentive compatible and hence self-
enforcing. It is credible in the imperative sense if the player cannot act otherwise because
performance is coerced or discretion is disabled." Douglass C. North, Institutions and Credible
Commitment, 149 J. Inst. & Theoretical Econ. 11, 13 (1993); see also Oliver E. Williamson,
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & Econ. 233
(1979).
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As discussed above, the trilateral structure of the mutual fund falls in
the mid-range of the corporation/contract continuum. 52 The Corporate
Fund is more centralized in decision-making fimction, while the
Contractual Fund disperses its decision-making function widely. Thus,
the Corporate Fund and the Contractual Fund represent two intermediate
forms of business organization that differ primarily in their degree of
contractual incompleteness.'53 This is because, compared with the
Contractual Fund, the Corporate Fund is a radically incomplete contract,
giving the board of directors considerable discretion to make business
judgments.54
As two intermediate forms of mutual funds, the Corporate Fund and
the Contractual Fund represent solutions to the problems of coordination
and motivation. These problems give rise to transaction costs that differ
depending on the nature of the transaction and the way that it is
organized.'55 Thus, this Article conducts a comparative institutional
analysis of the Corporate Fund and the Contractual Fund. Such analysis
is important because we cannot say one form of mutual fund is
"inefficient" unless the other form would do better for each person on
average across the circumstances in which it operates.
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING MUTUAL FUND
STRUCTURE
This part develops a unified framework to evaluate the comparative
merits of the Corporate Fund Model and the Contractual Fund Model.
Section A adopts the standard of hypothetical contracting to postulate a
bargaining between the Adviser and the Investors over how to allocate
monitoring functions to the Monitor. Section B examines the attributes
and constraints of contracting, taking into consideration the unique
features of mutual funds.
152. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
153. For a discussion of the relationship between contractual incompleteness and business
organizations, see Oliver E. Williamson, The Logic of Economic Organization 74 (1989).
154. The comparative merits between centralization and decentralization have long been a major
theme of organization and economics. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Symposium on Organizations
and Economics, J. Econ. Persp., Spring 1991, at 19. For a general discussion of the comparative
merits between concentration and diffusion of decision controls in business organizations, see, e.g.,
Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Owvnership and Control, 26 J.L. & Econ. 301
(1983).
155. See Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management 28-32
(1992).
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A. Hypothetical Contracting over Allocating Monitoring Functions
In the simple model of an Adviser-Investors contract, there is no place
for third-party control. The third party arises in response to the need for
contractual integrity. Allocation of third-party control thus becomes a
bargaining variable between the Adviser and the Investors. Since the
institutional details of the trilateral arrangement are shaped by
monitoring considerations,'56 this section isolates the monitoring element
from the other elements of the bargaining.
According to the standard of hypothetical contracting, we should
identify and adopt the arrangement that rationally and fully informed
parties would have adopted ex ante.57 In a hypothetical ex ante
contracting, rational and fully informed parties would recognize that
problems of information and collective action are likely to arise, and they
would therefore take these problems into account in allocating control
functions to the third party. The normative objective of my analysis is
efficiency, measured by the maximization of the ex post wealth of the
contracting parties.'58
The hypothetical bargaining approach is particularly fitting in the
mutual fund context because the two general arguments that can be used
to justify intervention-the imperfect information argument and the
externality argument-are not applicable in this context. First, mutual
funds operate in a very efficient and competitive market.'59 In the past
twenty years the SEC has developed standards for disclosing and
advertising fund performance and other information.1 60  These actions
have permitted the evolution of an information industry that tracks funds.
Specialized newsletters, for example, are published by a host of
organizations, and many financial and general interest publications
156. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92
Yale L.J. 49, 50 (1982).
157. This is the standard adopted by many corporate law scholars. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook
& Daniel R. Fisehel, The Corporate Contract, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1416, 1433 (1989).
158. See id. For a discussion of the concept of efficiency, see, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, An
Introduction to Law and Economics 7 (1989). In a sense, hypothetical contract arguments are not
really contractualist at all. A better term would be welfarism, for in the case of hypothetical
contracts it is to the welfare of the parties, and that alone, that one must look, in the absence of any
other basis for imputing an agreement to them. See Anthony T. Kronman, A Comment on Dean
Clark, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1748 (1989).
159. At the end of 1990 there were more than 3,108 mutual funds in the United States. These
funds offer similar services, with competitive fees. See ICI Fact Book, supra note 22, at 22.
160. 17 C.F.R. §§ 23(o), 2 3 (p), 29(x), 27(o). See, e.g., Advertising by Investment Companies,
Investment Company Act Release No. 16,245, 53 Fed. Reg. 3,868 (Feb. 10, 1988).
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provide extensive coverage and analysis of mutual funds.' 6' Moreover,
the mutual fund market has a heavy institutional component. Recent
statistics indicate that institutional investors purchased more than one
third of the total number of all mutual fund shares. 6 2 Since mutual funds
must offer shares on the same terms to all investors, unsophisticated
investors can free ride on the efforts of sophisticated investors.
Second, mutual funds are not characterized by significant externalities
or third-party effects. In the mutual fund context, the bargaining
between the Adviser and the investors produces minimal third-party
effects. For example, the possibility that the bilateral bargaining will
have externalities with respect to bondholders is low. This is because a
mutual fund may not issue debt securities and may not borrow money
except in certain circumstances.163
The lack of third-party effects in the mutual fund context stands in
sharp contrast to the externalities which can be produced by the
interaction of the bondholders, stockholders and management of a
publicly-held corporation. In the context of a publicly-held corporation,
the contractual structure consists of two separate contracts, one between
bondholders and stockholders, and one between stockholders and
management. Since the purposes of the various parties are seldom
consistent, coherent interpretation of interlocking terms is hindered and
may cause damages to bondholders.'" In the mutual fund context,
however, because the Adviser-Investors contract does not have
externalities with respect to third parties such as bondholders, the
161. Specialized newsletters are published by a host of organizations. Investors can get
information in reference works like Morningstar Mutual Fund Sourcebook or Standard &
Poor's/Lipper Mutual Fund Profiles. For an introduction to one of the leading publishers, see Barry
Vinocur & Robert N. Veres, Mutual Funds the Morningstar Way, Investment Advisor, Jan. 1993, at
40 (Morningstar has established itself as the prominent mutual fund data source.).
In addition, many financial publications such as the Wall Street Journal and Money Magazine
provide extensive coverage, including periodic rankings of performance. and fund expense ratio.
Even general interest publications regularly publish statistics on mutual fund performance. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Times, How Mutual Funds Perforned, Jan. 9, 1993, at Y32 (publishing a table showing the
1992 performance of more than 3,000 stock and bond funds).
162. At the end of 1990, 34% of all mutual funds were held by institutions, up from the 32%
share they held at the end of 1989. See ICIFact Book, supra note 22, at 53.
163. A mutual fund may not issue debt securities. Nor may it borrow money except (1) for
temporary purposes in amounts not in excess of 5% of the total assets of Ile company at the time of
the loan or (2) from a bank, provided that immediately after any such borrowing the investment
company maintains 300% percent asset coverage for the loan and for any other borrowing. See
§§ 80a-18(f), (g).
164. See Lewis A. Komhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment
on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1449, 1458-59 (1989).
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Adviser and Investors bear the full costs of their decisions and reap all
the gains.
If we take efficiency as a positive principle, the structure and
governance of a mutual fund are simply efficient choices made by both
the Adviser and the Investors. The take-it-or-leave-it form can be
regarded as bargaining for an outcome, although not necessarily
bargaining for a specific process. The investors only assign to the third
party those things they cannot do or decide for themselves. In other
words, rational parties will weigh the benefits of employing a third party
against its costs. It is inevitable that some amount of shirking or self-
dealing will occur on the Adviser level. The question is whether these
costs can be cut by the second-tier agent-the Monitor-or whether that
agent is not itself more costly.
It should be noted that, although the contractual view of mutual funds
provides a useful framework of analysis, adopting a contractual view
does not entail accepting any particular position of mandatory rules. For
instance, it is possible to adopt a contractual framework to state reasons
for supporting mandatory rules.161 In fact, as will be demonstrated
below, it is advisable to adopt mandatory rules for mutual funds within
the contractual framework. 66  In addition, most of the bargaining
elements are interactive and interrelated. If the Monitor is allocated with
more power, then it follows that the Investors may have less control over
the process; and vice versa.
Despite the global scope of the subject matter, this Article assumes
that the "venue" of the bargaining is the United States securities and
mutual fund market, subject to the bargaining attributes and constraints
of the U.S. marketplace. This assumption is fitting because this Article
evaluates mutual funds from an American perspective, and will consider
below two Contractual Fund proposals intended to improve the
governance structure of mutual funds in the United States. 67
B. Contracting Attributes and Constraints
Hypothetical bargaining requires an examination of context. As
pointed out by Ronald Coase, there are costs to carrying out transactions,
and these transaction costs differ depending on the nature of the
165. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1820 (1989).
166. See infra part V.B.2; parts VI.C.-D.
167. See infra part VI.B.
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transaction and on the way a mutual fund is organi2ed.' This section
considers the attributes of the underlying transactions in the mutual fund
context in order to devise value-maximizing governance arrangements.
1. Organizational Capital and Fund Management
Modem theories of institutional economics recognize the role that
organizational capital plays in influencing the monitoring structure of a
business firm. 69 Thus it is important to examine the organizational
capital of the mutual funds-the financial assets provided by the
Investors and the human assets offered primarily by the Adviser. In
addition, it is desirable to examine the nature of business that the mutual
fund conducts.
a. Liquid Capital
First, consider the asset specificity of the mutual fund. Asset
specificity refers to the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to
alternative uses without sacrificing productive value. 70 From a property
rights perspective, the "firm" of the mutual fund can be viewed as a set
of financial assets.' Oliver Williamson was the first to recognize that
transaction costs may assume particular importance in situations where
economic actors make relationship-specific investments-investments to
some extent specific to a particular set of individuals or assets. He
argued that holders of such investments are vulnerable to the hold-up
problem. 73 That is why, in Williamson's view, bringing a transaction
168. See generally Coase, supra note 38.
169. See Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 155, at 29-34.
170. Id. at 30-31. The concept of asset specificity has wide applications in the analysis of
business firms. For an application of asset specificity to the structure of corporate law firms, see,
e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm, 41 Stan. L.
Rev. 567 (1989) (examining the organizational structure of a corporate law firm in light of its
dominance of human capital).
171. One way to resolve the question of how integration changes incentives is spelled out in
recent literature that views the firm as a set of property rights. This is because ownership of an asset
goes together with the possession of control over that asset. See generally Bengt R. Holmstr~m &
Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, in I Handbook of Industrial Organization 61 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
172. Williamson argues that the principal dimension on which transaction cost economics relies is
the condition of asset specificity. See Williamson, supra note 153, at 69-70.
173. For example, utilities firm A has to locate and invest in an electricity generating plant
adjacent to a coal mine belonging to supplier B. In Williamson's view, bringing a transaction from
the market into an industrial organization-the phenomenon of vertical integration-mitigates this
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from the market into a vertical integration mitigates such opportunistic
behavior.
In contrast, mutual funds consist primarily of liquid assets rather than
relationship-specific assets.1 74 As a matter of law, a mutual fund may not
invest more than fifteen percent of its assets in illiquid securities.
1 75
Liquid assets are non-specific assets that can easily be redeployed to
alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive
value. This is because external markets will provide a guide to the
parties' opportunity costs even after the relationship is underway. Thus,
for mutual fund investors, liquidity is a virtue because no one wants to be
"locked in."
b. Human Capital
Secondly, consider the human assets of the mutual fund. Up to now it
has been assumed that mutual funds consist of financial assets only.
However, a business firm can be a meaningful entity even if its
ownership of physical or financial assets is quite limited. Examples
include investment banks and law firms. In addition to financial assets,
the mutual fund also consists of other intangible assets such as goodwill
and reputation. The Adviser is the one who actually conducts the
productive activities of the mutual fund. In other words, a mutual fund is
the embodiment of the efforts, expenses, and goodwill of its Adviser.
Thus, it is fair to say that the Adviser carries the institutional reputation
of the mutual fund it creates.
176
c. The Nature of Fund Management
Thirdly, consider the internal organizational structure of the mutual
fund. Mutual fund "management" consists primarily of investing and
reinvesting money according to a stated policy. The fundamental service
opportunistic behavior and improves investment incentives. This is because once the parties sink
their investments, they are to some extent locked into each other. See Oliver E. Williamson, The
Economic Institutions of Capitalism, 21-30 (1985).
174. Such assets should be distinguished from physical assets which are more illiquid and
relationship-specific. Id. at 21-30.
175. In the SEC's view, an illiquid security is any security that cannot be disposed of within seven
days in the ordinary course of business at approximately the amount at which the fund has valued the
instrument. See Guide 4 to Form N-lA, Revision of Guidelines to Form N-lA, Investment
Company Act Release No. 18,612 [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,930
(Mar. 12, 1992). No explicit liquidity standards are applicable to closed-end investment companies.
176. See infra part VI.A.1.
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an Adviser offers is expert assistance in the selection of investments
through which investors can achieve their investment objectives. The
Adviser must acquire information and employ a reasonable decision-
making process when determining whether to act on the information.
Within the internal organization of the entity acting as Adviser, such
specialized knowledge relating to portfolio management is concentrated
in a small number of people. As such, unlike large, complex
organizations, these investment decisions do not go through a "decision
hierarchy" before they are approved and finalized.'77 The internal
organization of the Adviser bears out this hypothesis: the portfolio
management of most mutual funds is conducted by a single portfolio
manager, and only a few are run by committees.
7 1
Due to the specialized nature of such knowledge, the small number of
persons who possess such knowledge are the ones who actually make the
investment decisions. Mutual funds often market their investment
vehicles by using the individual portfolio managers' track record.'79 In
fact, mutual funds investors are often advised to watch for a change in
177. For instance, publicly-held corporations are one organizational form that is characterized by
a decision hierarchy. In 1932, Berle and Means announced the separation of ownership and control
in American industry. They reported that owners of major corporations had become atomistic
shareholders lacking the ability, skill, information, and often the incentives to monitor the
performance of specialized managers. Thereafter, the corporate governance debate became a search
for a mechanism to bridge the separation of ownership and control by holding managers accountable
for their performance. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property (1932). Alfred Chandler argues that the increasing corplexity of business was a
more important cause of separation than the dispersion of stock holdings. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.,
Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism 232 (1990).
178. There are a few funds managed by committee, or at least by a few money managers who split
up the assets and are each responsible for their portion. See, e.g., Thomas Watterson, Spurning the
Manager in Favor of a Committee, Boston Globe, Aug. 11, 1991, at 38.
This system can be justified on efficiency grounds: In a non-comp'ex organization, specific
knowledge important for decision management and control is concentrated in one or more agents.
Because the bare facts contained in such specialized knowledge are often uninterpretable, it is
difficult and costly to transfer or communicate such knowledge to others. See, e.g., Fama & Jensen,
supra note 154, at 305-07; Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revi.-ited, in The Nature of the
Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development, 159, 175 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter
eds., 1991). Hence, concentration (or decentralization) of decision-making function represents
significant savings on information transmission within the organization of the manager. In addition,
confining investment decisions to a small number of individual portfolio managers enables the
manager to conduct performance measurement, establish accountabilit., and provide incentive
compensation more effectively.
179. However, there is no easy way to determine whether the individual portfolio manager who
compiled that record is still around. In an effort to address this concern, the SEC has recently
promulgated rules requiring closed-end funds to tell investors the names of those who manage the
funds. See Sandm Block, SEC Says Closed-End Mutual Funds Muwt Identify Managers for
Investors, Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1992, at A3.
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management; if successful managers leave a fund, then investors should
at least keep a closer eye on the performance of the fund until they are
comfortable with new portfolio managers. 8 ' Since it is very costly to
transfer such specialized knowledge to others, regulators should be
careful when considering whether or not to create a regulatory structure
which will permit an institutional superior or "higher-up" to interfere
with the productive activities of the Adviser.'8 '
d. Summary
The nature of the organizational capital of the mutual fund has
profound implications on its optimal monitoring structure. First, viewing
the mutual fund as a repository of reputation highlights the importance of
the Adviser in the organization of the mutual fund. Second, because
mutual funds consist primarily of financial assets and typically have
minimal lock-in effects, investors should be less concerned about post-
contractual opportunism on the part of the Adviser. Third, the
specialized nature of fund management suggests that a complex decision
hierarchy is not suitable for mutual funds. Therefore, it can be argued
that, in the absence of overriding concerns, the Adviser should be
permitted to share significant control over the operations of the mutual
fund. 182
2. Performance Observability
Managerial theory indicates that observability problems are created
when the firm's owners cannot easily observe the manager's
performance ex ante (or even expost).'83 The asymmetry of information
that results from this lack of observability can create various incentive
problems, such as moral hazard, because owners cannot contract for
behavior they cannot observe.'84
10. Investors of mutual funds have often been advised to keep "current" on who the portfolio
manager is. See, e.g., Jim Melloan, Want to Break Up with YourFund?, Worth, Apr. 1994, at 118.
181. For example, Demsetz points out that, "[r]oughly speaking (since other things also matter),
the vertical boundaries of a firm are determined by the economics of conservation of expenditures on
knowledge." Demsetz, supra note 178, at 173.
182. See infra part VI.A.
183. The source of this moral hazard or incentive problem is an asymmetry of information that
results because individual efforts cannot be observed and hence contracted upon. See Holmstr6m,
supra note 55, at 74.
184. See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 55.
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a. Total Return and Risk Level
How do observability problems affect the structure of mutual funds?
The investment decisions that Advisers make are fully priced in the
securities market."5 Because a mutual fund is required to compute net
asset values daily, the public nature of such figures (and the amounts
distributed to investors) makes its performance record very transparent.
A mutual fund is required to calculate its net asset value per share on a
daily basis, subject to certain exceptions.'86 Although the investors
cannot observe the efforts of the Adviser directly, they can infer them
from the observed outcomes. Since net asset value provides accurate
price signals, it can serve as an objective valuation mechanism and as a
low-cost method of evaluating the investment return of mutual funds.
Thus, due to such ex post observability, the Adviser's performance is
measurable at a low cost.
This ease with which a mutual fund's performance may be measured
makes the management of mutual funds an outcome-oriented business.
Although it is difficult to observe the care and skill exerted by the
Adviser, it is easy to observe the outcomes of investment. Admittedly,
an outcome-oriented mentality may be morally disheartening because
outcomes depend as much upon chance as on the Adviser's efforts."t 7
For instance, it is common to hear portfolio managers attempt to explain
their poor performance by stating, "We went short thinking interest rates
would go down and they didn't." Similarly, they often explain good
performance by stating, "We made a good bet on [i:nIsert your favorite
issuer or industry]." This mentality is why concern with investment
return is an everyday reality of the mutual fund business.
It should be noted that mutual fund performance means more than
"total return"--the percentage change in a mutual fund's net asset value
185. The price of stocks traded in securities markets is to a considerable extent established by
professional investors such as managers of mutual funds. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier H.
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549 (1984).
186. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-l (1993). Net asset value is computed by adding up the value of the
fund's investments, cash, and other assets, subtracting its liabilities, and then dividing the result by
the number of shares outstanding. For example, securities for which market quotations are readily
available are valued at their market value. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41).
187. Given the somewhat speculative nature of investment managemen, sometimes efforts spent
by the Adviser (and its individual portfolio managers) bear little direct relation to outcomes. After
all, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between investment and speculation or gamble. See, e.g.,
Sharpe & Alexander, supra note 25, at 5-7. This is particularly true for mutual funds, where past
performance is no guarantee of an Adviser's future performance. See Barbara Donnelly, Past Is No
Guarantee of Manager's Future, Wall St. J., Oct. 27 1992, at Cl.
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over a specified period of time.'88 From an investor's perspective, good
performance can be defined as the delivery of total returns that are, with
reasonable consistency, superior to those achieved by other mutual funds
with similar investment policies, objectives, and structures. Thus, in
evaluating the performance of mutual funds, investors should take into
account the risk element. 89
b. Fees
In addition to total returns and risk levels, investors value other factors
such as fees, because total return is almost always calculated before the
deduction of fees and other costs. 90 After all, each dollar of fee that an
investor pays reduces his or her total return by a precisely equal amount.
The amount of fees paid by investors is not easily observable. One
reason is that it is difficult to ascertain the level of indirect costs
associated with the management of a particular fund.' 9' The uncertainty
created by these indirect costs makes it difficult for investors to observe
ex ante the level of the Adviser's income from both direct and indirect
sources.
For example, expenses such as research costs are difficult to attribute,
because research is nearly always performed collectively within a fund
complex. 92 In addition, most of the expenses assumed by the Adviser
are incurred jointly for all the funds and accounts in the complex. As
such, the portion of the fees benefiting a particular fund is not directly
ascertainable. One way to solve this problem is to use a pre-set fee rate
in the prospectus and contract so that investors can better evaluate the
value of mutual fund products.193
188. The ending net asset value is adjusted to take into account the reinvestment of all income
dividends and any capital gains distributions made by the fund.
189. See infra part VI.C.2.
190. Such costs include, for example, taxes payable by the shareholder on the income from
dividends and capital gains distributions.
191. Indirect costs are costs that cannot be traced to the cost object in an economically feasible
way. See, e.g., Charles T. Horngren et al., Cost Accounting: A Managerial Emphasis 26-27 (1994);
see also infra notes 242-54 and accompanying text.
192. For example, the Fidelity group is supported by a team of more than 200 analysts who
monitor investment opportunities worldwide. See Fidelity Magellan Fund, Prospectus, May 20,
1993, at v.
193. See infra part VI.B.l.b.
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c. Quality of Services
Another performance-related term is the quality of' services provided
by the Adviser and its affiliates. There are funds with good performance
records which have not been successful and vice versa. Although
Advisers that perform well generally attract more assets, investors often
do not move from bad mutual funds rapidly. This is because investors
value service quality as well as investment returns.'94
3. Compensation and Incentive Effects
Good incentive schemes serve to decrease moral hazards and, hence,
attenuate the need for third-party monitoring. One way to align the
interests of the Adviser and the Investors is to make incentive-compatible
arrangements whereby the Adviser's compensation is closely tied to the
Investors' gain. Empirical studies have shown that incentive
compensation schemes often have alignment effects. For example, in the
case of publicly-held corporations, studies have shown that there is a
statistically modest relationship between shareholder gain, measured by
returns to common stock, and executive salaries and bonuses. 95
The compensation schemes commonly associated -with mutual funds
have even stronger alignment effects. Advisers of mutual funds typically
get paid a percentage of the net asset value of the fund. This
compensation method can be justified under efficiency rationales: if
quality standards are easy to specify and monitor, then principals might
prefer piece rates over time rates, or profit-sharing over fixed
payments.'96  Because the Adviser's investment decisions largely
determine performance outcomes, mutual funds are able to provide
effective incentives to the Adviser.
194. Whether service quality is measurable is a more controversial issue. See infra part VI.C.I.
195. In a study of the relation between top management pay and corporate stock performance,
Jensen and Murphy estimated that a CEO's compensation changes by $3.25 for a $1,000 change in
stock value. Michael C. Jensen and Kevin Murphy, Performance Pa: and Top Management
Incentives, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 225 (1990). However, there are many corportions in which executive
compensation bears little relation to any rational measure of corporate performance. This is
probably because it is very difficult to quantify the causal relationship between the executive's
performance and corporate performance. Therefore, corporate managers are paid for their efforts as
well as for corporate performance. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 77, at 1Z89-95.
196. See, e.g., James Roumasset & Marila Uy, Piece Rates, Times Rates, and Teams: Explaining
Patterns in the Employment Relation, 1 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 343 (1980); Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping, 41 Rev. Econ. Stud. 219 (1970).
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The incentive effects are twofold: first, an Adviser's interest in
preserving and expanding his client base provides considerable
motivation to carry out his responsibilities; and second, the standard fee
arrangement offers the Adviser an adequate basis for sharing in the fruits
of superior investment results.197 Such ex post observability has
implications on incentive effects concerning management fees.
How observable are costs, such as distribution costs, involved in
operating a mutual fund? In no other section of the financial services
field are cost and value more closely linked. In the case of mutual funds
it might be said that knowing the price of everything reveals the value of
everything, since each dollar of cost that an investor pays reduces his
return by a precisely equal amount. Thus, it is important that the Adviser
bears a share of the wealth effects of mutual fund costs. One way to
control costs is to set forth a pre-determined formula in the contract.
This practice would motivate service providers to both economize on
present costs and estimate future costs more accurately.
4. Redemption Rights and Exchange Privileges
Loyalty and exit remain essential elements of business associations as
well as political systems. In this respect, Hirschman's concepts of exit,
voice, and loyalty can serve as a framework for the various rules
concerning corporate governance. 9 ' For example, corporate law often
provides adequate conditions for "exit," such as the dissenting
shareholders' appraisal remedy in merger transactions. 99 The following
discussion focuses on redemption rights and exchange privileges.
a. Redemption Rights
One distinctive feature of mutual funds is the redeemable nature of the
claims that investors hold. A redeemable security is defined in the Act as
197. Note, however, that this compensation scheme is not entirely performance-based. The
Investment Advisers Act generally prohibits a registered investment adviser from receiving
compensation on the basis of a share of capital gains in, or capital appreciation of, a client's account.
Subject to specific requirements, limited exemptions from that prohibition are available for advisory
contracts with registered investment companies such as mutual funds. Regulation 205-1; 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-5(a)(1).
198. This much-used paradigm of exit, voice and loyalty, stems from Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty (1970).
199. See, e.g., Commission on Corp. Laws, An. Bar. Ass'n Section of Corp., Banking & Bus.
Law, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Dissenters' Rights, 32 Bus. Law.
1855 (1977). See also Cary & Eisenberg, supra note 120, at 1094-1117.
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one which entitles the holder at its option to receive his or her pro rata
share of the pool's "current" net assets or the cash equivalent."' Under
the Act, current net asset value is computed daily.20' Thus, mutual fund
investors hold fluctuating claims, not a fixed claim like debt holders, or
residual claims like corporate stockholders.
Redemption can be regarded as a form of residual right of
control-the right to make any decisions concerning the asset's use that
are not explicitly controlled by law or assigned to another by contract. 22
Such rights are self-enforcing because their enforcement is not dependent
on judicial intervention or third-party decisions. The availability of
accurate and inexpensive ex post market signals is helpful to investors
deciding whether to exercise redemption rights. As such, redemption
rights are superior to shareholder's appraisal right- in publicly-held
corporations." 3
Admittedly, in determining whether to exercise redemption rights
investors have to take into consideration factors such as redemption fees
and tax consequences. Redemption fees make it costly for investors to
sell their interests. However, the number of mutual funds that charge
redemption fees are small, and market constraints do not give managers
free hands to impose redemption fees. In determining whether to charge
redemption fees, the manager has to balance many factors, such as the
impact on marketability of fund shares. That is why only 134 of the
3,000-plus funds charge redemption fees. 204 As a result, the presence of
200. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(32).
201. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-l(b) states "current net asset value . . . shall be computed no less
frequently than once daily." Note that under the Act, open-end investment companies (i.e., mutual
funds), which are redeemable daily, and closed-end investment companies, which are not
redeemable, are two extremes in the continuum of liquidity. However, as a result of recent reform, it
is possible for investment companies to offer investors funds with intermediate degrees of liquidity
not currently available to shareholders of closed-end and open-end funds. See Periodic Repurchases
by Closed-End Management Investment Companies; Redemptions by Open-End Management
Investment Companies and Registered Separate Accounts at Periodic Intervals or With Extended
Payment, Investment Company Act Release No. 18,869, 57 Fed. Reg. 34,701 (Aug. 6, 1992).
202. For a discussion of the concept of residual rights of control, see generally Grossman & Hart,
supra note 150.
203. For a discussion of appraisal rights in publicly-held corporations, see, e.g., Roberta Romano,
Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 Colum. L.
Rev. 1599, 1613-15 (1989).
204. Carole Gould, Readers' Mail: A Question of Risk, N.Y. Times, Fea. 20, 1994, at F14. One
concern is the equality issue: in most funds, all investors have to shoulder the transaction costs
incurred by a fund when other investors sell their interests. The redemption fees are supposed to
compensate the long-term shareholders for transaction expenses incurred to meet redemptions by
short-term traders. Thus, redemption fees directly benefit a fund's remainirg shareholders. Id.
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redemption fees does not pose a serious barrier to most mutual fund
investors.
In effect, redemption rights are a special form of diffuse control in
mutual funds. The withdrawal decisions of redeemable claim holders
affect the resources under the Advisers' control, and they do so in a more
direct fashion than customer decisions in other business organizations.
In other words, the decision of the claim holder to withdraw resources is
a form of partial takeover or liquidation which deprives management of
control over a portion of the fund's assets."' Thus, this control right can
be exercised independently by each claim holder. Since investors can
look after their own interests and withdraw claims on demand without
jeopardizing the viability of the organization, the need for their
surveillance is accordingly attenuated.
b. Exchange Privileges
Another related feature of some mutual funds is an exchange
privilege. A prime attraction of investing with a large family of mutual
funds is the ability to shift easily among its offerings-from a
conservative stock fund to an international fund to a short-term bond
fund. Many mutual funds are part of a "family of funds" (a group of
funds managed by the same Sponsor/manager company) and may offer
an option called an exchange privilege.
An exchange privilege allows an investor to transfer shares from one
of these funds to another. Exchange policies vary from fund to fund.
Generally speaking, the fee for an exchange is nominal." 6 In addition,
the procedures for exercising exchange privileges are easy to follow. In
fact, it is sometimes possible to use automated services available through
a telephone to make exchanges between a family of funds." 7
c. Summary
To summarize, the availability of redemption rights and exchange
privileges within mutual fund complexes has resulted in high investor
mobility and a competitive environment for mutual funds. Hence,
205. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. &
Econ. 327,338 (1983).
206. See ICI Fact Book, supra note 22, at 7. See also Andree Brooks, Avoiding Unnecessary
Costs in Switching Among Mutual Funds, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1994, at F30.
207. See, e.g., Fidelity Magellan Fund, Prospectus, May 20, 1993, at 18.
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allocating certain control functions to a third party might not be
necessary or even desirable if the costs of such allocation are larger than
the costs of exercising redemption rights or exchange privileges.
5. Other Market Constraints
Like managers of publicly-held corporations, the Adviser's behavior
is to a considerable extent shaped by the constraints imposed by market
forces. In the context of publicly-held corporations, studies on market
constraints typically include a product market, corporate control market,
managerial labor market, and capital market.2"' It is well recognized that
competition in these markets reduces managerial slack.0 9
In the mutual fund context, the market for corporate control (proxy
fights, direct purchase of shares, and mergers) does not really exist.
Whether a takeover will occur depends largely on whether the value of
the company in the eyes of some potential buyer exceeds the sum of the
company's total market price. In other words, such a market exists
because there is a substantial gap between share value and the intrinsic
value of the organization. In the case of a mutual fuad, however, there
exists no such gap to warrant the costs of a takeover."0
Nevertheless, mutual funds operate in a competitive environment
because they live or die based on their ability to replenish their
redeemable assets with the sale of new securities. On the market side,
four factors substantiate this assertion. The first three factors measure
the market's elasticity of demand for mutual funds The last factor
measures the consumer's elasticity of demand for a particular fund.
Consider the concentration of the industry. One study indicates that (1)
according to the Justice Department's guidelines, the mutual fund
advisers compete in an unconcentrated market; and (2) the 30 largest
complexes experienced declining market share, indicating that new
entrants and smaller managers have been successful in gaining shares
from their larger rivals.2 '
208. See Lucian A. Bebehuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable
Constraints on CharterAmendments, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1820, 1841-48 (1989).
209. For example, Hart argued that if product markets are perfectly competitive, there will be no
supernormal profits and hence managers must maximize profits just to survive. See Oliver D. Hart,
The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme, 14 Bell J. Econ. 366 (1983).
210. This, of course, has something to do with the organizational capital of the mutual fund. See
supra part IV.B.1.
211. William J. Baumol et al., The Economics of Mutual Fund Markets: Competition Versus
Regulation 117 (1990).
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The second factor concerns the conditions of entry. Conditions of
entry apply to two levels: (1) the market for advisers; and (2) the market
for funds. In both cases, the statistics indicate that there are no
"significant entry barriers" in the mutual fund industry. 12 Overall, the
absence of redemption fees for most funds, the high liquidity of mutual
fund assets, and the exchange privileges within some mutual fund
complexes have resulted in high investor mobility and a competitive
environment for mutual funds. In addition, a recent research study
predicts that in the 1990s, overcapacity, new competitors (notably banks
and foreign firms), downward pressures on revenues, and upward
pressure on costs will combine to make the mutual fund business an even
fiercer game.21 3
In terms of internal organization of mutual funds and their Advisers,
empirical results strongly support the findings of "economies of
scope." '214 Most mutual funds are typically organized as part of a few
large corporate complexes controlled by investment advisers. Each
Adviser offers multiple mutual fund products (e.g., growth funds, income
funds, and money market funds); each fund in a complex is usually a
separate legal entity. In practice, the majority of funds are little more
than organization tools with few, if any, employees other than officers
and directors. Each fund incurs only minimal fixed costs. This structure
reveals how a mutual fund complex maximizes its internal economies of
scope and diversifies the entrepreneurial risks of the various mutual
funds it organizes. Economies of scope are thus realized by sharing the
advisory cost among all contracting funds within a fund complex. The
greater the number of funds offered by the complex, or the greater the
number of overall shareholders for the complex, the more significant the
economies of scope.
From the standpoint of individual mutual funds, it can be argued that
some funds have reached "economies of scale" because the per unit cost
of performing transactions decreased as the number of transactions
increased."1 5 Under such circumstances, related conflicts may arise in
212. Id.
213. See Fiske, supra note 10, at 6.
214. Economies of scope (in the form of cost savings) typically arise from joint usage of fixed
resources. See, e.g., Robert S. Pindyck & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics 221-24 (1989).
215. Economies of scale, defined in a cost perspective, means that the cost of production increases
proportionately less than output as output increases. id. at 187. Allocation of costs against different
product lines or segments of the same product is an art rather than a science. The issues of
economies of scale and dividing entrepreneurial reward will be examined below. See infra part
V.B.1.; part VI.A.1, B.2.
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connection with dividing the benefits of any economies of scale that may
be generated as the assets of the company increase. This is because
advisory fees typically are calculated as a percentage of assets under
management even though the cost of providing investment advisory
services-consisting largely of salaries and overhead--is relatively fixed
(e.g., a portfolio manager can manage $500 million nearly as easily as
$100 million). An advisory fee that does not scale down as company
assets increase consequently may yield enormous profits to the Adviser.
V. AN EVALUATION OF THE CORPORATE FUND
I have developed a framework for evaluating how monitoring
functions ought to be allocated to the Monitor, which, in the case of the
Corporate Fund, is the board of directors. This part applies the
normative observations developed above by analyzing the structure and
governance of the Corporate Fund.
A. The Effectiveness of the Semi-Hierarchy
What kind of structure does the Corporate Fund lake? On the one
hand, the Adviser, a functionally autonomous entity typically governed
by a separate board of directors, sponsors and manages the mutual fund.
On the other, an investment company's own board of directors is
responsible for the organic or structural integrity of the investment
company. The Corporate Fund is in essence a "semi-hierarchy" because
it establishes a hierarchical decision-control mechanism yet eschews
outright ownership of the Adviser. Given its semi-hierarchical structure,
the Corporate Fund has been referred to as a corporate anomaly.216
It is often believed that hierarchical organizations, including semi-
hierarchical ones, can do everything contractual arrangements could do
and do so at least as well." 7 They may be able to secure the best of two
worlds--enjoying the incentive advantages of independent firms while
still facilitating close planning where necessary. As I will argue below,
such a structure involves certain transaction costs which sometimes go
unnoticed. This section first examines the board's independence and
informational advantage and then considers the potential costs of such a
semi-hierarchy.
216. See Modesitt, supra note 3.
217. See Stiglitz, supra note 154, at 18.
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1. The Board's Independence and Informational Advantage
The most enduring institution for minimizing agency cost has been the
independent director. The concept that shareholders can elect non-
employee directors to monitor management performance has reached the
status of conventional wisdom.218 That is why the American Law
Institute2 9 and the Delaware courts 0 have come to accord independent
directors a primary monitoring role. Similarly, the Corporate Fund also
accords independent directors a primary monitoring role.
a. Independence
As discussed above, section 10(a) of the Act provides that at least
forty percent of the board of directors of a mutual fund must consist of
independent directors. This requirement is predicated on the belief that
the mutual fund governance system works best when the functions
required of independent directors are performed by individuals who are
truly independent.22' However, the lack of independence of the directors
of mutual fund boards, including the independent directors, is well
documented.2' As one critic commented, "Who picks the unaffiliated
directors? The affiliated men pick the unaffiliated men. The men who
need to be watched pick the watchdogs to watch them."'2"s
Both the Wharton Report and the SEC Public Policy Report attributed
the lack of effective independent director control largely to the existing
218. But see Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda
for hIstitutional Investors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863 (1991) (analyzing failings of outside director
concept).
219. See Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 3A.01
(Proposed Final Draft 1992).
220. The Delaware courts have assigned special weight to outside director's decisions. See, e.g.,
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (finding merger failed fairness test where
feasibility study not shown to outside directors).
221. Note that inside directors have their own advantages. As Fama noted, outside directors have
more independence and objectivity, but inside directors have more information and their careers are
at stake. See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288
(1980); see also John L. Grant, Shield Outside Directors From Inside Seduction, Wall St. J., Nov.
23, 1992, at A14.
222. See, e.g., William J. Nutt, A Study of Mutual Fund Independent Directors, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev.
179 (1971); Robert H. Mundheim & William J. Nutt, The Independent Directors of Mutual Funds.
Wharton Q., Spring 1972, at 8.
223. Conference on Mutual Funds: The Mutual Fund Management Fee, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 726,
739 (1967) (remarks of Abraham L. Pomerantz).
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224selection process. In effect, the power to place a slate of directors
before the shareholders through the proxy mechanism is tantamount to
the power of appointment. Thus, the issue is not who will elect the
directors but who should select the candidates who will stand for annual
elections or fill interim terms. The Adviser who wants to engage in
mutual fund business is typically the one who incorporates the
investment company, owns its initial shares, and nominates the initial
board members, including the independent board members.2 s Because
the Adviser controls the mutual fund from the moment of its inception,
this co-dependency problem is more serious than that of ordinary
publicly-held corporations.
b. Informational Advantage
A potential advantage of incorporating the board into the governance
structure of the Corporate Fund is the possibility that the board may use
its expertise and access to information. Unfortunately, independent
directors are ill-equipped for this task because they have only limited
resources at their disposal. Like their counterparts in publicly-held
corporations, directors of a mutual fund, acting in that capacity, are
usually generalists. Admittedly, these are people with specialized
knowledge, competence and skill (e.g., as a lawyer or a banker).
However, in light of the specialized nature of the fund management
business, they must have pertinent and unbiased information if they are
to "direct" the investment process of the Adviser.
What are the sources of such pertinent and unbiased information? The
Act imposes a duty on the directors to request and evaluate, and a duty
on the Adviser to furnish, the information reasonably necessary to
evaluate the terms of the investment company's service contracts,
including the contract between the investment company and the
Adviser. 6  Some are generally available and some are prepared
especially for this purpose in accordance with the Adviser's routine
practice or at the request of the directors. The primary source of
information, however, will be the Adviser.
224. Candidates for subsequent elections are in most fund complexes selected by a nominating
committee composed of both affiliated and independent directors. See Nutt, supra note 222, at
215-20.
225. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
226. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c).
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The available information can be both hard (e.g., numbers and
statistics) and soft (e.g., opinions and strategies). It is also a common
practice to use materials prepared by outside experts. For example, such
materials are typically used to provide comparisons of fee structures,
expense levels and performance (e.g., Lipper Analytical Services or the
Wall Street Journal). Some of the information, such as materials
prepared by outside experts, can be relatively objective and thus can shed
light on the performance and internal operation of the Adviser. Other
information provided by the Adviser, however, may be somewhat biased.
If information provided by the Adviser is biased or not sufficiently
pertinent, could the directors rely on information prepared by the internal
staff of the investment company? The answer is no. Unlike ordinary
corporations, the investment company has no employees that are truly its
own.227 Since these officers are employed and compensated by the
Adviser, it would be imprudent to assume that they can be impartial in
their duties. Not surprisingly, one commentator has recently observed
that the board of the Corporate Fund has no "teeth" because directors are
not adequately informed about fund operations.228
In an attempt to address this concern, the SEC has considered
requiring mutual funds to provide independent directors with their own
staff or counsel. However, this idea was rejected because of the cost
concerns.229 Therefore, it may be a mistake to think that the board has
information superior to the information available to some of the mutual
fund's investors (e.g., institutional investors). 3
2. The Costs of the Semi-Hierarchy
It is believed that the governance costs of the Corporate Fund are
insignificant. For instance, Lipper Analytical Services, Inc. estimated
that total governance costs do not exceed two basis points for the typical
investor3' Compared with an average total expense ratio of 1.118%
(approximately 112 basis points) for 2,731 funds, such costs may be
227. See SEC Report, supra note 12, at 251 n.3.
228. See letter from Bruce Oliver, former chairman of John Hancock Group of mutual funds, to
Jonathan Katz, Secretary of the Securities and Exchange Commission 3 (July 27, 1990)
(commenting on the reform of mutual fund structures).
229. See SEC Report, supra note 12, at 268.
230. One third of mutual fund investors are institutional investors. See supra note 160 and
accompanying text.
231. Letter from Lipper Analytical Services, Inc. to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Oct. 9,
1990), File No. S7-11-90, at 1.
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considered insignificant.232 However, since directors are empowered to
make decisions and give directions regarding the operation of the fund
on an ongoing basis, the Corporate Fund will incur transaction costs
from three major sources.
a. Influence Costs
"Influence costs" are the first item of these three sources. 3 The most
obvious and direct of the costs associated with the monitoring function
are the director's salary and the costs of providing information to support
the director's decision-making process, including the time the Adviser
(or other information providers) spends reporting information to the
directors. More importantly, because the Adviser often would want to
seek unproductive interventions (e.g., in conducting self-interested
transactions), it may expend resources trying to influence the decision
maker. Even if these attempts fail, the resources expended represent
influence costs. If the influence activities are successful, the inferior
quality of the decisions made and implemented will also represent
influence costs.
There are reasons to believe that directors of the Corporate Fund may
be vulnerable to influence activities. Directors are empowered to
scrutinize many service contracts and hence to bargain for fees and
allocate expenses. The directors are nominated by, and serve at the
pleasure of, the Adviser or its affiliates. The Adviser or its affiliates
provide, or mandate, much of the information received by the directors.
Under such circumstances, it is possible that the Adviser may fail to
report completely and accurately the information needed for the board to
make good decisions. Of course, the magnitude of influence costs
depends on factors such as the kind of procedures that govern decision-
making and the form of the decision rule (e.g., carte blanche or detailed
rules). However, although many of the more egregious examples of
influence activities depend on a corruptible centralized authority, even an
"incorruptible" authority may be amenable to influence.2 34
232. Id.
233. The term "influence costs" refers to the large amounts of time, ingenuity, and effort that go
into these attempts at influence. See Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 155, at 193.
234. Most business organizations are vulnerable to influence activities. For discussions on
politics in publicly-held corporations, see, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate
Governance as a Multi-Player Game, 78 Geo. L.J. 1495 (1990); John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders
Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 81-86 (1986).
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b. Intervention Costs
Intervention costs are the second major source of transaction costs.
The board of directors of the investment company is equipped with
authority to approve multiple service contracts, including the investment
management contract. However, the Adviser, as a profit-seeking
enterprise, is a functionally autonomous entity with its own internal
system of accountability and discipline. In addition, the design and
operation of a mutual fund and its success or failure are primarily the
responsibility of the Adviser. When the board intervenes in the operation
of a free-standing business such as the Adviser, intervention costs can
occur. .For instance, any intervention makes it more difficult for
investors to evaluate the Adviser's performance and, hence, undermines
the market's ability to provide the appropriate incentives.235 Contrast this
with what happens if the Adviser is a subsidiary of the investment
company: in this situation, the costs of such intervention are relatively
low.
To constrain influence and intervention costs, it is possible to impose
on the Adviser fiduciary duties of loyalty and care,z 6 enforced through
lawsuits. However, courts are not necessarily at center stage in this
process, and legal rules can only have minimal deterrent effects on
influence and intervention activities. After all, the effort to establish
standards of conduct under the third party's duty of care poses a number
of practical and metaphysical difficulties.27
In fact, most decisions made by the board of the Corporate Fund are
covered by the business judgment rule. The rule provides that, in the
absence of self-interest, the business judgment of directors will not be
challenged or overturned by courts or shareholders, and the directors will
not be held liable for the consequences of their exercise of business
235. See infra part VI.A.1-2.
236. Such legal rules are common in business associations. In the context of corporations, the
duty of care demands that members of the board (and officers) invest a certain amount of time and
effort and exercise a certain level of skill and judgment in the operation of the firm. The duty of
loyalty requires that directors (and officers) put the interests of the shareholders ahead of their
personal gain and subject them to oversight in transactions involving conflicts of interest. See, e.g.,
Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project,
35 Stan. L. Rev. 927, 927-28 (1983).
237. See generally Philip C. Sorensen, Discretion and Its Limits-An Analytical Framework for
Understanding and Applying the Duty of Care to Corporate Directors (and Others), 66 Wash. U.
L.Q. 553 (1988). This is especially the case when these decisions are mixed-motive decisions. See
Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's Duty ofIndependence, 67
Tex. L. Rev. 1351 (1989).
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judgment, even if their judgment turns out to be wrong. 3 The business
judgment rule is an especially deferential approach. Behind the rule lies
a recognition that the total wealth of investors as a c:.ass would be lower
if directors' decisions were routinely subjected to strict judicial review.
My analysis of the ineffectiveness of imposing fiduciary duties upon
the board is not intended as an attack on the business judgment rule. The
truth is that, given the nature of discretionary decisions, they cannot
easily be subjected to detailed and enforceable legal standards and
guidelines. The rule simply reflects limits on the use of fiduciary rules to
assure contractual performance-people would not serve as directors if
they were deemed to be guarantors of the wisdom of their good faith
decision-making. Thus, legal rules and expost enforcement would not be
effective in disciplining influence activities." 9
If fiduciary rules are not effective in disciplining the board of
directors, other devices may serve to align the interests of the directors
with those of the investors. One possibility is incentive-compatible
contracts. The typical independent director of a muual fund is paid an
annual retainer fee. In addition, each director receives some
remuneration for each meeting attended. Because this is not
performance-based compensation, the directors are not provided with
incentive-compatible contracts.
c. Collective Decision-making Costs
Collective decision-making costs are the third major source of
transaction costs. When ownership of a business organization is shared
among investors, a method for collective decision-making is often
devised. As discussed above, the Corporate Fund provides extensive
Issue Voting and Election Voting. As methods for aggregating the
preferences of investors, such collective choice mechanisms often
involve substantial costs in comparison to market contracting.240
238. In other words, if a deliberate decision by the third party on whether or how to conduct a
given activity satisfies the conditions of the business judgment rule, the board may be insulated from
liability even though the decision was not a reasonable one. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of
Care of Corporate Directors and Offcers, 51 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 945 (1990).
239. See generally Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule in Overview, 45 Ohio St. L.J.
615 (1984).
240. See Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J.L. Econ. & Org. 267, 272-80 (1988).
Henry Hansmann extends the transaction cost analysis of firm organizatian by introducing as a key
variable the cost of collective decision-making. See Roberta Romano, Foundations of Corporate
Law 5 (1993).
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To begin with, such a decision-making process may yield decisions
that are collectively inefficient in the sense that they do not maximize
aggregate shareholder surplus. Thus, if the preferences of the median
voter are not those of the mean, a majority voting mechanism may yield
decisions that are not only inefficient but inferior, from a welfare
standpoint, to those that would be reached if the shareholders simply
contracted as individuals. Moreover, the process of collective decision-
making itself can have high transaction costs. These costs include the
costs of proxy solicitation (e.g., legal and accounting fees incurred in
connection with preparing proxy material), the costs of resolicitation if
necessary in order to achieve a quorum, and the costs of holding annual
or special meetings of shareholders.24"'
d. Summary
In conclusion, because independent directors do not possess fully
adequate information and cannot be regarded as truly impartial, it is not
realistic to expect the board to bargain effectively on behalf of the
investors. This is particularly the case when there are no effective
mechanisms, such as fiduciary rules or incentive-compatible
arrangements, to motivate or discipline the directors. Thus, to equip the
board with considerable discretionary power may bring with it
significant transaction costs that otherwise would not be present.
B. The Responsibilities of the Board of Directors
In evaluating the structure and governance of business organizations,
institutional details matter. Because the Corporate Fund relies on the
board of directors to protect investors in a variety of conflict of interest
situations, it is important to examine the board's legal responsibilities in
each situation. The responsibilities of the board can be divided into four
categories. First, under the Act the board has primary responsibility for
evaluating the reasonableness of a number of different fees and charges
for investment advice, distribution, administration, and shareholder
services. Second, the Act and its rules also make the board responsible
for policing various operational conflicts. Third, the board is required to
monitor whether the Adviser and its affiliates have complied with the
rules and regulations applicable to the mutual fund. Fourth, the board
assumes general oversight responsibilities and other gap-filling
241. See SEC Report, supra note 12, at 274-76. See also infra part V.C.1-2.
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functions. This section examines each of these categories in greater
detail below.
1. Evaluating Fees Paid to Advisers and Their Affiliates
Fees paid from a mutual fund's assets to the Adviser and its affiliates
directly affect shareholders' investment return-the higher the fee, the
lower the return. To ensure the reasonableness of fees paid to the
Adviser and others, the Act imposes varying requirements upon the
board when it evaluates fees paid to the Adviser and its affiliates.
sections 15(a) and 15(d) charge the board of directors with the
responsibility for evaluating the Adviser's contract with the investment
company and the compensation paid under the contract.24 Principal
underwriting contracts are subject to similar scrutiny. Multiyear
contracts also must be approved annually by the board or by a majority
shareholder vote. The board is also required to review and evaluate
asset-based distribution fees. A mutual fund's board likely would also
review any service contract, such as transfer agency .and custodial
agreements.
a. Fee Negotiations
There are several reasons why fees should be evaluated by the board
rather than the investors.243 One of the most important reasons is that for
investors of the Corporate Fund, determining fees is a ponderous task.
As the SEC Report indicated, in the last two decad.es mutual fund fee
structures have grown increasingly complicated. The variety of charges
and operating and distribution expenses are difficult to aggregate, cannot
be readily compared among funds, and cause investC confusion.2" Let
us review these complex fee structures.
242. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-15(a), 15(d).
243. When section 15 was enacted in 1940, the chief counsel of the SEC testified that "[t]here is
not a single provision in section 15 which even remotely assumes to fix what [Advisers] should be
paid as compensation .... We feel that is a question for the stockholders to decide." Investment
Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcompn. of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 252 (1940) (statement of David Schenker, Chief
Counsel, SEC Investment Trust Study).
244. Investors of mutual funds have to pay sales charges-the costs of buying a fund, commonly
called the "load." Most funds take loads out of initial investments. When loads are levied on
withdrawals, they can take two forms. Deferred charges decrease over time; redemption fees arise
when investors sell shares. In addition to sales charges, the investment company incurs
overheads-management fees, advisory fees, transfer agent fees and bookkeeping fees, etc. To
make matters worse, some mutual funds have a 12b-1 plan, which allocttes shareholder money for
Vol. 69:927, 1994
Mutual Fund Structures
There are primarily two visible fees:245 sales charges and expense
ratios. Operating expenses are paid annually but sales charges are paid
only when shares are purchased. "Load" is defined as the difference
between the public offering price paid by investors and the current net
asset value of the fund per share, less any portion of such difference
deducted for administrative expenses not properly chargeable to sales or
promotional activities. 246 There are no initial sales charges incurred in
the purchase of no-load funds. Nonetheless, no-load funds shareholders
often pay for marketing and advertising expenses indirectly in the form
of a charge known as a "12b-l" distribution fee.247 A 12b-1 fee is an
extra fee paid to the fund's Adviser to help finance the costs of
marketing the fund's shares. Among the various forms of sales charges
are the regular load, the contingent deferred sales load,24 ' and the low
load. Sales charges are the predominant form of transaction charges
applicable to fund shares-that is, charges paid directly by the investor
making the transaction, as distinguished from the fund itself.249
The second of these two types of fees is the expense ratio, which
represents the total cost of ownership (as distinguished from acquisition)
of a fund's shares. Generally, there are three major categories of
expenses which will be incurred in procuring the services necessary for a
fund's operations. The first major expense category is the investment
distribution costs. See infra note 247 and accompanying text; see also SEC Report, supra note 12, at
291-98, 332-33.
245. One large invisible cost, often ignored because of its invisibility, is the cost the fund incurs
in executing its portfolio transactions.
246. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(35).
247. A 12b-1 fee is so named because it relates to a particular regulatory paragraph. See 17
C.F.R. § 270.12b-1. A 12b-1 fee is an extra fee paid to the fund's Adviser to help finance the costs
of marketing the fund's shares. Paragraph 12b generally provided that a mutual fund may not act as
a distributor of its securities, except through an underwriter, in contravention of any rules prescribed
by the SEC. In 1980, the SEC prescribed rule 12b-l, which governs the use of fund assets for
distribution. Since the adoption of the rule, more than half of all mutual funds have enacted rule
l2b-I plans, using these charges, alone or with sales loads, as the primary means of financing
distribution. The legislative and administrative history leading up to the adoption of rule 12b-1 is
recounted in detail in 53 Fed. Reg. 23,258 (1988) (proposed June 13, 1988).
248. Contingent deferred sales loads are "contingent" since they are paid only on redemptions that
occur within a specified period after purchase and may be expressed as a percentage of either the
original purchase price, or more typically, the redemption proceeds. Shortly after the adoption of
rule 12b-l, the SEC issued the first of many exemptive orders allowing the deduction of contingent
deferred sales loads upon redemption of fund shares. E.F. Hutton Investment Series, Inc.,
Investment Company Act Release No. 12,079, 46 Fed. Reg. 60,703 (Dec. 4, 1981) (Notice of
Application); E.F. Hutton Investment Series, Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 12,135, 24
SEC Docket 528 (Jan. 4, 1982) (Order).
249. See, e.g., John C. Bogle, John Bogle on Mutual Funds 197-201 (1994).
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management fee paid to the Adviser for portfolio supervision and for
general management of the fund's operations. The second expense
category includes administration fees which are incurred largely to
provide record-keeping and transaction services to fund shareholders.
The third expense category includes other operating expenses such as
custodial fees, taxes, legal and auditing expenses, and directors' fees.5
It is becoming increasingly difficult to separate sales charges and
expense ratios. For one thing, sales charges are often included in the
fund's total expense ratio. Of further confusion to investors, fees with
the same label pay for different services. For example, some advisory
contracts provide for portfolio management only. Other advisory
contracts also provide for administrative, shareholder accounting, and
transfer agent services. Compounding the labeling problem, particular
fees are obscured by their placement in either the fund or the shareholder
account, or by shifting their timing among the point of purchase, the
investment period, and the point of exit. 5' Consequently, investors do
not have the ability to price fees and services offered by mutual funds.
If investors are confused by the industry's multiple fee structures, to
what extent can the boards of mutual funds ameliorate such confusion?
As examined above, the board is vulnerable to coalition politics, and its
screening authority gives rise to influence activities and costs. Hence,
the arm's-length bargaining between the board and the Adviser and its
affiliates is more apparent than real. Despite the assumed advantage of
the board of directors, mutual fund fees have been escalating even
though the industry's growth, a tenfold increase in assets over the past
decade, has allowed huge economies of scale. 2 This shows that boards
have not done well in cutting fees. Although they sometimes negotiate
fee rates below that proposed by the Adviser, the amount of the reduction
is usually marginal.2 3
250. Id.
251. See SECReport, supra note 12, at 336.
252. See Jeffrey M. Laderman, Are Fund Managers Carving Themselves Too Fat a Slice?, Bus.
Wk., Mar. 23, 1992, at 78; See also Carole Gould, Fees-Front, Back and Sideways, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 15, 1992, at FI4.
253. See, e.g., Werner Renberg, Sixth Men or Fifth Wheels: Do Fund Directors Earn Their
Paychecks?, Barron's, Aug. 12, 1991, at M13-14. Note that the Adviser is not hired by the mutual
fund, but rather organizes and promotes it. Consequently, the Adviser may plausibly claim some
reward for bearing entrepreneurial risk; because the Advisor does not normally take the customary
promoter's risk-equity shares in the newly organized fund-it may take the reward instead in the
form of higher advisory fees. See Sterrett, supra note 121, at 195. For a discussion of why it is
difficult to set a standard against which the fairness of such fees can be measured, see Frankel, supra
note 24, at 252-58.
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How about expense ratios? Given the clear financial impact of
expenses on mutual fund performance, along with the exponential
growth of industry assets, one might expect that fund expense ratios
would have declined over the years. However, the reverse has proven
true. In 1956, the average expense ratio of U.S. equity funds was 0.79%.
Today, when computers and telecommunications have vastly simplified a
wide variety of functions, managing money should cost far less. But it
doesn't. The expense ratio of equity funds currently averages 1.45%, or
nearly twice the 1956 level. 4  Because directors are supposed to
accurately allocate the expenses incurred by each fund, they are not
excused from failing to watch these costs.
b. Litigation on Fees
The Act imposes fiduciary duties on a board's negotiation of fees. 5
section 36(b) imposes upon advisers and directors a fiduciary duty with
respect to the management fees they receive. 6  The fiduciary duty
imposed by section 36(b) is unique in that it relates to the compensation
received for performing fiduciary functions, rather than the performance
of those functions. The provision encompasses compensation for
services or payments of a material nature paid by the investment
company or its shareholders. However, Congress did not expressly
define the standard courts should apply when determining whether an
Adviser has breached its fiduciary duties. The cases which have
examined the negotiation process provide some clues as to the
effectiveness of fiduciary duties in policing fee negotiation 7
The standard and factors applicable to claims under section 36(b) were
first set forth in the Gartenberg cases-the 1981 district court and 1982
Second Circuit decisions in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset
254. See, e.g., Riva Atlas, Watch Those Costs, Forbes, Aug. 30, 1993, at 112.
255. For an introduction to fiduciary duties, see, e.g., Easterbrook & Fisehel, supra note 52, at
90-108.
256. Section 36(b) provides that the Adviser "shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with
respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid ... by
[the fund] to such investment advisor or any affiliated person." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b). Section
36(b) was added by the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 20,
84 Stat. 1413, 1429 (1970). For a discussion of the legislative history of section 36(b), see William
P. Rogers & James N. Benedict, Money Market Fund Management Fees: How Much is Too Much?,
57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1059 (1982). In addition, through regulation 12b-l, this fiduciary duty extends to
payments by the fund related to the distribution of fund shares. 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-l(b)(2), -
2 (b)(3)(iii).
257. Most lawsuits have centered on the so-called 36(b) issue.
Washington Law Review
Management, Inc.,258 and the 1983 district court and 1984 Second Circuit
decisions in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc."9
These decisions articulated a standard which requires that mutual fund
arrangements bear a reasonable relationship to the level of fees that
would have been negotiated in an arm's-length bargain. After reviewing
all the relevant factors, the Gartenberg court concluded that "in assessing
whether an advisory fee is reasonable a reviewing court must look to all
the costs and benefits associated with the Fund."26 As fiduciaries, the
directors have no obligation to bargain for the least expensive investment
advisory services for the fund.26 '
Moreover, in Krinsk v. Fund Asset Management, Inc.,262 the Second
Circuit rejected the plaintiffs contentions that section 36(b) requires
fund directors to negotiate the "best deal" possible for shareholders and
that excessive profitability alone should suffice for proving a violation of
section 36(b). The court found the nature and quality of services
provided to investors, particularly the fund's performance, to be
excellent, and rejected plaintiff s proposal to measure the fund's yield on
a risk-adjusted basis. 3 Emphasizing the importance of the deliberations
by the fund's directors, the court held that, in evaluating the
reasonableness of compensation under section 36(b), it should examine
factors such as the expertise of the directors, whether they are fully
informed, and the extent of the care with which they perform their
duties.2
To fulfill the procedural requirements of arm's-length bargaining,
directors of mutual funds have been advised to perform several tasks: (1)
meet from time to time without representatives of the Adviser and
arrange meetings "replete with presentations"; (2) receive ample material
and information as well as legal advice from separate counsel; and (3)
document the formulation of a negotiation position and strategy that can
be shown to be the result of the directors' own evaluations of the data.265
258. 528 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 906 (1983).
259. 573 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 740 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1984).
260. 740 F.2d at 194.
261. See generally James N. Benedict et al., Developments in Management Fee Litigation, 22
Rev. Sec. & Commodities Reg. 157 (1989).
262. 715 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 875 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1989).
263. Id. at 502-03.
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., Stanley J. Friedman, The Role of Outside Directors in Negotiating Investment
Company Advisory Agreements, 24 Rev. See. & Commodities Reg. 49 (1991).
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As long as the procedural requirements are met, the courts have shown
no inclination to limit fees because they are ill-suited to substitute their
own business judgment for that of the fund's board of directors. Thus,
fiduciary duties serve only to exalt form over substance.
Although to date Advisers and directors of mutual funds have won all
the 36(b) cases that have been adjudicated, they have often chosen to
terminate impending litigation by agreeing to costly settlements.266
Consequently, even following these court decisions, one can only expect
the board to continue the middle-of-the-road approach-adding more
breakpoints and implementing sliding-scale fee structures that reduce
percentage fee rates as net assets increase. In Kalish v. Franklin
Advisers, Inc., for example, the independent directors, after prolonged
negotiations with the affiliated directors, only managed to marginally
modify management fee rates.267
The truth is that independent directors are charged with an impossible
mission. In evaluating the fee structure of a mutual fund, the board has
to take into consideration factors such as the Adviser's performance (i.e.,
investment returns and risk levels), its direct and indirect income, and
direct and indirect costs incurred in managing the mutual fund. None of
these factors are easy to ascertain. This problem becomes even more
complicated because a reasonable profit must include a reward for
entrepreneurial risk.26 Thus, such fees are by no means the result of
arm's-length bargaining; rather, they are simply the result of politicking.
2. Policing Operational Conflicts of Interest
In addition to policing conflicts concerning fees, the board of directors
also polices a number of operational activities. The Act and the SEC's
rules give independent directors several specific responsibilities. For
example, the independent directors select the company's independent
public accountants,269 oversee securities transactions involving affiliates
266. See, e.g., West Report, supra note 1, at 56.
267. The management fee was adjusted from 0.45% to 0.44% on net assets in excess of $10
billion up to $12.5 billion; 0.42% on assets in excess of $12.5 billion up to $15 billion; and 0.40%
on net assets in excess of$15 billion. Prior to the effectiveness of this modification, the fee schedule
of the fund was 0.625% on the first $100 million of net assets; 0.50% on the next $150 million; and
0.45% on amounts over $250 million. See Kalish v. Franklin Advisers, Inc., [1990-1991 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,861 (2d Cir. Mar. 21, 1991).
268. See infra part VI.A.I.
269. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-32(a)(1), -31(a)(1).
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to the extent such transactions are permitted by various rules,27
determine annually whether participation in joint liability insurance
policies is in the best interests of the company,271 and review and approve
fidelity bonds.272
In some cases, the full board must approve operational activities. For
example, the full board values certain types of portfzlio securities273 and
sets the time of day at which net asset value is determined.274 The board
annually approves custody contracts with members of national securities
exchanges, clearing agencies, book-entry systems, and foreign
custodians.2 75 Finally, the board approves an investment company's code
of ethics, which must be designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative practices by investment company insiders in connection
with personal securities transactions.276
Conflicts of interest arise because the Adviser, in addition to portfolio
management service, also provides other services to the investment
company."7 It can be argued that disciplinary forces exerted by various
markets may lead the Adviser and its affiliates to pursue value-
maximizing activities. When a transaction is value-decreasing, its
adverse effect on net asset value and operating expe:ases makes it on the
whole unattractive to the Adviser. For example, for situations that do not
involve a potential transfer of value from the investaent company to the
Adviser, incentive effects and other market forces are usually effective in
motivating the Adviser to maximize net asset value.
The effectiveness of market discipline varies depending on the type of
conflict of interest involved. Although investors may have the ability to
price the economic terms of the management contract, they may not have
the ability to price the other terms or transactions.27  In particular,
270. See, e.g., §§ 80a-10(f), -17(a), -17(e); 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.10f-3, .17a-7, .17e-1.
271. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-l(d)(7).
272. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17g-1.
273. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41); 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-4 (directors are responsible for valuing
portfolio securities and other assets for which market quotations are not rzadily available).
274. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-l(b).
275. 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.17f-l, .17f-4, .17f-5.
276. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-1.
277. To be precise, the term "conflict of interest" should be distinguished from "self-dealings."
For a definition of such terms in the context of publicly-held corporatiois, see, e.g., Robert Charles
Clark, Corporate Law 141, 159 (1986). Following the usage of the SEC, this Article uses the term
"conflict of interest" to refer to transactions with affiliated persons covered by the Act. See SEC
Report, supra note 12, at 255.
278. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev.
1599, 1563 (1989).
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investors can hardly rely on market discipline to monitor transactions
that are significantly redistributive. Significantly redistributive
transactions are transactions that involve a potential transfer of
significant value from investors (or the segregated assets of the fund) to
the Adviser. For such transactions, market discipline may not be
effective in discouraging the manager from seeking value-decreasing
transactions if the size of the potential transfer involved (the distributive
element) is significantly larger than the magnitude of the potential effect
on overall value (the efficiency element)." 9
For instance, market forces may not be adequate in disciplining
transactions between the investment company and the Adviser or its
affiliates. The Adviser would want to conduct these transactions because
the direct benefit to it or its affiliates may substantially exceed the
adverse effects on its compensation from reductions in net asset value.
Under these circumstances, investors may need directors to scrutinize or
approve such transactions.
In the Act, directors were given only limited duties. Rules adopted
since 1940, however, have increased the board's duties. °  The
promulgation of these rules was the beginning of a substantial shift of
responsibilities for detailed oversight from the SEC to directors.28 ' The
underlying rationale for the current approach is that it limits the number
of affiliated transactions requiring SEC approval and is, therefore, less
costly and more efficient. As a substitute for SEC oversight, however,
the board approval mechanism brings significant costs if its own. As
discussed above, the board's approval mechanism may be costly because
of the lack of independence and the opportunities for influence costs.
Hence, alternatives should be considered.
In addition to adding more exclusions,... one possibility is to replaceboard screening with inflexible or prophylactic rules (i.e., to detail the
279. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1437, 1461-67 (1992).
280. In 1980, the SEC eliminated absolute prohibitions in the statute if the directors or the
independent directors adopted and monitored procedures to protect investors. There is some
contention that the increased responsibilities may have caused directors to become even more
susceptible to control by the Adviser. See Tamar Frankel, Money Market Funds, 14 Rev. Sec. of
Commodities Reg. 913, 915 n.18 (1981).
281. See West Report, supra note 1, at 20. In addition, the SEC Report recommends permitting
mutual funds to engage in some transactions with remote affiliates with the approval of their
directors, including their independent directors. See SECReport, supra note 12, at 488-91.
282. Recognizing the need to eliminate SEC review for transactions that do not pose significant
potential for abuse, the SEC Division recommends some exclusions and changes to the current
regulations on affiliated transactions. See SEC Report, supra note 12, at 482-501.
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prohibited affiliated transactions in the contract and prospectus). Thus,
for example, the criteria to be followed by an Advise:. of a money market
fund to comply with Regulation 2a-7 could be detailed in the contract.
Of course, one disadvantage of such inflexible rules is that they would
impose opportunity costs on mutual funds. But compared to the
potential costs of board discretion, such opportunity costs may well be
marginal.283
This is not to argue that the board should play no role in policing
operational conflicts. Some transactions are so unique as to require
individual consideration by the board. Under such circumstances, the
board should be given an oversight function. These transactions include
open-ended conflicts which can only be policed on an ad hoc basis. For
example, brokerage commissions paid on the fund's portfolio
transactions are, by their very nature, variable costs. To police the
potential conflicts of interests between the Adviser and brokers, a rule
requiring the Adviser to use only unaffiliated brokers would not be
desirable. Such a rule would not only impose opportunity costs on the
fund but, more importantly, would not eliminate concerns about
reciprocal agreements.284
3. Monitoring Compliance
In addition to the specific functions relating to the evaluation of fees
and operational conflicts, the board assumes a narrow supervisory
283. In this regard, the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance also takes this position.
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 5.09 (Proposed Final Draft
1992). Section 5.09 (Effect of a Standard of the Corporation) provides that if a director or senior
executive relies upon a standard that authorizes certain conflict-of-interest transactions, and the
standard was authorized in advance by disinterested directors, following proper disclosure, the
standard is to be deemed equivalent to an authorization of the action in advance by disinterested
directors. Such a rule provides a practical convenience for the treatment of conflict-of-interest
transactions, because after such a standard is initially adopted, it can be employed on a recurring
basis without the usual formalities of disinterested board approval. Id.
284. For the same reason, in proposing the unitary investment ftaid model the Investment
Company Institute recommended that specific trustee oversight on this matter should be an exception
to the general rule that the trustee not function as a substitute for the board. See Investment
Company Institute, Comments on the Reform of Regulation of Investment Companies 32 (1990).
Since negotiated commission rates have been introduced, an Adviser's duty to obtain the best
execution has become more complex. For a discussion of the selection of brokers and payment of
commissions by institutional managers, see, e.g., Applicability of tae Commissioner's Policy
Statement on the Future Structure of Securities Markets to Selection of Brokers and Payment of
Commissions by Institutional Managers, Exchange Act Release No. 9,598 [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. 78,776 (May 9, 1972).
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function that can be called the "compliance function. '285 Pursuant to
such a function, the directors are charged with the responsibility of
reviewing the adequacy of the fund procedures for ensuring that its
employees comply with all applicable laws and regulations. In this
context, the directors basically perform a whistle-blower function-they
are required to take reasonable care to ensure that the fund is
administered in accordance with applicable laws and regulations as well
as contractual terms. For instance, although the directors may not have
sufficient expertise to develop policies on how fund assets should be
invested, they do have the responsibility to see that the Adviser's
investment strategy is consistent with the goals of most shareholders.
Like a trustee in a trust indenture,286 directors exercise limited
discretion in conducting the supervisory function. In other words,
conducting such function does not necessarily involve many business
judgments. Since directors' compliance monitoring is subject to rules
and regulation and as such involves limited influence costs, the
compliance function is justified.
To carry out this gatekeeper function, directors need to be equipped
with a discovery function-the authority to discover the misconduct or
violation.287 Such duties include taking actions to investigate and report
possible misconduct to appropriate authorities. Some commentators
have argued that the efficacy of the directors in actually discovering
mistakes or bad practices is exaggerated. It is invariably the auditor,
SEC inspection, confession, or disclosure by the Manager that uncovers
these situations-not the investigative work of the directors.288 The SEC
Report seems to recognize this point. Specifically, it recommends that
285. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-1.
286. An example is the indenture trustee. A standard term in a trust indenture reads: "The trustee
undertakes to perform such duties and only such duties as are specifically set forth in this Indenture,
and no implied covenants or obligations shall be read into this Indenture against the Trustee." See
Sullivan & Cromwell, Standard Closed-End Indenture Provisions: Unsecured Securities Offered in
the United States 42 (1985). This provision conforms to section 315 (a)(1) of the Trust Indenture
Act of 1939: "[t]he indenture trustee shall not be liable except for the performance of such duties as
are specifically set out in such indenture." 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(a)(1) (1988).
287. An example of this kind of "failure to supervise" obligation is stipulated in section
15(b)(4)(E) of the Security Act of 1934. This section imposes sanctions against a broker-dealer if
the firm has "failed reasonably to supervise, with a view to preventing violations [of federal
securities laws], another person who commits such a violation, if such other person is subject to his
supervision." 18 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E).
288. See West Report, supra note 1, at 64.
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rules that impose specific duties and responsibilities on the directors
should not require them to "micro-manage" operational matters.289
4. Overseeing the Fund's Operation
The duties imposed on directors by the Act are in addition to those
imposed by state law. Under state law the role of the board of directors
is to provide management direction. Hence, pursuant to a typical
investment advisory contract, the Adviser of the fund is required to make
all investment decisions in a manner consistent with the fund's
investment objectives and policies and is subject to the overall
supervision of the fund's board of directors. Thus, by subjecting the
Adviser to its direction and supervision, the board is authorized to
intervene in or exercise decision control over some internal activities of
the Adviser to the extent that such activities relate to the investment
process of the fund.
a. Directorial Function
An active board has many reasons to assume some directorial
functions. For example, when a pattern of poor performance develops,
the independent directors may ask the Adviser for an explanation. If
they are not satisfied with this explanation, they are entitled to make
further inquiries before deciding whether to continue: the contract. For
instance, they can review the investment management process or help
define the investment strategy of the fund. However, one cannot,
without distorting the nature of the mutual fund, apply to fund directors
the same freedom or responsibilities in the remaking of fund policy as
are applied to corporate directors in other types of businesses.
As discussed above, mutual fund management consists primarily of
investing and reinvesting money according to a stated policy. Occasions
for business judgments, apart from the simple determinations of whether
and when to buy and sell securities, occur only rarely. For example,
whether and how much to pay dividends, a recurrent policy problem for
corporate directors, is, as a matter of practice, automatically determined
in the operation of a mutual fund. Under such circumstances, why
should the Adviser be subject to the overall supervision of the fund's
board of directors?
289. See SEC Report, supra note 12, at 266, 269-271.
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In a multi-divisional firm (e.g., publicly-held corporations), the board
of directors normally would provide the benefits of facilitating internal
coordination290 or making strategic decisions.29' This is not the case for
mutual funds. As discussed above, because the organization of a mutual
fund is non-complex and fund management requires specialized
knowledge,292 the investment company does not need a centralized body
such as the board to coordinate production activities or make strategic
decisions. In other words, because the investment company is a legal
shell only, the centralized board cannot be justified as a hierarchical
superior within the entity.
The real economic actor that the board would want to supervise is, of
course, the Adviser. Assume that the X fund performed poorly last
quarter-say the yield rate has fallen within the bottom quarter of all
funds in the same category. The directors of the fund feel strongly
(presumably with good reasons) that the individual portfolio manager
should be replaced. The Adviser, however, has expressed full
confidence in the individual portfolio manager and believes that his poor
performance is really temporary.293 Under these circumstances, should
the board intervene by asking the Adviser to replace the portfolio
manager? If the board makes such a request (or demand), should the
Adviser comply with the direction or should it follow its own judgment?
If the Adviser decides to comply, then to what extent should the board
get involved in the selection and replacement process?
290. For example, one of the primary functions of the board in multi-divisional firms is to
coordinate activities among large and complex organizations. Because the agents/managers of the
firm are bounded-rational in information processing, communication, and computation, they are
limited by their capacity to learn. In hierarchical organizations, the coordination problem can
usually be solved by authority. The boss is able to coordinate decisions of his subordinates by
receiving from them reports concerning the information they possess, and by telling them what to do.
Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 155, at 150-58.
291. In the literature of organizational economics, hierarchy is viewed as a mechanism in which a
strategic decision centrally made at the top level is decomposed through each successful level into a
command of specialized tasks for each operating unit at the bottom level. The major benefit arising
from this mechanism is the utilization of economies of specialization in operating tasks. That is why
modem corporations-the so-called M-form firms-are characterized by a top team of generalists
(i.e., the board of directors). See Oliver F. Williamson, Organization Form, Residual Claimants, and
Corporate Control, 26 J.L. & Econ. 351,351-55 (1983).
292. See supra part IV.B.1.
293. In the mutual fund business past performance is no guarantee of an Adviser's future. See,
e.g., Barbara Donnelly, Past Is No Guarantee of Manager's Future, Wall St. J., Oct. 27 1992, at Cl
("Short term losers aren't necessarily bad managers. They may just be the victims of bad luck. The
shorter the track record under consideration, the harder it is to know for sure who's competent and
who's not.").
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The Adviser is rewarded or punished as a result of good or bad
performance. Its profits and compensation depend on the operation and
success of the fund. In contrast, the directors of the fund receive a fixed
salary only. Between the Adviser and the directors of the fund, who is
better motivated to ensure the superb performance of the fund? If a fund
performs poorly and many investors redeem their shares, who is going to
suffer the most? The reality is that the individual portfolio manager (or
the internal management committee) is accountable 1.o the Adviser, and
the directors of a fund should not have the power to change the
operational aspects of the fund."' The board should defer to the
Adviser's legitimate interest in controlling the portfolio management
process. Thus, the internal hierarchy of the Adviser (and its own board)
should decide for itself who should run the fund and how to run it.
It may be argued that since the boards of most funds will choose to be
passive supervisors anyway, the fact that they are empowered to interfere
will not cause troubles and incur costs. As the example discussed above
illustrates, the board's intervention could incur the cost of information
acquisition, negotiations, and time. More importantly, directorial
monitoring gives the board considerable discretion to make decisions
that can affect the benefits and costs of the operations of a particular
mutual fund, thereby inviting influence activities from the Adviser.
Given the entangled relationship between the board and the Adviser,
such influence activities could easily lead to coalition politics.
b. Dispute Resolution Function
The board of directors does provide one potential benefit in exercising
residual decision-making power.295 Assume that an investor of a mutual
fund alleges, without foundation, that the Adviser has made certain
improper expense allocations. Because the management contract does
not provide a clue as to how to deal with such an unforeseen
contingency, the board of the fund is authorized to conduct an
investigation and make a business judgment as to the merits of the claim.
Hopefully, its informed decision can protect the Adviser against
unwarranted charges of improper allocation. When mistakes or
294. See Nathan D. Lobell, The Mutual Fund: A Structural Analysis, 47 Va. L. Rev. 181, 192
(1961).
295. One may interpret "owning an asset" to mean having the residual rights of control-that is,
the right to make any decisions concerning the asset's use that are not expticitly controlled by law or
assigned to others by contract. See, e.g., Grossman & Hart, supra note 150; Oliver Hart & John
Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1119 '1990).
1000
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violations of law do occur, the independent directors are able to exert
pressure on the Adviser to act in the best interest of shareholders.
Actions that may be taken by the Adviser include prompt and full
disclosure of the problem or reimbursement to the mutual fund so that
shareholders are properly remedied.
Assume further that an employee of the Manager has made an
inadvertent mistake in calculating the daily net asset value of the fund.
From the point of view of the Manager, an approval mechanism would
serve to protect it from liabilities for taking various actions which it
believes are in the best interest of the fund. Without informed approval
by the third party, these decisions would have to made by the regulators
(e.g., the SEC) or, if litigation ensued, the courts. Whether the internal
decision-making body is more desirable than the external mechanisms
(e.g., regulators and courts) depends on a number of factors: the costs of
corporate governance, the costs of influence activities, and the costs and
institutional competence of such external mechanisms. 96
c. Summary
In conclusion, the board of directors of the Corporate Fund provides
few benefits in the way of facilitating coordination and making strategic
decisions. On the other hand, the selective intervention system could
incur significant costs, including influence costs and intervention costs.
Finally, the residual decision-making power of the board does provide
some benefits by settling disputes internally.
C. SEC Reform Proposals
The SEC Report reexamined the adequacy of the governance structure
for investment companies. It concluded that the corporate regulatory
structure is fundamentally sound and should be retained, with limited
modifications. With respect to the board of directors, the Division
believes that the structure can be streamlined and improved by changes
to both the board's structure and its responsibilities. With respect to
shareholder voting, the Division proposed to eliminate several obsolete
shareholder voting requirements and to modify others to comport with
296. For a discussion of the court's competence in settling disputes on corporate law, see John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89
Colum. L. Rev. 1618 (1989).
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the realities of modem-day securities markets. This section evaluates
these reform proposals.
1. The Role of the Board of Directors
The SEC Report proposed three modifications with respect to the
board of directors. First, it recommended certain measures to enhance
the independence of the board of directors. Second, independent board
members should be given separate authority to protect shareholder
interests by terminating advisory contracts. Third, the Report
recommended eliminating provisions in certain rules under the Act that
make independent directors responsible for detailed findings of fact or
for reviews and findings that involve more ritual than substance. 97
By and large, these proposals would both streamline the structure and
increase the responsibilities of the board of directors. For instance, the
proposal to increase the minimum proportion of indep endent directors on
the board from forty percent to a majority would enhaice the
independence of the board. In addition, because a board of directors is
ill-equipped to "micro-manage" operational matters, rules that impose
specific duties and responsibilities on the independent directors are
appropriately eliminated. Because these proposals can be undertaken
without undue expense, they should be implemented.
However, even if the proposals are adopted, the Corporate Fund still
demonstrates an over-reliance on the board of directors.298 Consider, for
example, the proposal to give independent board members separate
authority to terminate advisory contracts.299 Although the law is fairly
specific about the process of approving and terminating contracts, it does
not require the board to specify the reasons for replacing an Adviser.
Since the primary function of the board is to monitor the Adviser's
297. See SEC Report, supra note 12, at 266-271.
298. For a discussion of court cases where independent directors have not successfully challenged
or even attempted to challenge certain management actions that allegedty violated the Act's self-
dealing prohibitions, see Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-leavenly City or Potemkin
Village?, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 597 (1982).
299. Section 15(c) provides that entry into or renewal of the contract must be approved by vote of
at least a majority of the independent directors. To facilitate such an evaluation, section 15(c) further
provides the directors with information rights (the right to obtain relevant information from the
manager). 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c). Management contracts continuing in effect for a period of more
than two years must be approved annually by either the full board or a majority of the company's
outstanding shares. § 80a-15(a)(2). The full board has the authority to terminate the management
contract at any time, but such authority is not expressly given to the indapendent directors. § 80a-
15(a)(3).
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performance, presumably "bad performance" is one of the main reasons
for replacement.
The individualistic nature of the mutual fund investment makes this
power unnecessary. Viewed from a contractual perspective, parties to
the mutual fund should expect the fund to be long-standing as a
collective investment vehicle. Some might argue that, since the quality
of a mutual fund is non-contractible, a mutual fund should be of limited
duration. But this is already true: due to the availability of a redemption
right, the mutual fund contract is, in effect, a contract of indefinite
duration. Regardless of whether the board is given the right to renew or
terminate the contract, investors could always terminate the contract on
an individual basis, with low costs.
This individualistic approach more accurately reflects the realities of
mutual fund investment, because the duration of the contract with the
fund is decided by the individual investor, rather than by a collective
decision-making process. After all, securities investment is a personal
decision. Just as there are a variety of theories on when and which funds
to buy, so are there numerous strategies for selling. For instance, factors
that may contribute to an individual's decision to sell may include the
fact that the portfolio manager has changed, the expense ratio has grown
unreasonable, the performance is consistently lagging that of a
comparable stock or index, or the performance is lagging behind that of
funds with a similar style. Given these diverse individual reasons for
deciding to sell, why authorize the board to review or terminate the
management contract?
Some may argue that the fear of firing may have a salutary effect,
acting as a deterrent to shirking and managerial consumption of
excessive perquisites. However, investors' redemption rights can
achieve the same goal, and replacing the Adviser is simply not a practical
option under normal circumstances. The Adviser, not the investment
company or its board, manages the fund's portfolio and operates its daily
business.00 Furthermore, the Adviser and its affiliates often are the
fund's other service providers. These factors make termination much
more difficult.
Moreover, many investors invest in a fund based on the Adviser's
reputation and would leave the fund should the Adviser be terminated.
Hence, the possibility of disrupting the fund's operation and the risks and
uncertainty involved in replacing the Adviser with a new and untested
300. Securities and Exch. Comm'n., Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth,
H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1966).
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one make termination of the existing advisory relation an unrealistic
alternative for the board.3"' In effect, if the board replaces the Adviser, it
would have to set up a new fund. The authority of the board to replace
the Adviser on the ground of bad performance also raises a legitimacy
issue. Since reasonable persons could differ on what constitutes "bad"
performance, evaluating the Adviser's performance should be left to
individual investors. Probably because of such concerns, boards of
directors seldom fire mutual fund Advisers.302 It therefore may be
desirable to encourage the long-term stability of the joint undertaking. 3
This is not, however, to argue that the board should not have the
authority to fire the Adviser under any circumstances. The Adviser
should be fired if and only if it materially breaches the management
contract or if there is a fundamental change of circumstances that
frustrates the purpose of the mutual fund. This is desirable because these
are causes for termination that the investors would have agreed upon had
they been consulted. For example, the law could provide that the
Adviser should be fired when it is insolvent or when it is reasonable to
believe that removal is in the best interest of all investors." This
"floodgate approach" would minimize the monitoring costs because the
board would not expend duplicative efforts to monitor the performance
of the Adviser.
Some might argue that board members take the severity of their
decision to terminate an Adviser into account when making replacement
decisions. However, since the Adviser may expend resources trying to
bring about a renewal decision, the carte blanche approach would incur
301. Id. at 131. As one representative in the industry argues: "Having given the [fund] our name,
we feel ourselves responsible, and we would refuse to permit anyone else to manage them."
Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before 2 Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 600 (1940).
302. See, e.g., Renberg, supra note 253, at M14. For instance, recent statistics show that 15 funds
ranked in the bottom 25% of all stock funds in at least 7 of the past 10 calendar years, and some of
the Advisers that generated such bad results with alarming regularity are still around. See Jonathan
Clements, Some of These Turkeys Never See Gravy, Wall St. J., Nov. 27, 1992, at C1.
303. For example, arguing against free termination of the management contract by the Adviser,
one authority in the United Kingdom observed that being able to promote a scheme to the public
carries with it a responsibility to continue the scheme for so long as there are investors wishing to
participate. See Vaughan, supra note 115, at 36-42.
304. In the United Kingdom, for example, the circumstances under wh ch a trustee may remove
the manager include (a) that the manager has gone into liquidation, and (b) that the trustee has good
and sufficient reason to believe that a change of manager is in the interests of the holders. See id. at
36.
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significant costs arising from influence activities.30 5 Because both the
board and the investors monitor the same type of activities, this would
yield overlapping monitoring costs. From an economic perspective, both
under-monitoring and over-monitoring are undesirable.
2. The Role of Shareholder Voting
It is important to note at the outset that the description of investors as
"shareholders" in the Corporate Fund does not suggest that they are
entitled to the same set of shareholder rights as corporate shareholders.
Their participation rights should be based on a cost/benefit analysis of
collective decision-making in the fund context rather than a
preconception of the rights associated with "shareholder" or "owner."
As discussed above, shareholder voting is a means for investors to
participate in fund governance. The combination of explicit contracts,
structural rules, and fiduciary rules still leaves much to the discretion of
the board. Thus, shareholder voting must fill in the details. However,
because voting is expensive, mutual fund investors may desire to
conserve its use. Indeed, the collective action problems that attend
voting in large business organizations suggest that voting rarely serves
any function except in extremis. When many are entitled to vote, no one
expects to have sufficient votes to decide the contest. Consequently,
none of the voters has the appropriate incentive to study the fund's
affairs and vote intelligently. On the other hand, shareholder voting does
play an important role in connection with a limited range of investment
company operational activities such as investment company mergers or
changes in an investment company's investment objective.
Admittedly, the cost of shareholder voting has decreased significantly
as a result of an interpretive position that the Act does not require an
annual meeting to elect directors.3"6 In addition, several states have
special corporate law structures that effectively do not require
shareholder meetings other than those required by the Act.3 7 These
305. Consider an example of such a cost: during the contract renewal time, ordinarily one
function of legal counsel is to prepare a memorandum (almost universally called in the trade the
"Gartenberg Memorandum," after the famous § 36(b) fee litigation) summarizing for the directors
their responsibilities under relevant laws. See Friedman, supra note 265, at 56.
306. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., supra note 85. This no-action letter pointed out that section 16(a)
expressly requires a meeting to elect directors only (1) for the initial board and (2) to fill vacancies if
less than a majority of the board is elected by shareholders. The letter took the position that the
necessity for annual meetings was generally a question of state law.
307. Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3806 (Supp. 1992); Md. Code Ann., Corps & Ass'ns § 2-501(b)
(Supp. 1991).
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positions suggest that shareholder voting requirements should be
streamlined but not eliminated.
The SEC Report proposed to eliminate several obsolete shareholder
voting requirements," 8 to modify others to comport with the realities of
modem-day securities markets, and to add an express voting requirement
for changes in investment objectives.30 9 These recommendations are
premised on the belief that investors should continue to have the
opportunity to vote on proposals that significantly alter the nature of the
investment.
However, the election voting requirements serve no practical purpose.
The Corporate Fund provides shareholders with the right to elect the
board of directors to operate the investment company in the best interest
of the shareholders.3"0 For this purpose, section 16(a) expressly requires
a shareholder meeting to elect directors (1) for the initial board; and (2)
to fill vacancies if less than a majority of the board is elected by
shareholders.31'
Election voting is used to delegate (and recall) monitoring functions to
the board of directors. Unlike election voting in publicly-held
corporations, which serves many important functions," 2 election voting
in mutual funds seldom plays an important role. The reasons are
twofold. First, there is no analog in the mutual fund context to the large
shareholder in the corporation who may be willing to undertake
monitoring, either directly or through voting. In fact, voting in publicly-
held corporations is often justified by the market for corporate control,
which functions through the processes of proxy fights, direct purchase of
shares, and mergers.3 3 In contrast, the market for corporate control is
308. These include ratification of investment company auditors, initial approval of advisory
contracts and rule 12b-1 plans. See SEC Report, supra note 12, at 277-78.
309. The SEC Report recommended that §§ 8(b) and 13(a) of the Act be amended to classify as
fundamental a company's investment objective. Id. at 278.
310. Despite the usual link between risk of loss and control, in some situations the holders of the
principal residual claim may be entirely content not to have control. See William A. Klein, The
Modem Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 Yale L.J. 1551, 1557-59 (1982);
see also Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete
Contracts, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 927 (1990) (noting that the distinguishing featare of franchising is that
franchisees own assets that are subject to the franchisor's control).
311. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16(a).
312. For a discussion of shareholder participation in the governance of pLblicly-held corporations,
see, e.g., SEC, StaffReport on Corporate Accountability (1980).
313. Some commentators have justified voting on the ground of its function as a corporate control
mechanism. This is because collective action problems may be overcome by aggregating the shares
(and the attached votes) through acquisitions, such as mergers and takeovers. See Henry G. Manne,
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practically non-existent for mutual funds.314 For instance, arguing that
shareholder voting in mutual funds serves a "largely ritualistic purpose,"
one observer pointed out that there have been no shareholder director
nominees selected to oppose management nominees, no instances where
an incumbent manager has been ousted through a proxy fight, and
apparently no successful opposition to any management proposal for a
management contract or for other matters requiring a vote.315
Second, the extent of voting is influenced by the existence of adequate
dissenters' remedies such as redemption rights. Mutual fund investors
have a trade-off between liquidity and control. Investors that want
liquidity may hesitate to accept control. 16 The importance of "liquidity"
to mutual fund investors cannot be overemphasized-in most mutual
fund prospectuses, the issue of redemption always occupies a prominent
place. 17 If an easy, low-cost exit (e.g., redemption rights) is possible, the
members will rationally have less interest in exercising a more costly
"voice."3 8 Thus, one report on mutual funds concluded that "the very
concept of shareholder control through the exercise of voting rights may
be contrary to the realities of the mutual fund business."3 9
Since most mutual funds have a heavy institutional component, one
possibility is that these institutional investors could initiate changes in
board composition. Such institutions, for example, could comment on
nominees for director positions to ensure that the most qualified persons
are elected as independent directors. Institutional investors, of course,
are faced with the exit/voice option. Unlike institutional investors in
Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1427 (1964) (arguing that shareholder
voting is important chiefly as a necessary incident to the market for corporate control).
314. See SEC Report, supra note 12, at 273.
315. See Phillips, supra note 4, at 908.
316. For a discussion of such a tradeoff for institutional shareholders in participating in corporate
governance, see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as
Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277 (1991).
317. For instance, the Table of Contents of the prospectus of Fidelity Magellan Fund contains 18
headings. One of them is entitled How to Redeem Shares. Fidelity Magellan Fund, Prospectus 2
(May 20, 1993).
318. This argument, of course, is a context-specific application of Hirschman's generalization that
the members of any organization face a choice between "exit" and "voice." See Hirschman, supra
note 198.
319. Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds, H.R. Rep. No. 2274,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1962). The SEC does not dispute the contention that mutual fund
shareholders are passive. The SEC Staff Report noted that many observers have told the staff that
mutual funds often find it difficult to obtain a quorum, meeting attendance is usually sparse, and a
vote outcome is almost never contrary to the wishes of the investment adviser. See SEC Report,
supra note 12, at 273 n.82.
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publicly held corporations, however, there is no empirical evidence that
mutual fund institutional investors are actively involved in the election
process or have placed their representatives on investment company
boards of directors. Institutional investors of publicly held corporations
and those of mutual funds differ in one major respect: the former often
cannot sell much of their portfolio in any reasonable time frame, while
the latter have much more liquidity and thus are less stuck with the
investment.3
21
D. Concluding Remarks: The Board as Coordinator-Monitor
A mutual fund is a trilateral arrangement comprised of three
actors-the Adviser, the investors, and the Monitor. The Corporate Fund
has been characterized as an intermediate form of business organization
which, contrasted with the Contractual Fund models in Germany, Japan,
and the United Kingdom, is more centralized in its decision-making
functions. Adopting organizational efficiency as a positive principle, this
Article has developed a contractual framework to explain when the
specific monitoring functions should be allocated to the Monitor (or the
board of directors in the case of the Corporate Fund). Based on the
foregoing discussions, the following observations are warranted.
The Corporate Fund can be regarded as a semi-hiererchy. To evaluate
the institutional competence of the board, it is essential to inquire into the
board's independence and informational advantage. As I have argued
above, because directors are not truly independent, they are vulnerable to
coalition politics. In addition, because directors have a limited
informational advantage over investors, it may not be realistic to expect
them to strike the best deals for investors. In this respect, traditional
monitoring devices such as fiduciary duties and incentive-compatible
contracts are not effective devices to discipline the performance of the
board. Thus, the semi-hierarchy of the board leads to transaction costs
such as influence costs and intervention costs.
In a Corporate Fund, the board's responsibilities can be divided into
four categories: (1) approval of fees and expenses; (2) scrutiny of
operational conflicts; (3) monitoring of compliance:, and (4) general
oversight. Four comments are in order with respect to the effectiveness
of these specific responsibilities. First, the board structure has not been
320. Institutional investors, who increasingly own large unmarketable blocks, must accept
substantial price discounts in order to liquidate these blocks. See Coffee, supra note 316, at
1288-89.
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effective in policing economic terms such as fees and expenses. Second,
it may be desirable for the directors to approve operational transactions
that are significantly redistributive in nature. However, to minimize
influence activities, some of the board's discretion should be replaced by
inflexible rules. Third, the board should be responsible for ensuring that
the Adviser and its affiliates comply with the rules and regulations
governing the mutual fund's operations. Fourth, as a general rule, the
board's "directorial" function-telling the Adviser how to manage the
mutual fund-is unwarranted. However, as a dispute resolution
mechanism, the board's approval functions can sometimes protect the
Adviser against charges of improper conduct.
The board of directors of the Corporate Fund should be regarded as
not only the "Monitor" but also the "Coordinator" of mutual fund
operations. From an organizational perspective, the board may not be
uniquely qualified to function as Coordinator. For one thing, the board's
independence and informational advantage may be more apparent than
real. In addition, the Corporate Fund does not provide economic
incentives and effective devices to discipline the board's performance.
Fortunately, the market has largely "practiced around" the institutional
design of the Corporate Fund. Rather than acting as an active
coordinator, the board mainly serves as a passive Monitor.32' However,
because the market cannot contract around all the inefficient legal rules
applicable to the Corporate Fund, the Corporate Fund still incurs
significant transaction costs.
Once we realize that the Corporate Fund may be economically costly,
alternative mutual fund structures should be considered.3" For instance,
because the board exercises broad discretion and cannot be effectively
monitored, perhaps discretion should not be allocated to the board in the
first place. One way to achieve this is to adopt structural rules so that
investors themselves can evaluate and discipline mutual funds more
easily. After all, what the investors can do for themselves should not
create duties for the board of directors. We should therefore be willing
to look afresh at the merits of alternative mutual fund structures.
321. The debate over passive versus active boards is not limited to mutual funds. For instance,
Scott suggests two fundamental and contrasting perspectives for publicly-held corporations. The
"active model" of monitoring requires directors to inquire and obtain information about the firm and
to be active participants in corporate decision-making. The "passive model" of monitoring requires
the board to play a mostly formal role in policy-making. Under this model monitoring would focus
not on the formation of policy decisions but on the results of these decisions such as replacement
decisions. See Scott, supra note 236, at 933-35.
322. See supra part IHI.D.
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VI. AN EVALUATION OF THE CONTRACTUAL FUND
As discussed in part V above, by employing a semi-hierarchical
governance structure, the Corporate Fund incurs significant transaction
costs. The question is whether these costs can be cut by an alternative
governance structure that is less costly. The alternative examined here is
a contractual arrangement that is not independent of its Sponsor and
Adviser.
A. Conceptual Analysis of the Contractual Fund
The following analysis consists of three parts. Part one posits that the
Adviser, rather than the board, should assume the central role as the
coordinator of a mutual fund. Part two considers a contractual
governance system where market forces could effectively prevent post-
contractual opportunism and discipline performance-related terms
stipulated in the bilateral contract. Part three focuses on institutional
monitoring arrangements designed to address contractual failures.
1. The "Investment Manager" as Coordinator
To understand the concept of the Contractual Fund, it is important to
view the role of the Adviser as the coordinator of the mutual fund's
operations, not merely as an outside service provider. This claim is
supported by three arguments. First, from the standpoint of efficiency,
the sponsoring and the advisory functions can usually be conducted by
the same business firm, an investment manager ("Investment Manager").
Second, the Investment Manager should have common control over
periphery activities such as distribution and administration. Third, the
Investment Manager should be allowed to write its own ticket; that is, its
handiwork is final in all but exceptional instances.
a. Investment Manager as Sponsor and Adviser
First, consider the possibility of combining the functions of the
Adviser and the Sponsor in the Investment Manager. As discussed
above, the Sponsor 23 and the Adviser each perform a distinct economic
function: the Sponsor pays the seed capital and takes entrepreneurial
risks, while the Adviser provides investment advisory service. While the
323. For the concept of the "Sponsor," see supra notes 120-21 and accorpanying text.
1010
Vol. 69:927, 1994
Mutual Fund Structures
Adviser is invariably licensed as an investment adviser, the Sponsor may
be licensed as an investment adviser, a broker-dealer, an insurance
company, or even a bank. Under the current regulatory scheme the
Adviser and the Sponsor may or may not be the same business firm.
Consider the entrepreneurial risks assumed by the Sponsor. A mutual
fund is the embodiment of the Sponsor's efforts, expenses, and
goodwill.324 The Sponsor identifies the opportunity, pays the seed
capital,3"s and bears the organizational expenses and entrepreneurial risk
of organizing a fund.326 It usually incurs initial losses when establishing
a fund, i.e., it absorbs the expenses investors would be forced to shoulder
if the fund were internally managed. In addition, it might have to
shoulder the unprofitable burden of selling and distributing its shares
during the formative period at heavy expense and small return. Thus,
Sponsors run the risk that their organizational and promotional efforts
will not result in sufficient funds under management to adequately
reward them for their services.
The entrepreneurial reward of a mutual fund Sponsor may be
distinguished from that of a corporate Sponsor. A corporate Sponsor's
entrepreneurial risk is rewarded in the form of capital appreciation of the
firm's corporate shares when the entrepreneur sells off a portion of the
firm's residual claims to investors.327 At the initial stage, the corporate
Sponsor often acquires his ownership interest in the corporation-equity
shares-at a cost lower than that paid by other equity shareholders who
invest in the corporation later on. The corporate Sponsor is rewarded
later by selling, in an initial public offering, all (if he wants to drop his
managerial position) or some (if he wants to retain his managerial
position) of his stock.
In contrast, mutual fund Sponsors cannot share in the success of their
entrepreneurial efforts in the same way as corporate entrepreneurs do
324. In fact, because Advisers are the sponsors of mutual funds, they sometimes claim the right to
the name of the mutual fund which they created. See 2 Tamar Frankel, supra note 24, at 208-12.
325. Section 14(a)(1) of the Act provides that a mutual fund should have a net worth of at least
100,000 dollars prior to the commencement of a public offering of its securities. 15 U.S.c. § 80a-14.
"Legislative history indicates that Congress imposed a minimum net worth requirement for [mutual
funds] to prevent organizers [from] forming and later abandoning the company to the detriment of
investors." Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on H.R. Doc. No. 10065 Before
a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Interstate andForeign Com., 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 116 (1940).
326. No reputable distributor would offer shares of a mutual fund whose initial balance sheet
shows a large capital deficit due to organization expenses.
327. Similarly, the costs of bearing the risk of the enterprise is reflected in residual earnings.
Consequently, in his capacity as the shareholder, the promoter shares both risk and return of the
corporate enterprise. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 52, at 8-15.
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because mutual funds cannot issue cheap stock.328 A mutual fund, by
definition, stands ready to redeem its own shares upor the demand of the
investors at the net asset value of the enterprise. 29 In addition, the value
of a fund's shares is always directly related to the market value of the
fund's portfolio. No mutual fund shares may be sold at less than the
"current public offering price" described in a prospectus.3  Thus,
Advisers cannot receive shares for their sponsoring services, brand
equity and organizational expenses because reallocation of equity
ownership to Advisers is not permitted.
As such, the entrepreneurial reward of a fund Sponsor comes not from
selling off cheap shares but from sources such as management fees. 3 '
Management fees can be considered as a reward for the initial
entrepreneurial risk each Adviser takes when it first organizes a fund and
as repayment of the losses experienced until the fund reaches an asset
level sufficient to be self-supporting. In addition, ongoing operation
risks may be considered to be an element of reasonable management.
For example, Advisers must bear the risks of general industry-wide
investor dissatisfaction or disinterest in mutual funds, with a consequent
reduction in sales and an increase in redemptions. Such disaffection may
be caused by extraneous considerations, such as economic recession,
rather than by the Adviser's poor performance. Thus, the management
fees can be justified both as compensation for advisory services provided
by the Adviser and as the reward for entrepreneurial risks taken by the
Sponsor.
From an economic standpoint, combining sponsoring and advisory
functions in an Investment Manager may be efficient. After all, it is very
328. Section 22(g) of the Act requires that shares be sold only in exchange for cash and securities,
except in cases of reorganization or dividend distribution to security holders. 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-
22(g).
329. Such pricing regulation is justified because existing and continuing investors should not have
the value of their units diluted as a result of the issuance and redemption of units of a mutual fund.
The principle on which pricing regulation is based is that of fairness between incoming, outgoing
and continuing participants. Congress was well aware of these potential abuses and adopted § 22 to
deal with the issue for mutual funds. See, e.g., West Report, supra note 1, at 3 1.
330. The baseline of that price must be the "current net asset value" of the fund. 15 U.S.C.
§ 22(a)l, 22(d). Most jurisdictions employ this single pricing system, under which prices are
calculated on the same basis regardless of whether units are being bought cr sold and irrespective of
whether a fund is growing or shrinking. In contrast, the United Kingdom adopts a "dual pricing
system" under which prices are determined by the offer and bid net asset values of a fund. These
prices are fixed at the discretion of the manager within the overall limits set by regulation. See Page
& Ferguson, supra note 54, at 194-96. The thrust of such differing pricing systems-to prevent
managerial abuse and to ensure non-dilution of assets-is the same.
331. See Sterrett, supra note 121, at 199.
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difficult to decide which portion of the management fees should be
considered as the reward for entrepreneurial risk and which portion the
compensation for management services. Under these circumstances
Investment Managers should be able to assume both functions and bear
the attendant risk and return of the mutual fund operation. In so doing,
the Investment Manager's entrepreneurial reward or compensation can
be contingent, to a significant degree, on the success of the business.
b. Common Control over Peripheral Activities
Second, periphery services such as distribution and administration
should be under the Investment Manager's control. Since distribution
services are complementary services, it may be more efficient to charge
the Investment Manager with the responsibility of determining how
mutual fund shares should be distributed. According to the principle of
unity of responsibility, complementary activities should be brought under
common control or ownership. 32 This policy makes it easier to evaluate
performance and costs and to provide incentives.
In fact, market practice has borne out this principle. Today, many
necessary marketing or operations services, including investment
advisory, administration, and distribution services, are provided by the
Adviser and its affiliates. For instance, although the Fidelity Magellan
Fund is managed by Fidelity Management & Research Company, its
investment advisory, distribution, and transfer agency services are
provided by other affiliates of the company.3 3  With respect to
distribution, the sale of fund shares is usually contracted out, on an
exclusive basis, to a "principal underwriter," which in most cases is the
Adviser itself or a close affiliate. Principal underwriters typically
confine themselves to wholesale transactions and leave the public selling
to independent retail dealers under a sales agreement.334
Admittedly, there is no bright line to delineate the boundary of a
mutual fund. Some activities (e.g., selling fund shares) may be
conducted by an internal branch of the Sponsor/Adviser, some by its
affiliates, and others by third-party service providers that are not related
332. Theorists on managerial science have developed this principle. According to this principle,
final responsibility for all the jobs needed to accomplish a particular task should reside with a single
entity. See, e.g., Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 155, at 410-11.
333. Fidelity Magellan Fund, Prospectus, May 20, 1993, at 3,23.
334. See SEC Report, supra note 12, at 291-94.
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to the Sponsor/Adviser at all.335 But we should not be too concerned
about how to draw the boundary between the mitual fund and the
market. Because there is a competitive market fbr these peripheral
services, it does not really matter whether the services are internalized or
conducted through market contracts.
c. Writing the Ticket
Once the Investment Manager has common control over the core
operations of the mutual fund, it should also be charged with the
responsibility of putting the mutual fund together. Why should this be
the case? The fundamental bargaining elements between the Investment
Manager and the Investors include risk of loss, return, and control.
Because these elements are interrelated, the person with the greatest risk
of loss generally will have control over the relationship. It follows that
allocation of control determines who has the right to make the various
decisions affecting the business.336
Although the Investment Manager is not a major shareholder of the
mutual fund, it is nevertheless a major stakeholder. Under the Jensen-
Meckling model, as the Investment Manager's stake in the enterprise
increases, its incentive to misbehave decreases. As a result, the need to
monitor is reduced.337  Because the Investment Manager shares
significant risks and returns in the mutual fund enterprise, it is natural for
it to share significant control as well. In other words, the Investment
Manager may be more justified in seeking "hire capital" from a group of
passive investors than in subordinating itself to a pre-monitoring
mechanism like the board of directors.
Once the Investment Manager becomes the Coordinator of the mutual
fund operations, it is feasible for investors to conduct bilateral bargaining
with the Investment Manager. As the Coordinator, the Investment
Manager is responsible for the mutual fund's design and operation and
for its success or failure. Thus, a mutual fund is not really independent
of the Investment Manager, because the fund is a financial product that
the Investment Manager produces.
335. In fact, many of the services are provided by the Sponsor/Manager itself or its affiliates. See,
e.g., SEC Report, supra note 12, at 255-60.
336. For a discussion of the interrelationship between risk, return, and control, see, e.g., William
A. Klein & John C. Coffee, Jr., Business Organization and Finance: Leg'l and Economic Principals
viii-x, 42-44 (3d ed. 1988).
337. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 56, at 305.
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This contractual arrangement may prove to be a blessing to the
investors. From their perspective, the contractual arrangement acts as a
"pay-as-you-go" vehicle. Because the investors can evaluate the
institutional reputation of the Investment Manager and price the contract
terms themselves, they have the ability to accept or reject the contractual
terms proposed by the Investment Manager. Once they are capable of
bargaining with the Investment Manager by themselves,338 it would be
redundant for a hierarchical higher-up such as the board of directors to
pre-approve these terms.
2. Contractual Governance and Market Discipline
Some have argued that the unique nature of the mutual fund industry
has made arm's-length bargaining impossible, and that the marketplace
consequently cannot be relied upon to curb excessive fees.339
Admittedly, by allowing the Investment Manager to write the ticket, we
should be concerned about the possibility of post-contractual
opportunistic behavior. To a considerable extent the contractual
governance structure is quite effective in controlling such behavior34
because it not only facilitates performance evaluation but also provides
perfect incentives. In particular, as far as economic terms are concerned,
arm's-length bargaining between the Investment Manager and the
investors is possible and should be permitted.
a. Perfonnance Evaluation
How does the contractual governance structure facilitate the
evaluation of the fund's performance? Recall that in the Corporate Fund
the investment company, acting through its board of directors, has to
enter into multiple service contracts with multiple service providers. As
discussed above, the board of directors of the Corporate Fund is not very
effective in allocating costs and expenses to mutual funds. The reasons
are twofold. First, directors of the Corporate Fund may lack
independence and informational advantages. Second, due to the
338. By bargaining, I mean the ability to change the results rather than merely the ability to
engage in the bargaining process.
339. See SEC, Report on the Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth, H.R.
Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1966).
340. There is extensive literature on self-enforcing contracts. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Keith
B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 615
(1981); L. G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. Bus. 27 (1980).
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complexity of a mutual fund's fee structures, it is very difficult for the
directors to effectively allocate indirect income and costs as well as to
determine entrepreneurial reward. Thus, for directors and investors
alike, determining fees is a ponderous task.
The Contractual Fund provides a solution to this coordination
problem. Because the Investment Manager and the investors of the
Contractual Fund have a direct contractual relationship, the Investment
Manager can set a single, fixed fee in exchange for all services necessary
for the fund's operation and can commit to provide or contract with third
parties for these services. All expenses, except brokerage commissions
on the fund's own portfolio transactions and extraordinary costs, would
be paid from the single fee or from the Investment Manager's own
resources. 341  To facilitate performance evaluation, the Investment
Manager can disclose the level of fees so that investors can evaluate the
"totality" of costs they pay for investing in a mutual find.
Some may argue that "bundling" the fee would leave investors
without specific information as to the costs of particular aspects of a
fund's operations. This should not be considered a disadvantage. Given
the complexity of current fee structures, few investors can analyze the
specific expense items in fund financial statements in a meaningful way.
Because the unitary fee structure of the Contractual Fund would result in
increased investor focus on bottom-line fund expenses, it can better
facilitate investors' evaluation of mutual fund performance. After all,
investors should be concerned primarily with the "totality" of the fund's
performance, including total returns and fees.342
b. Economic Incentives
As the Coordinator of the mutual fund's operations, the Investment
Manager must be properly motivated to provide good services. For
instance, the fee payable to the Investment Manager can be computed as
a percentage of fund assets and deducted from assets on a daily basis.343
Let us consider how such a compensation scheme could motivate the
Investment Manager to provide quality services to the investors.
341. See infra part VI.B.2.
342. Id.
343. As discussed above, incentive-compatible contracts can motivate the Investment Manager.
See infra notes 380-81 and accompanying text. For a fee schedule to ae pareto optimal, it must
implicitly serve to allocate the risk attaching to the outcome of the agent's activity in a satisfactory
way and to create appropriate incentives for the agent. See Shavell, supra note 55, at 55-60.
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Suppose an investor feels very unhappy about a mutual fund because
its transfer agent has always been tardy in providing shareholder
services. After making repeated complaints to no avail, he or she has
two options: replace the transfer agent or leave the fund by exercising the
redemption right. Which course of action would the investor likely
pursue? Probably the latter. After all, from the investor's perspective, it
is much more burdensome to convince (or demand) the board to make a
replacement decision than to vote with one's feet. If the investor does
exercise his or her redemption right, the Investment Manager (as well as
the transfer agent) will be penalized because the redemption will
decrease the amount of management fees. Thus, the Investment Manager
is motivated to provide quality services, such as transfer agency services,
in order to maximize its own returns.
Another type of market discipline is the new issues market for mutual
funds. Because mutual funds continuously offer shares in the market, the
Adviser's success (and profitability) depends primarily on its ability to
replenish a fund's redeemed assets with the sale of new securities. Thus,
the Adviser holds an ongoing entrepreneurial stake in the mutual fund
enterprise. A mutual fund carrying the brand name of the
Sponsor/Adviser group is the primary source of competitive advantage.
In fact, because the Sponsor/Adviser's goodwill is on the line,3" some
have argued that a mutual fund can be perceived as a proprietary
financial product produced by the Investment Manager.345
Finally, the contractual arrangement does not provide the Investment
Manager with an opportunity to "hold up" the investors. Because the
asset-specificity of the financial assets that the investors hold is low,
investors do not suffer from a lock-in problem. 46 In addition, investors
are not too concerned about the fact that periphery functions are
controlled by the Investment Manager. Because these services are
344. One of the most important assets of a Sponsor/Adviser group is its company name. Because
the name of a mutual fund usually represents valuable goodwill, it can be considered as a type of
equity investment by the Sponsor/Adviser. See, e.g., David A. Aaker, Managing Brand Equity:
Capitalizing on the Value of a Brand Name 1-25 (1991).
345. See West Report, supra note 1, at 19. This description, however, should be qualified. Some
funds occasionally change names due to interminable corporate identity crises and bad performance.
Moreover, some funds which bear one Adviser's name may be managed by another corporate group.
For example, Shearson Lehman Brothers Growth and Opportunity Fund is now managed by
Salomon Brothers. See Susan Antilla, Weill's $53 Billion of Lagging Assets, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14,
1993, at FI5. A mutual fund may cease to be a proprietary product once it loses the identity of its
original Sponsor/Adviser.
346. As discussed above, mutual funds consist of liquid assets that can easily be redeployed to
alternative uses without sacrificing productive value. See supra part IV.B.I.
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peripheral and delegable functions, their providers are not likely to create
monopoly rents or appropriable quasi-rents.3 47
c. Summary
In conclusion, when the success of a project depends on the
coordinated execution of several tasks that makes it difficult to assess the
performance of each task separately, then it is usually best to make a
single entity responsible for all the related tasks. Thus, the underpinning
of the Contractual Fund is a recognition that a mutual fund is, in many
instances, a proprietary product that investors choose on the basis of the
Investment Manager's reputation, skill and services. To minimize
agency costs, the investors rely on market constraints and performance
arrangements to discipline the Investment Manager. In other words, as
far as economic terms are concerned, the external monitor of the
Contractual Fund-the market-can effectively replace the internal
monitor of the Corporate Fund-the board of directors.348
3. Depositary or Trustee as Monitor
When market discipline is not effective at preventing the opportunistic
behavior of the Investment Manager, a Monitor shculd be installed to
ensure the performance of the management contract. For instance, in the
case of the Corporate Fund it may be desirable for the board of directors
to police operational transactions (e.g., affiliated transactions) that are
significantly redistributive.349 Similarly, a Contractual Fund benefits
from the oversight function that a Monitor performs.
How do the Investment Manager or the investors put a Monitor into
place in a Contractual Fund? Under the Corporate Fund, the investors
347. A monopoly rent is the increased value of an asset protected from market entry over the
value it would have had in an open market. In contrast, an appropriable quasi rent can occur with no
market closure or restrictions placed on rival assets. Once installed, an asset may be so expensive to
remove or so specialized to a particular user that if the price paid to the owner were somehow
reduced the asset's services to that user would not be reduced. See Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & Econ. 299
(1978).
348. This protection can be considered as a hybrid of invisible hand techniques as well as a
conscious contractual protective governance structure. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economic
Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance, 7(sp.) .L. Econ. & Org. 159 (1991).
349. For examples of operational transactions, see supra notes 273-76 and accompanying text.
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choose the Monitor-the board of directors-through Election Voting. 0
The agency costs associated with the appointment of the board of
directors are simply the investors' "monitoring" expenditures. In
contrast, in the Contractual Fund the Investment Manager chooses a
Monitor prior to the formation of the fund and proposes its appointment
as a contract term. This voluntary arrangement may not come as a
surprise. Pursuant to principal-agent theory, the Investment Manager
may be willing to expend "bonding" expenditures to induce investors to
believe its promises." 1 Although the process of appointment is quite
different, the result may not be. In either model, the agent-the Adviser
or the Investment Manager-bears all the agency costs associated with
the firm's governance arrangement." 2
Note, however, that monitoring problems need not always be solved
through the firm internally. In fact, one does not need to look far to see
examples of market solutions to these problems of monitoring, such as
auditing by independent public accountants. In a Corporate Fund, the
Monitor (i.e., the board of directors) selects the fund's independent
public accountant.353 In many Contractual Fund jurisdictions, it is also
up to the Monitor to approve the auditors." 4
One of the most important regulatory requirements for mutual funds
relates to the safeguarding of the assets in the Investment Pool. The
following discussion is divided into four components. The first
component examines why mutual funds need custodians in the first
place. The second considers how the depositaries operate in the German
Model. The third explores the role played by the Trustee in the British
Model. Finally, the fourth component investigates the institutional
safeguards designed to ensure the integrity of the depositaries or the
trustees.
350. Because agency problems are foreseen, they can be addressed ex ante through efforts to align
the incentives of the manager and shareholders. See supra part III.A.1; part V.C.2.
351. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 56, at 305-310.
352. Jensen and Meckling argue that it makes no difference who actually makes the agency costs
expenditures-the promoter/sponsor bears the full amount of these costs and a wealth reduction in
all cases. The promoter/sponsor of the firm bears all the agency costs associated with the firm's
governance arrangement. Id. at 305, 310-11.
353. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-31(a)(1).
354. Under the British Model, the auditor of a unit trust is appointed by the manager and
approved by the trustee. See Vaughan, supra note 115, at 35.
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a. The Need for Custodial Service
As in the case of other business organizations, the separation of
ownership from control creates opportunities for managers to
misappropriate the assets or the value of these assets. 5 This problem is
particularly acute for mutual funds. Because a large portion of mutual
funds' assets are held in a highly liquid form, insider misconduct (e.g.,
embezzlement of funds) is relatively easy to connit."6 Thus, the
custodian who keeps custody of the assets of the find is an important
player. The custodian, which may be a bank, will have functions
including safeguarding the fund's assets, making payments for the fund's
portfolio of securities, and receiving payments when securities are
sold.357
The operation of a mutual fund requires frequent consummation of
securities transactions as well as a strict accounting for every penny of
capital, capital gains, and income. Consequently, it may be desirable to
install added safeguards over the fund's assets. For instance, the
custodial contract can regulate the mechanics of how the investment
company's or the Adviser's personnel access the assets in their
custody.358 The benefits of allocating such a function to the Adviser
probably outweigh the costs of doing so.
b. Depositary as Monitor
In Germany, although the Depotbank acts solely in the interest of the
investors, it is subject to the manager's instructions unless these
instructions violate relevant laws and regulations. 9 The KAGG requires
actual physical separation of the Sondervermogen from the assets of the
355. Misappropriation and self-dealings are usually policed by the duty of loyalty under corporate
law. See Scott, supra note 236, at 937. In its broadest sense, appropriation could take two forms,
one blatant, the other subtle. The former includes outright theft, diversion, or conversion; the latter
comprises self-interested transactions or taking secret commissions given by third parties transacting
with the mutual fund.
356. See Robert Charles Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intennediaries, 86 Yale L.J. 1, 27
(1976).
357. Pursuant to § 17(f) of the Act, mutual funds must place and maintain their securities and
similar investments in the custody of a qualified custodian. A qualified custodian is either (1) a
bank, (2) a member of a national securities exchange pursuant to regulations prescribed by the SEC,
(3) the company itself in accordance with the regulations prescribed by the SEC, or (4) a central
clearing system pursuant to regulations prescribed by the SEC. 15 U.S.C. -j 80a-17(f).
358. Id.
359. See supra part 11.B.l.
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manager. The legal relationship between the depotbank and the manager
is a matter of contract. The law grants the manager a claim against the
Depotbank for payment out of the Sondervermoegen of the manager's
proper fees and expenses. The Depotbank also has the right to terminate
the manager's authority to deal with the Sondervermoegen under certain
circumstances.36
The KAGG regulates the extent of this contractual relationship
between third parties and the manager. The KAGG prohibits direct
claims by third parties against the Depotbank with respect to the
Sondervermoegen, although such claims may arise indirectly if the third
parties attach the manager's claim against the Depotbank for payment of
the manager's fees and expenses.36" ' The Sondervermoegen is not a legal
entity capable of entering into legal transactions. All transactions must
be undertaken by the manager, which is authorized to deal with the
Sondervermoegen in its own name.362
In transactions relating to the Sondervermoegen, the manager is the
contractual party with the third person. Any property acquired, however,
immediately becomes part of the Sondervermoegen as a matter of law
without passing through the manager. The property is thus never subject
to attachment by manager's creditors, and the Sondervermoegen is not
included in the manager's assets in bankruptcy. The legal obligations of
the Depotbank inure primarily to the benefit of the certificate holders.
The investor may sue the Depotbank as a third-party beneficiary.363
c. Trustee as Monitor
In Great Britain, the duties of the trustee of a unit trust include the
following: (1) to carry out the instructions of the managers (subject to
law and regulations); (2) to take custody of the assets and hold them in
trust for the investors; and (3) to take reasonable care to ensure that the
manager calculates issue and redemption prices." Compared to the
board of directors of the Corporate Fund, there are fewer specific items
360. KAGG §13(4) grants the depotbank the right to terminate the investment company's
authority if the investment company is dissolved for any reason other than those specified in the
KAGG, if a composition of creditors proceedings is instituted, or if the manager is prohibited by a
court order from dealing with the Sondervermoegen generally. See Butler & Thoma, supra note 99,
at 1608.
361. Id. at 1607.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1606-08.
364. See Vaughan, supra note 115, at 38.
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that require direct trustee consideration. Moreover, although the
manager and the trustee must be independent of each other, the trustee
and the custodian do not need to be separate entities.365
In Great Britain, it is permissible for the trustee to delegate the
custodial function to a custodian. In doing so, the trustee is obligated to
make reasonable inquiries to ensure that the custodian is fit and proper
and that arrangements have been made to protect the rights of the trustee
in priority over those of other creditors of the custodian.366 Of course, it
may sometimes be necessary for the custodian to exercise some kind of
discretion. For instance, the custodian should be required to alert a
designated regulatory body if it receives unusual instructions in dubious
situations. 67
d. Institutional Competence and Safeguards
The most obvious replacement for the independent directors would be
a trustee or depositary, in much the same way that a "depositary" is used
in the European Council Directive on the Cocrdination of Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to Undertakings for
Collective Investment in Transferable Securities ("TCITS Directive'".368
The UCITS Directive establishes a scheme for the recognition and
marketing of mutual funds throughout the Community. The UCITS
Directive deals with the coordination of Member States' provisions
relating to "undertaking for collective investment in transferable
securities" (UCITS) 69 It covers only open-ended UCITS, both unit
trusts and investment companies. Its aim is to ensure that, once
authorized in one Member State, the units or shares of UCITS may be
marketed throughout the Community.370
365. Id.
366. Council Directive 85/611, art. 8, 1985 O.J. (L 375) 3, 5, as amended by Council Directive
88/220, 1988 O.J. (L 100) 31 [hereinafter UCITS Directive] ("It must furnish sufficient financial and
professional guarantees to be able effectively to pursue its business as depositary and meet the
commitments inherent in that function.").
367. For instance, the role of custodian has received close attention in the United Kingdom. This
was prompted by the Maxwell scandal, in which assets belonging to peasion schemes were diverted
by the fund manager. See Michael Cowley & Andrew Sutch, Defining the Role of Custodians, V
Global Investor, Mar. 1993, at 56.
368. UCITS Directive, supra note 366.
369. Id. at 3.
370. Id. The UCITS Directive prescribes a common denominator approach to protecting investors
in certain mutual funds qualifying as UCITS.
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Under the UCITS Directive, a fund's depositary is supposed to act in a
general oversight capacity for all fund operations. Thus, depositaries are
subject to public control due to the important functions that they assume.
For instance, to be eligible to perform as a depositary or trustee, an entity
must demonstrate financial and professional soundness.37t In addition, to
ensure that the depositary and the Investment Manager conduct mutual
monitoring, not mutual collusion, the depositary and the Investment
Manager must act independently and solely in the interest of the
investors.372
Compared to the board of directors, employing the depositary as the
Monitor offers two advantages. First, because the depositary and the
Investment Manager must interact (e.g., settle transactions or
communicate changes in asset value) on a regular basis, the depositary
can acquire low-cost information about the Investment Manager. This
mutual monitoring system can tap this information for use in the
monitoring process.373 Second, because depositaries (like the Investment
Managers) are typically compensated on the basis of account size, they
bear a major share of the wealth effects of their performance. In contrast,
boards of directors of the Corporate Funds do not bear a major share of
the wealth effects of their monitoring decisions because they receive
fixed salaries.
B. Two Contractual Fund Proposals
Disenchantment with the present Corporate Fund structure has led
some to endorse simplified governance arrangements such as the Unitary
Investment Fund (UIF) and Unified Fee Investment Company (UFIC)."7
The UIF proposal-a structure closer to that of the Contractual
Fund-represents a somewhat radical departure from the Corporate
Fund. The UFIC proposal, on the other hand, is closer to that of the
Corporate Fund and deviates less from the Corporate Fund Model.375
371. Id.. at art. 8 ("It must furnish sufficient financial and professional guarantees to be able
effectively to pursue its business as depositary and meet the commitments inherent in that
function.").
372. Id at art. 10. For a discussion of collusion in organizations, see, e.g., Jean Tirole,
Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 203
(1986).
373. See Fama & Jensen, supra note 154, at 310-11.
374. This Article uses the term Contractual Fund to include both UIF and UFIC, which are
considered subtypes of the Contractual Fund.
375. For a discussion of the contract-organization continuum, see supra notes 69-70 and
accompanying text.
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Because the UIF and the UFIC share some important features with the
Contractual Fund, they can be considered as stylized models of the
Contractual Fund.37 6  The following section examines these two
proposals.
1. UIF as a Proprietary Product
Originally proposed in 1980,"' 7 the UIF is an alternative form of
mutual fund whose structure is predicated on the belief that a mutual
fund is a proprietary product, more suited to a conlractual arrangement
than to corporate democracy. In response to this proposal, the SEC
requested public comment on the UIF in 1982.378 Most commentators
opposed the UIF, based largely on concerns about the adequacy of
investors for the UIF's investments.
The term "Unitary Investment Fund" is used presumably because,
unlike the Corporate Fund, it is a contractual being which is not
independent of its Sponsor or investment adviser.379 In most Contractual
Fund jurisdictions, the Investment Pool, even though not subordinated to
a corporate entity, is nevertheless legally required tc be segregated from
the manager and its assets. In other words, the Investment Pool is still
regulated and operated as if it were an independent entity.380
a. The UIF Proposal
As proposed, the UIF would have the following key features:
31
(1) The UIF would be an optional form of investment company,
similar in form to a trust, with a corporate trustee (the sponsor/manager),
a trust indenture (which would spell out fundamental investment policies
and the management fee), and investors holding interests in the trust.
376. Note, however, that Contractual Funds may have different arrangements. For instance,
unlike the UFIC, many mutual funds in Contractual Fund jurisdictions do not really charge a unified
fee. See generally World's Investment Fund, supra note 50.
377. The concept of UIF was first proposed by Stephen West of Sullivan & Cromwell. See
Stephen K. West, Address at the General Meeting of the Investment Company Institute (May 1,
1980).
378. Advance Notice and Request for Comment on Mutual Fund Governance, Investment
Company Act Release No. 12,888,47 Fed. Reg. 56,509 (Dec. 10, 1982).
379. See West Report, supra note 1, at 63.
380. A notable example is the concept of Sondervermoegen in the Ge rman investment fund. See
supra notes 359-63 and accompanying text.
381. See SEC Report, supra note 12, at 283-84.
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(2) A single management fee would cover all expenses, except for
extraordinary expenses and shareholder account services. The fee would
be subject to a statutory maximum, which the SEC could increase by
rulemaking. No limit would be placed on the percentage of the fee that
could be used for distribution expenses.
(3) The UIF would have no board of directors or shareholder voting,
nor would section 36(b) apply.
(4) During an initial period (perhaps five years) the indenture could
not be amended without an exemptive order from the SEC. Thereafter,
the Sponsor could amend the indenture at any time upon adequate notice
to investors. Shareholders objecting to a change could redeem.
(5) The UIF would either be no-load or would refund the sales charge
upon redemption in most situations.
(6) All section 17 prohibitions concerning transactions with affiliates
would apply. Because there would be no board of directors to prevent
the Sponsor's brokerage affiliate from charging excessive commissions
to a UTF, agency transactions with affiliates currently allowed under
section 17(e) would be prohibited.
(7) The UIF could not engage in activities that rely on rules or
exemptive orders conditioned on director oversight unless mechanical
rules or individual exemptive orders were substituted for each oversight.
b. Evaluation of the UIF
Pursuant to this proposal, the UIF would have a simplified governance
structure-with neither voting shareholders nor a board of
directors-and a relatively simple fee arrangement. Since the time of
this proposal, a number of variations have been suggested. 82 For
example, some advocates of the UIF now take the position that even UIF
shareholders should have voting rights. Others, citing investor protection
concerns, have recommended that any UIF structure retain an
independent trustee to exercise oversight over the affairs of the
company. 83 However, none of these advocates has generated specific
details of the structure and operation of the UIF and its monitoring
structure.
382. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 4, at 905.
383. Others, citing investor protection concerns, have recommended that any UIF structure retain
an independent trustee to exercise oversight over the affairs of the mutual fund. See, e.g., Investment
Company Institute, Comment Letter on the Reform of Regulation of Investment Companies, Release
No. 33-6868, Oct. 5, 1990, at 30.
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Assuming that the single-fee approach would be an adequate
substitute for the current system of director review of fees,384 the question
remains whether the corporate model is necessary for other investor
protection purposes. As discussed above, in the absence of a third-party
monitor, a contractual governance regime is unlikely to effectively police
some operational transactions that involve a potential transfer of
significant value from investors to the Investment Manager or its
affiliates. That is why, under the Act and the rules thereunder, directors
oversee mutual fund operations in many areas that do not involve fees.
One alternative would be to substitute greater oversight and
examination by the SEC. This would involve some kind of merit review
conducted by the SEC. For example, a UIF's registration statement
under both the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act would
have to be declared effective by the SEC before shares could be sold,
thereby giving the SEC the opportunity to review the management
contract as well as the proposed prospectus disclosure.385 However, this
suggestion may be unrealistic given fiscal constraints. For instance, the
SEC reportedly already is nervous that its staff assigned to inspect funds
may be stretched too thin.386
In conclusion, mutual fund investors should have certain protection
provided by an independent monitor and, to a lesser degree, by
shareholder voting. Because the UIF proposal provides neither the
protection of the Act's governance requirements nor the similar
protection of a foreign regulatory system,387 it should be rejected. Thus,
we should consider alternative structures which can adequately address
investor protection concerns while minimizing transactions costs.
2. UFIC with a Simplified Fee Structure
Having rejected the UIF proposal, the Division considered a possible
variation that would reflect the proprietary nature of a mutual fund and at
384. For an evaluation of the single fee approach, see infra part VI.B.2.
385. Currently, a mutual fund is automatically registered under the Act upon filing a notification
of registration on Form N-8A. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(a). Typically, a Securities Act registration
statement for shares of a mutual fund includes a delaying amendment and is declared effective by the
SEC only after review and comment by the SEC staff. If, however, a Securities Act registration
statement were filed without a delaying amendment, it would become effective automatically in
twenty days. See 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 230.473 (1994).
386. It was recently reported that only 126 federal examiners keep tabs on nearly 3,800 mutual
fund portfolios with assets of $1.6 trillion. See Michael Schroeder, The SEC May Not Have Enough
Guns, Bus. Wk., Jan. 18, 1993, at 68.
387. See supra part VI.A.3.
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the same time retain the watchdog function of the directors of the
Corporate Fund. Adopting the single fee aspect of the UIF, the Division
proposed the Unified Fee Investment Company (UFIC) to promote
competitive pricing and consumer choice.388
a. The UFIC Proposal
The UFIC is an optional, additional form of investment company. Its
purpose is to provide investors with a simplified fee structure, the
bottom-line expenses and investment performance of which could be
readily compared to other funds of the same type. The proposal includes
several major features:
The Unified Fee. A UFIC would have a single, fixed fee computed
daily as a percentage of fund assets and expenses. This unified fee,
together with the resources of the "Investment Manager" (to be defined
in the Act as the Sponsor-Adviser of a UFIC), would cover all fund
expenses other than extraordinary expenses and brokerage commissions
on the fund's own transactions.389 To promote full disclosure and
investor choice, the level of the fee would be prominently displayed on
the cover page of the prospectus and in all sales literature and
advertising. There would be no separate sales charges, redemption fees,
or distribution fees.390 The SEC Report argued that fee levels would b
dictated by competitive pressures in the marketplace.
The Board of Directors. Two thirds of the directors would be required
to be non-interested, and after the fund Sponsor establishes the initial
board, the directors would be self-nominating with respect to any
vacancies to be filled.391 The duties of the board would include
evaluating and approving the advisory contract as well as its continuance
beyond the initial two-year period. In addition, the UFIC's independent
directors would separately evaluate and approve the initial contract and
any renewal of the contract. The UFIC board, however, would not be
responsible for approving the fee with the Investment Manager. In
addition, the UFIC's board of directors would not be required to
388. See SECReport, supra note 12, at 337.
389. "Extraordinary expenses" would be defined by SEC rule. See SEC Report, supra note 12, at
340.
390. However, to protect investors should competition not restrain fee levels for the UFIC, the
Act would prohibit "unconscionable or grossly excessive" unified fees. Id. at 332.
391. Id. at 341-44.
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authorize, review, or evaluate the component of the unified fee
representing asset-based distribution fees.392
The Division also recommended that a new paragraph (g) of section
15 "specify that the board, including the independent directors voting
separately, must approve and periodically review all material contracts
the Investment Manager has executed."393 The board must also review
other contracts furnishing services to the fund to ensure provision of
adequate services to the fund. The suggested revision also would
provide that either the full board or its independent directors may
terminate a material contract at any time, on appropriate notice.394 This
material contract review would ensure that the UFIC is provided the
level of services needed for its safe operation.
Shareholder Rights. UFIC shareholders would not vote to approve,
amend, or terminate advisory contracts. Instead, Shareholders would
receive 90 days written notice of any management or advisory fee
change.395 Because there would be no front-end sales loads or other sales
charges, but rather the ongoing, daily deduction of the unified fee,
dissatisfied investors would be expected to "vote with their feet"
regarding the fee. UFIC shareholders would have all other voting rights
currently required by the Act.396
b. Evaluation of the UFIC Proposal
First of all, consider the significance of the UFIC proposal to the
Corporate Fund structure. As if to downplay its significance, the SEC
Report discussed the UFIC proposal in Chapter 8, "The Sale of Open-
End Investment Company Shares," '397 instead of in Chapter 7,
"Investment Company Governance," as with the UIF.398 According to
the Division, the proposal would "promote price competition and result
in more economical and efficient distribution methods," because it would
provide a simplified method of distribution financi.g.399 The Division
392. Id. at 342.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 343. Note also that a fee could not be charged until it had been in effect for one year.
Id.
396. Id. at 343-44.
397. Id. at 332-45 (Part IV of chapter 8 is entitled "The Unified Fee Investment Company: An
Alternative.").
398. Id. at 282-89 (Part IV of chapter 7 is entitled "Alternative Governance Arrangements.").
399. Id. at 297.
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apparently considered the UFIC proposal to be a modified version of the
Corporate Fund."0 After all, like the Corporate Fund, the UFIC would
have a board of directors to police operational conflicts and to approve a
variety of operational activities.
Viewed from another perspective, however, the UFIC can be
considered a type of Contractual Fund because its simplified fee concept
goes beyond distribution financing. Under the proposal a UFIC would
be organized and operated by the Investment Manager. A written
"management contract" would specify a single, unified fee payable to the
manager in exchange for all services necessary for the UFIC's operation
and would bind the manager to provide or contract with third parties for
these services. Consequently, a direct contractual relationship would
exist between the Investment Manager and the investors and, at least as
far as fee-related matters are concerned, the corporate machinery would
be eliminated. Because the Investment Manager would be able to
assume some important coordination functions and to write some
economic terms without going through a pre-approval system, a UFIC
can be considered a modified version of the Contractual Fund.'
This proposal is a great step toward realism. As discussed above,
alternative forms of distribution charges, such as the Regulation 12b-1
fees and contingent deferred sales loads, have become increasingly
prevalent and have resulted in complex distribution arrangements. 0 2 In
addition, the Act made lawful a system of retail price maintenance and
impeded price competition with respect to front-end sales loads.40 3
Consequently, the variety of charges and operating and distribution
expenses of bond and stock funds are difficult to aggregate, cannot be
readily compared among funds, and cause investor confusion. Thus, it is
important to develop an integrated cost comparison that considers the
two visible costs-sales charges and expense ratios. Because the unified
fees are intended to represent the "totality" of the sales charge and
400. The UFIC proposal is one of the three general recommendations with respect to the sale of
mutual fund shares.
401. See supra notes 316-31 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 243-54 and accompanying text.
403. To prevent abusive trading practices that resulted from the backward pricing method used by
funds before 1940, the Act required that all sales of mutual fund shares be made at a fixed offering
price specified in the prospectus. The base price of a mutual fund is always derived from net asset
value, so this requirement fixed the sales load component of the public offering price. Although this
provision, § 22(d), minimized the identified trading abuses, it also made lawful a system of retail
price maintenance and eliminated all secondary market trading. Thus, the Act provided that the sale
of mutual fund shares is exempt from normal antitrust law principles of free competition. See SEC
Report, supra note 12, at 291-315.
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expense ratios (subject to limited exceptions), investors should be able to
make their own decisions concerning appropriate expense levels.
The UFIC fee levels would be market-based and would not be subject
to regulatory limits. Because of the perceived competitive element, the
board of directors would be relieved of the responsibility under Federal
law of reviewing the level of management fees. To this end, the
fiduciary duty of the Investment Manager with respect to compensation
and other elements of section 36(b) would be eliminated and the unified
fee would not be subject to private litigation."'
One benefit of the UFIC is that the unified fee would enable
Investment Managers to build internal budgets, gauge performance of
internal divisions, obtain service costs of all the service providers, and
reduce record-keeping costs of the mutual fund operations. Bundling all
costs of operation and distribution into a single fee should reduce the
time and expense of detailed accounting reports, legal analyses, and
deliberations surrounding expenditures from fund assets that must be
allocated for advisory, distribution, and other services. Thus, the unified
fee concept can be analogized to the standard cost accounting adopted by
many industrial and service corporations. °5
In conclusion, the benefits of the UFIC seem clear: increased investor
and media focus on bottom-line fund expenses, in general, and the
importance of these costs to investment performance, in particular.
Because of increased investor awareness of fund expenses and its effect
on investment return, and the evolution of an information industry that
tracks funds,406 market forces have become a more effective restraint on
expenses. Some would argue that permitting a "bundled" fee would
afford the Investment Manager the opportunity to build an excessive
profit into the single fee. However, given that the single fee is easy to
"price" and that minimum exit barriers exist, the market will work to
keep fees at reasonable levels.07
404. See id. at 341-43.
405. See, e.g., Charles Homgren et al., Cost Accounting: A Managerial Emphasis 224-36 (1994).
406. One example is the Business Week rating, which regularly publishes information on both
sales charges and operation expenses. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Laderman, The Best Mutual Funds, Bus.
Wk., Feb. 15, 1993, at 68-73.
407. It is very important to link "pay" to "performance." For instance, in an effort to address this
issue, the SEC has promulgated rules to force more disclosure of executive pay. See, e.g., Kevin G.
Salwen, SEC To Allow Investors More Room To Talk; Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1992, at Cl, C12.
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3. Summary
As the foregoing discussion suggests, while the UIF proposal should
not be adopted, the UFIC proposal has merit and should be implemented.
The UIF proposal should be rejected because it provides no effective
substitute for the oversight of the board of directors. On the other hand,
the UFIC proposal has merit, not only because competitive forces would
provide adequate discipline with respect to its simplified fee schedule,
but because the Investment Manager would be better motivated than the
board to coordinate a mutual fund's operations. In addition, the UFIC
proposal goes a long way toward streamlining shareholder voting
requirements, especially voting requirements with respect to fee-related
issues. Because protection would still be retained for matters other than
fees, the UFIC is a hybrid between the Corporate Fund and the
Contractual Fund which may have some efficiency advantages.
C. Suggestions for Improving the UFIC Proposal
1. Beyond Unified Fee
It is often believed that the three sides of the "eternal triangle" of
mutual fund investing are potential reward, potential risk, and cost4 8 The
other important element-service quality-is often ignored. Everyday
nuisance-type problems, such as late or inaccurate statements or dividend
checks, may be a sign of the overall incompetence of a mutual fund.
Should the market-oriented approach of the unified fee arrangement be
extended to service quality? According to the UFIC proposal, although
the board of the UFIC would not be responsible for negotiating the level
of the fees and expenses, it would still be required to oversee the level of
services provided to the UFIC through review of all material service
contracts.
The SEC argued that "[w]ithout a third-party monitor to oversee the
level of services, investors would be virtually left to their own devices,
but typically without the expertise, incentive or power to assess the
quality of these services."40 9 However, if investors have the ability to
compare fees, why can't they evaluate mutual fund services as well?
Customers of a bank do not normally appoint an independent bargaining
agent to oversee the services provided by their bank. Why then should
1031
408. See, e.g., Bogel, supra note 249, at 190.
409. See SEC Report, supra note 12, at 285.
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investors have to rely on the board of directors to monitor the services
they receive?
Admittedly, services differ from other items (e.g., investment returns)
in that they are difficult to measure and to evaluate. Unlike tangible
goods, mutual fund services cannot be tested and verified in advance of
sale to assure quality. The way investors evaluate mutual fund services is
more complicated and varied than the way they evaluate, say,
automobiles.410 However, because the only criteria that count in
evaluating service quality are defined by investors, the board of directors
should not be charged with the responsibility of evaluating service
quality. Because service-quality perceptions stem from how well a
provider performs vis-6-vis investors' expectation s about how the
provider should perform, all other judgments, including the judgment of
the board of directors, are irrelevant.
In evaluating the overall performance of mutual funds, investors take
into consideration four interrelated elements: investment return, fees and
expenses, risk level, and service quality. In doing so, investors do not
isolate the level of service from the other elements; rather, they look for
an acceptable mix of all elements. In other words, investors ask
themselves whether the fees charged by the Investment Manager and its
affiliates are consistent with the services provided. The price factor
therefore plays an important role in shaping investors' expectations of
the level of services.4 ' If existing investors become unhappy with the
level of services, they may well redeem their shares. Similarly,
prospective investors may invest in a particular mutual fund partly
because it has a reputation for providing good service.
The Division further argued that, as a result of price competition, the
Investment Manager might be tempted to skimp on or eliminate the basic
services needed to operate an investment company.4 2 These temptations
could create serious investor protection problems, if, for example, the
Investment Manager hired an incompetent custodian.43  But these
410. Quality measurement and quality assurance in services are in their infancy. It is still
controversial whether quality can be measured meaningfully. Research on customers' view of
service quality still leave many questions unanswered. How exactly do customers evaluate the
quality of a service? Do they directly make a global evaluation or do they assess specific facets of a
service in arriving at an overall evaluation? If the latter, what are the multiple facets or dimensions
on which they evaluate the service? See Valerie A. Zeithaml et al., Delivering Quality Service:
Balancing Customer Perceptions and Expectations 16 (1990).
411. Id. at 15-20.
412. See SEC Report, supra note 12, at 341.
413. Id.
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concerns can be addressed by imposing mandatory quality terms. At the
very least, the basic services needed to operate investment companies can
be maintained by the standard minimum quality terms.414 For instance,
the SEC has adopted a rule that regulates management personnel's access
to assets in the custody of a broker-dealer or to the fund itself.415
Mutual fund service providers are strongly motivated to provide
quality service to assure investor satisfaction and loyalty. Although the
true costs and benefits of service quality cannot be measured,416 recent
studies show that most service providers do recognize the importance of
service quality. For example, a recent survey reported that over 80% of
the 73 mutual fund complexes stated that they view quality as a strategic
initiative within their organizations. In addition, 84% indicated that they
survey shareholders on a periodic basis to determine their level of
satisfaction with the quality of service provided.4 7
To summarize, because investors have the ability to price service
quality, the effectiveness of the board's function to scrutinize service
terms is questionable. Moreover, minimum quality terms and economic
incentives would adequately motivate the Investment Manager to provide
quality service. Therefore, performance-related terms that fall into the
purview of investors' choice should include not only fee levels but also
service quality.
2. Risk Disclosure
It has been argued that the Act is not a disclosure statute; rather, as
with banking laws and insurance statutes, it regulates a type of financial
institution.41 Nevertheless, disclosure still plays a very important role in
mutual fund regulation.419 Because ultimately investors have to make
investment decisions for themselves, they should be afforded the
414. Minimum quality terms relieve the investors of the need to choose between undertaking an
expensive search for information and the risk of making a potentially disastrous choice. For a
discussion of minimum quality terms that protect investors from misinformation, see, e.g., Victor P.
Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J.L. & Econ. 461,488-91 (1974).
415. The actual mechanics for custody arrangements are set forth in rule 17(0-3 covering custody
by the fund itself. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(f). The rule is augmented by the publication of a model
custody agreement. See West Report, supra note 1, at 29-30.
416. For a discussion of the costs and benefits of service quality, see, e.g., W. Earl Sasser, Jr., et
at., The Service Management Course: Cases and Readings 283-84 (1993).
417. See Investment Company Institute (with the assistance of Coopers & Lybrand), Mutual Fund
Transfer Agents: Trends & Billing Practices 73, 74 (1992).
418. See Frankel, supra note 24, at 28-34.
419. See, e.g., West Report, supra note 1, at 27-28.
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information necessary to shop for the right fund by comparing past
performance, including past returns, risk levels, fees, and service
quality.4
20
As discussed above, investment return should be evaluated by the
investors, not the board. Some, however, may argue that the board of
directors be allowed to assess risk. For instance, in determining the
appropriate level of management fees, the board can factor in the risk
level of the fund.42t From a practical perspective, risk can be defined as
the potential for losing money.4 22 If your mutual fund is volatile-if its
net asset value is subject to sharp fluctuations-it is risky.42  Investors
are probably not going to get too upset about sharp moves to the upside.
Although the method for assessing risk is critical[ for investors, it is
very difficult to develop a single accurate measure of risk. One problem
is that risk can mean something different for each investor. Some
investors can tolerate losing for years for a high ultimate return; others
willingly sacrifice higher returns for fewer interim losses. And risk
changes over time. Volatility penalizes short-term investors. For the
long term, outpacing inflation becomes the biggest risk. As a result, the
various risk ratings created by fund researchers, newsletter editors, and
financial publications are all flawed.424 Because risk-return assessment is
a personal thing, the board should not be allowed to asses risks.
Although it is very difficult to devise an accurate risk rating system, this
420. The importance of disclosure in mutual fund regulation cannot be overemphasized. Take
Japanese mutual funds as an example. Japanese funds generally do not state clearly their investment
philosophies, and they do not provide breakdowns of their investment; or the specific securities
owned. Hence, there is a tremendous need for unbiased information. See James Stemgold, World
Markets: A New Leaffor Japan's Mutual Funds?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 19S4, at F13.
421. The directors evaluate the performance by comparing each hind's achievement of its
objective against a selection of comparable mutual funds with similar objectives and risk levels. See,
e.g., Nutt, supra note 222, at 232-38.
422. There are other ways to define it, but for investors this is the most significant way.
423. Note that the Act has restricted the investment risks of mutual funds. For instance,
shareholder redemption rights and the related liquidity requirements restrict investment freedom.
See supra part IV. B. 4.
424. For instance, the Morningstar rating system, one of the more popular risk rating systems, is
computed by subtracting the risk-free return on a three-month Treasury bill from a fund's monthly
return. The number of months with negative results are divided by the number of months in rating
periods of three, five, or ten years, then compared with other funds, with the average risk rating
being 1.0. For example, Fidelity Magellan has a five-year risk rating of 0.79, meaning it carried just
three-quarters of the average risk of equity funds. "The advantages of this method are that it
penalizes funds only for losses, not unusual gains, and avoids compariscns with irrelevant indexes.
But it is merely a historical rating, not a predictive one." Carole Gould, Grasping the Slippery Idea
ofRisk, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1993, at F14.
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should not be an excuse for not providing investors with risk measures
most meaningful for them.4"
3. Regulating the Investment Manager
Legislation will be required to implement the UFIC proposal. To
what extent should the UFIC or its Investment Manager be regulated?
The Division proposed that the term "Investment Manager" be defined to
distinguish the Sponsor and manager of a UFIC from the Investment
Advisers of other mutual funds. In addition, the term "Investment
Manager" would be added, where appropriate, to provisions of the Act
and rules that refer to a fund's "Investment Adviser."426 It appears that
the SEC Division desires to implement the UFIC proposal with minimum
changes to the present regulatory scheme. It is doubtful, however, that
this minimalist approach would work.
As the coordinator of the UFIC, the Investment Manager would take
substantial entrepreneurial risks, because all costs of operating the UFIC
and distributing its shares (other than portfolio transaction costs and
extraordinary expenses) would be financed by the Investment Manager
out of the unified fee or out of its own resources. In addition, the unified
fee would not be changed until it had been in effect for one year,427 even
though the costs will vary over time. Thus, the Investment Manager runs
the risk that its organizational and promotional efforts will not garner
sufficient funds under management to reward its services adequately.428
Because the UFIC places greater economic risk on the Investment
Manager, this implicates regulatory concern.
Unlike the Investment Company Act, the Advisers Act relies much
more heavily on disclosure and antifraud provisions than on substantive
425. In fact, legislators and regulators are speaking with Morningstar Inc., the leading mutual
fund research company, about developing a universal risk-rating system for mutual funds. Id.
426. For example, § 36(a) would be amended to include the Investment Manager among those
persons whom the SEC may sue for breach of fiduciary duty involving personal conduct. See SEC
Report, supra note 12, at 338 n.186.
427. Id. at 343.
428. This makes sense because it is a familiar pattern in the principal-agent literature that an agent
must bear non-diversifiable risk to create an incentive. In addition, the manager can "average out'
such risks by organizing a wide variety of different mutual funds and, because they have more
wealth, they can better absorb the risks that remain. See e.g., Robert S. Pindyck & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Microeconomics 145-57 (1989).
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regulation.429 The objective of the Advisers Act was to have all advisers,
with certain exceptions, register and identify themselves and the nature
of their business.43 Currently any person (other than a criminal or a
violator of securities law) is entitled to register and give investment
advice to the public, regardless of his experience or financial condition.
As such, the Advisers Act emphasizes disclosure and fiduciary
obligations and does not regulate financial safety and soundness.43" '
Although this regulatory scheme may work well with investment
advisers that advise on Corporate Funds, it is not suitable to regulate
Investment Managers of UFICs.
One necessary component of the legislation governing Investment
Managers would be financial soundness. Capital requirements are the
most powerful source of discipline for financial institutions. When
maintained at an appropriate level, they reduce the incentive to take
excessive risks and provide a cushion against loss. A meaningful capital
standard also serves as a check against uncontrolled growth, because the
permissible level of operations can be directly tied to capital
requirements.432
More fundamentally, the focus of regulation should be shifted from
mutual funds generally to the Investment Managers. We should regulate
Investment Managers as persons who sponsor and advise mutual funds.
In fact, they should be treated as a separate category of financial services
firms. The approach would be similar to the approach taken by the
Commodity Exchange Act.433 It would involve a regulatory statute that
focuses on the conduct and activity of the Investment Manager with
respect to all mutual funds under its management. Meanwhile, the
regulation of the Investment Pool itself would still be extensive.434
429. Alan Rosenblat & Martin E. Lybecker, Some Thoughts on the Federal Securities Laws
Regulating External Investment Management Arrangements and the ALl Federal Securities Code
Project, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 587, 654-60 (1976).
430. Although the idea was that professional and financial qualifications could be developed over
time, none have been. See West Report, supra note 1, at 34.
431. Id. at 228-30.
432. Note, however, that minimum capital requirements should be used with care because they
could incur costs such as administrative costs and error costs. See e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 52, at 60-62.
433. In the case of commodity pools, or pools containing futures contracts or exchange-traded
commodity options as assets, the pools themselves are not regulated. See West Report, supra note 1,
at 44-47.
434. This is the approach taken by many Contractual Fund jurisdicticns such as Germany. See
supra parts M.B. 1, VI.A.3.
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This concept has many desirable aspects. Because of its focus on the
forest rather than the trees, it would place the regulatory focus on the
actual service being performed-the management of collective
investment vehicles.43 In particular, this approach would focus on the
regulation of fund complexes rather than individual funds. Today, most
mutual funds are members of one fund complex or another. Most fund
complexes comprise a large variety of funds with different objectives and
policies but are managed, administered, and distributed by a single
central entity-an Investment Manager. Given the recent history of the
increasing size and importance of fund complexes in the fund industry,
mutual funds should be regulated from the point of view of the
Investment Manager.
Because a fund complex concentrates on the total return of all the
funds sponsored by it, rather than the performance of a single particular
fund, this unitary approach would be more effective. This is especially
the case where many mutual funds have a set of directors sitting across
the complex or a group of funds (e.g., equity funds) of the complex. A
conflict of interest problem may arise because the same directors are
supposed to jointly determine fee rates and structures for "all" funds
under their directorship.436 Thus, we should develop a unitary approach
to regulate Investment Managers, such as Fidelity, who operate fund
complexes.
D. Paternalism and Alternative Monitoring Arrangements
The foregoing suggestions regarding the UFIC proposal were made
from within the regulatory framework of the Investment Company Act
and the Advisers Act. Yet it is possible to look beyond this framework
and to draw lessons from the Contractual Fund Models for other
monitoring arrangements. However, because the regulatory systems
governing the Contractual Funds are often driven by different rationales
from those underlying the Corporate Fund, it is necessary to examine
435. For a discussion of the regulation of mutual fund complexes, see Donald W. Glazer, A Study
of Mutual Fund Complexes, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 205 (1970).
436. For instance, Fidelity has more than $200 billion in assets under management, and the
number of Fidelity mutual funds is well over 200. The number of shareholder accounts exceeds 10
million, and the number of investment analysts and portfolio managers is in excess of 200. See, e.g.,
Keeping Both Hands in View, Economist, Jan. 22, 1994, at 77-78; Geoffrey Smith, What's Behind
Fidelity's Riveting Results, Bus. Wk., Nov. 22, 1993, at 68. For a discussion of the role of
independent directors in mutual fund complexes, see, e.g., Nutt, supra note 222, at 230-50.
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such rationales before more fundamental reform measures can be
considered.
1. Paternalism and Governmental Supervision
First, let us consider the role of paternalism in regulating mutual
funds. In general, any legal rule that prohibits an action on the ground
that it would be contrary to the actor's own welfare is paternalistic.
437
One primary justification for government paternalism is that the
government knows better than investors. In contrast, many economists
argue for contractual rule making in corporate law on the ground that
government intervention is unlikely to improve investor welfare.438
However, it is fair to say that governmental agencies, such as the SEC,
may have better information about what would really promote the
welfare of the investors than the investors themselves do, even though
governmental agencies may have imperfect incentives.
439
Paternalism takes many forms. Up to this point, this Article has
focused primarily on paternalistic rules that mandate the structure and
governance of mutual funds. The structure and governance of the
Corporate Fund and the Contractual Fund represent two forms of
paternalism on structural rules. Viewed from a contractual perspective,
the Corporate Fund, by interposing a corporate democracy between the
Adviser and the investors, is less contractual than the Contractual Fund
because the Corporate Fund places more reliance on the semi-hierarchy.
Thus, in this sense the Corporate Fund is more paternalistic than the
Contractual Fund.
However, paternalism goes beyond structural rules. The Contractual
Fund jurisdictions rely on another form of paternalism-the vetting
system, or entry regulation. In most of the Contractual Fund
jurisdictions, such as Japan and many of the European Community
countries, licensing and authorization procedures restrict market entrance
to only "fit and proper" applicants."0 Of particular importance are the
437. See Anthony T. Kronmnan, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 Yale L.J. 763 (1983).
438. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 157. For a useful summary of the debate on
contractual freedom in corporate law, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual
Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1395 (1989).
439. For a discussion arguing for paternalism, see Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and
Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1703 (1989).
440. For instance, in the United Kingdom the primary role in the supervision of unit trusts is
played by the Securities and Investment Board. The board is required to "vet" the unit trust scheme.
See Vaughan, supra note 115, at 16-22.
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requirements that the applicants demonstrate good repute, managerial
expertise," and adequate capital backing.442 Rather than regulating how
mutual fund contracts should be formed, the vetting system, in effect,
decides who is qualified to enter into the mutual fund business.
The vetting system may be unduly paternalistic and subject to abuse
and favoritism. For one thing, entry restrictions reduce competitive
pressures and create monopoly rents for the existing participants. They
also provide an incentive to the relevant governmental agencies to
exchange such licenses for illegitimate favors. Moreover, entry
restrictions raise issues of equity. The regulators must decide which of
the many potentially qualified entities should be entitled to a license." 3
The vetting system may nevertheless have relative advantages over the
more open United States system in a wide variety of contexts. Because
of the difficulty and costliness of presenting and assessing a full array of
information about financial institutions, it may be more efficient for a
supervisor to make his or her own judgments on the basis of qualitative
assessment. Such judgments can be transferred to the market in the form
of an approval, a license, or quality standards.4"
For instance, as discussed above, the current United States system
governing investment advisers, if applicable to Investment Managers of
UFICs, is inordinately risky for investors. Because of the direct or
indirect exposure to small investors, a possibility would be to impose
some net capital magnitude as a requirement."
In most Contractual Fund jurisdictions, both the Investment Managers
and depositaries (or trustees) are subject to government supervision. In
the European Community, the UCITS provides that the competent
authorities should approve the Investment Manager and the choice of
depositary,446 and the depositary may not be replaced without the
441. UCITS Directive, supra note 366, at art. 4, para. 3 ("The competent authorities may not
authorize a UCITS if the directors of the management company, of the investment company, or of
the depositary, are not of sufficiently good repute or lack the experience required for the
performance of their duties . . .').
442. Id. at art. 5 ("A management company must have sufficient financial resources at its disposal
to enable it to conduct its business effectively and meet its liabilities.").
443. In the United States, any person may sponsor a mutual fund provided it has the necessary
seed capital of S100,000 and is not subject to statutory disqualification. Hence, it is not uncommon
for individual entrepreneurs to enter into the mutual fund business. For one story on a mutual fund
entrepreneur, see Seth Lubove, Do It Yourself Forbes, Aug. 30, 1993, at 124.
444. See Page & Ferguson, supra note 54, at 38.
445. See generally Clark, supra note 356.
446. UCITS Directive, supra note 366, at art. 2, para. 2.
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approval of the competent authorities." 7  The UCITS reflects the
paternalistic spirit of Member States. For instance, in Germany, the
appointment of the depositary requires approval by the German Federal
Banking Commission. The Commission may under certain
circumstances order the appointment of a new depositary."4  In the
United Kingdom, the trustee may only retire when a replacement has
been appointed by the manager by means of a supplementary deed. In
addition, notice of the proposed changes must be sent to the Board.
Effect can be given to the proposed changes upon board approval or if
the board fails, within one month, to give notice of its refusal to approve
the changes." 9
Although regulatory supervision may be unduly paternalistic, it may
be justified for investor protection. For instance, regulators may be able
to facilitate the coordination of the multiple contrac':s that constitute the
mutual fund.450 Since a mutual fund consists of an interlocking web of
contracts among the Adviser (or the Investment Manager), the Investors,
and the Monitor, everyone may find it easier to conrtact against a set of
fixed background rules. For instance, investors, at the time they
determine whether to invest in a particular mutual fund, may care about
the terms governing the Investment Manager-Monitor relationship and
the extent to which those terms are modifiable. If all the terms in the
contract are negotiable, then investors must deal with contingencies
introduced by this contractual uncertainty. Some terms are more central
to the investors' concerns, specifically, those concerning the professional
qualifications of the Investment Manager and the Monitor. Regulators
therefore can reduce the costs of drafting the management contract.
45
'
Another form of paternalism that would influence the structure of
mutual funds is self-regulatory organization (SRO) for mutual funds.
The term "self-regulation" includes a broad range of subjects, including
self-certification, use of independent auditors, and an industry-sponsored
oversight group.4 2 The SEC published its most recent proposal in
447. Id. at art. 4, para. 4.
448. Butler & Thoma, supra note 99, at 1604-05.
449. Vaughan, supra note 115, at 38.
450. A mandatory term may reduce the costs of drafting the corporate contract and facilitate
coordination. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 164.
451. Contract law itself protects third-party beneficiaries of contracts from subsequent
modification of the promisor's duties. See E. Allen Farnsworth, Contracts § 10.8, at 768-77 (2d ed.
1990).
452. For instance, in the United Kingdom the self-regulation contemplated by the Financial
Services Act of 1986 is now in place. The Financial Intermediaries Managers and Brokers
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1983."'s This proposal does not contemplate a true SRO, but rather a
private entity to conduct investment company examinations. Currently,
the U.S. does not have a strong SRO to assume the inspection and
monitoring responsibilities or to police economic regulations such as
fees.
454
2. Alternative Monitoring Arrangements
Obviously, even the most paternalistic regulator cannot be an effective
substitute for a Monitor in the Adviser-Investor bilateral relationship.
The question, then, is what type of monitoring arrangements can best
serve the Investors' needs? Recall that the Corporate Fund employs a
board of directors as the Monitor, while the Contractual Fund uses an
institutional monitor such as a depositary or a trustee.
The mtchinery of a mutual fund's board of directors, of course, is
derived from ordinary corporations, such as publicly-held industrial
corporations.4"5 Because the board has to make many business decisions
day in and day out, it is characterized by the breadth of its discretionary
power.456 One primary advantage of the board is that, through a
collective decision-making process, a small group of individuals can
make informed and deliberated business decisions, especially strategic
decisions.457  Another advantage is that different constituencies of the
corporation, such as labor, shareholders, suppliers, and lenders, can have
representation on the board.45 Thus, the device of the board of directors
may serve ordinary industrial corporations well.
Regulation Association (FIMBRA) is the one that is most relevant to mutual funds. See World's
Investment Fund, supra note 50, at 88.
453. Concept of Utilizing Private Entities in Investment Company Examinations and Imposing
Examination Fees, Investment Company Act Release No. 13,044,48 Fed. Reg. 8,485 (Mar. 1, 1983).
454. See West Report, supra note I, at 78-81. The foregoing discussion is not intended to be the
definitive statement on the role of paternalism and government supervision in regulating mutual
funds. My view is that paternalism may have relative advantages over market forces in a variety of
contexts. Therefore, both theorists and regulators ought to face up to this point and then see what
headway, if any, can be made in devising principles for setting the optimal mix.
455. 1 Harold Marsh, Jr., Marsh's California Corporation Law § 8.1, at 401-02 (2d ed. 1983) ("A
corporation requires some form of government, as does any entity composed of individuals. The
government of a corporation is generally entrusted to a board of directors comprised of the elected
representatives of the shareholders.").
456. This explains why most decisions of the corporate board are protected under the business
judgment rule. See supra notes 236-39 and accompanying text.
457. Kenneth R. Andrews, From the Boardroom: Rigid Rules Will Not Make Good Boards, Harv.
Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 34, 44.
458. For a discussion of the composition of the board, see, e.g., Williamson, supra note 19.
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However, these advantages are not present in the context of the board
of directors of the Corporate Fund. For one thing, due to the specialized
nature of fund management, there is no place for the board to make
strategic decisions. Moreover, because the mutual fund involves a
comparatively simple relationship and its investors have minimal
exposure to lock-in effects, few investors or other constituents would
seek representation on the board. This is especially the case for a
Contractual Fund such as the UFIC, where the board's role is limited
largely to monitoring agency problems.
With the adoption of the simplified fee structure, the UFIC's board
would exercise substantially less discretionary power than the board of
the Corporate Fund. Because the UFIC would not benefit from the
machinery of the board of directors, a trust form may better suit the
UFIC. For some enterprises in the United Kingdom and the United
States, the business trust has been used in preference to corporate and
other forms of business entities.459 How does the trust form operate in
the case of the UFIC?460 The various functions that are assigned to
directors in the Corporate Fund can be handled by direct requirements in
the contractual documents (e.g., trust indenture). :[n addition, UFICs
would not be able to engage in activities that rely on rules or exemptive
orders conditioned on the trustee's oversight (as the Corporate Fund
would under the board's oversight).
The most obvious means of replacing the independent directors would
be to substitute a trustee or custodian for them, in much the same way
that a "depositary" is used in the UCITS. Under the UCITS Directive, a
fund's depositary is required to act in a general oversight capacity for all
fund operations.46 Similarly, the UFIC can use a financial institution as
its trustee. The role played by the trustee or depositary of the
Contractual Fund may be analogized to that of an indenture trustee.462
459. Generally speaking, the concept of split ownership is used with same frequency in common
law countries to facilitate investments in a variety of forms, including the unit trusts in the United
Kingdom and the real estate investment trusts in the United States. Recognition and use of business
trusts and similar concepts in civil law countries is limited, but appears to be growing. See generally
Emmanuel Gaillard & Donald T. Trautman, Trusts in Non-Trust Countries: Conflict of Laws and the
Hague Convention on Trusts, 35 Am. J. Comp. L. 307 (1987).
460. It should be noted that business trusts can be treated in the same way as corporations. After
all, legal identity means only that the segregated assets have a name or are identifiable as a distinct
corpus so that the assets may transact and be recognized as an independent pool of assets.
461. UCITS Directive, supra note 366, at art. 7.
462. For a discussion of the trustee's adequate powers to protect the bondholders, see Tenth
Annual Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission 153-55 (1944).
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What are the benefits of an institutional monitor such as a trustee?
Admittedly, many independent directors of the Corporate Fund are well-
known personalities with considerable potential reputational losses to
bear. However, compared to individual directors, an institutional
monitor's reputational loss from "mismonitoring" will normally
outweigh that of a natural person. The financial institutions that serve as
trustees are long-lived and stand to lose a great deal of future business if
their reputations are tarnished by negligent behavior.463 As such, it is
easier for investors of the UFIC to price the reputation of the trustee.
E. Concluding Remarks: The Case for Organizational Competition
After fifty years of dealing with the Act, people have come to accept
the required model as the natural scheme of things for mutual funds.
However, absent regulation, the organizational structure that will survive
in business activities will be the one that delivers the product demanded
at the lowest price while covering costs.464 The available evidence
suggests that it is advisable to reexamine the Act's "one structure fits all"
approach to mutual fund governance.
For one thing, even a casual inspection of alternative arrangements
prevalent in other jurisdictions suggests that the Corporate Fund Model
may not be an efficient organizational form for mutual funds.
Throughout the world, the requirement that mutual funds be organized
and governed as if they were free-standing corporations is the exception
rather than the rule. In Europe, Japan, and the rest of the world, the
corporate form of mutual fund is in a decided minority compared to a
contractual form of organization.465
Moreover, even in the United States, it is only for mutual funds and
closed-end funds that the Corporate Fund Model is required. Where it is
not required, it is hardly ever chosen by the Sponsors. For instance,
outside the Act's jurisdiction, banks' collective investment funds and
commodities' pooled assets vehicles have avoided the corporate
structure.466  Admittedly, the mutual fund industry has substantially
463. Presumably many trustees would engage in similar dealings with other customers, and news
of a trustee company that makes mistakes would spread rapidly to fiture customers as well. See
Klein & Leffler, supra note 340.
464. Fama & Jensen, supra note 205.
465. See supra part IILB.
466. See generally Donald W. Smith & Marie J. Lilly, Legal Overview of Bank-Managed
Investment Funds, paper presented at Virginia Bankers Ass'n Trust Employee Benefits Seminar
(Sept. 11, 1990).
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"practiced around" the Corporate Fund Model to minimize the adverse
effects of the structural constraints. For instance, boards of directors
have seldom intervened in the overall management of mutual funds or
467terminated advisory contracts. Nevertheless, because the industry
cannot contract around all the legal constraints imposed by the Act, the
structure and governance of the Corporate Fund still leaves much to be
reformed.
From a theoretical perspective, an organization is inefficient if there is
another organization that would be superior for each person on average
across the circumstances in which the organization operates.46 It has
been argued that mutual funds have prospered under the current
regulatory system and have not experienced the abuses that have recently
plagued other financial institutions.469  The force of this argument is
undermined, however, by the example of the Contractual Fund, which
has worked reasonably well throughout the rest of the world. For
instance, the favorable history of investor protection in the United States
has also been enjoyed in the United Kingdom.4 70  Without economic
natural selection, it is premature to assume that the Corporate Fund is the
superior organizational structure because the U.S. mutual fund industry
has a reputation for integrity.
In this globalized economy, the appropriate type ef regulation can no
longer be determined without carefully considering the regulations
imposed by competing states.41  Competition exists not only among
products but also among governance systems.472 This heightened
international competition has required the Corporate Fund Model to
467. For the role of the board in mutual fund management, see .-upra notes 290-305 and
accompanying text.
468. See Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 155, at 24.
469. See SEC Report, supra note 12, at 265. For a discussion of abuses that have plagued
banking institutions, see Kenneth E. Scott & Barry R. Weingast, Banking Reform: Economic
Propellants, Political Impediments (1992).
470. In reviewing the mutual fund industry in the United Kingdom, a renowned legal scholar once
commented that the British unit trusts have a "scandal-free operation." L.C.B. Gower, Review of
Investor Protection: A Discussion Document, para. 8.18 (1982).
471. For a discussion of international regulatory competition, see, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman,
International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction, 34 Harv. Int'l L.J. 47
(1993).
472. See, e.g., Statement of the Business Roundtable, Corporate Governance and American
Competitiveness: March, 1990, 46 Bus. Law. 241 (1990) (discussing the competitiveness of business
organizations).
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compete with various forms of the Contractual Fund operating in other
jurisdictions.4 73
One example of a regulatory regime which fosters organizational
competition is that adopted by the European Community. There, the
effort to promote the internationalization of mutual fund markets resulted
in the UCITS Directive.474 The UCITS Directive prescribes a common
denominator approach to protecting investors in mutual funds qualifying
as a UCITS.475  For instance, article three of the UCITS Directive
provides that a UCITS may be constituted either under the law of
contract (as common funds managed by management companies), under
the law of trust (as unit trusts), or under statute (as investment
companies).476 Each Member State must adopt domestic legislation to
implement the UCITS Directive, but each is free to choose a form and
method of implementation consistent with its legal system.477
In addition to reforming the current governance structure of the
Corporate Fund, the SEC should permit the UFIC as an optional form of
mutual fund. Because the UFIC would not be mandated, but would be
an optional form of organization, it would introduce to an already
complex market a vehicle that departs in significant respects from the
current mutual fund model. In France, for example, both the Corporate
Fund Model and the Contractual Fund Model are permitted.478 We
should likewise permit experimentation and innovation in the choice of
organizational forms so that more efficient forms of mutual funds can be
developed.
473. See generally SEC Report, supra note 12, at 185-91.
474. See UCITS Directive, supra note 366.
475. A UCITS from one European Community Member State may sell its shares in any other
Member State, subject only to the host country's marketing, advertising, and tax laws. For a
discussion of the common denominator approach, see David Reid & Andrew Ballheimer, The Legal
Framework of the Securities Industry in the European Community under the 1992 Program, 29
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 103, 132-36 (1991).
476. UCITS Directive, supra note 366, at art. 1, para. 3.; arts. 5-11 (setting forth obligations
regarding the structure of unit trusts); arts. 12-18 (setting forth obligations regarding the structure of
investment companies and their depositaries).
477. Id. at arts. 1-4.
478. Francoise Delavenne, Open-End Mutual Funds in France, in Funds and Portfolio
Management Institutions: An International Survey 131 (Stefano Preda ed.) (1991). In France the
Contractual Fund, called SICAV, seems to be the more popular form of mutual fund. Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted, from within the law-and-economics
tradition, to evaluate the structure and governance of the Corporate Fund
and the Contractual Fund from a comparative instittional perspective.
The fundamental structure of the mutual fund can be defined as a
trilateral arrangement consisting of the Adviser, the Investors, and the
Monitor. The Corporate Fund and the Contractual :Fund represent two
solutions to the problems of coordination and motivation. As
intermediate forms of business organizations, the Corporate Fund is more
centralized and the Contractual Fund more decentralized in decision-
making functions. Based on the lessons drawn on this framework, the
following normative observations seem warranted.
In the case of the Corporate Fund, the board of directors often lacks
either true independence or an informational advantage over many
investors, especially institutional investors. As such, the centralized
control mechanism-a semi-hierarchy-leads to significant transaction
costs such as influence, intervention, and collective decision-making
costs. With respect to specific responsibilities, the board has not been
effective in negotiating performance-related terms (e.g., fees) for
investors. In this respect, fiduciary duties on management fees and other
payments which are policed by shareholder suits do not adequately
address the thorny issue of who monitors the monitor. On the other
hand, the board does play an effective role in scrutinizing operational
transactions that are significantly redistributive in nature. In addition, the
board's discovery and corrective watchdog functions are desirable.
Therefore, we should guard against placing too much reliance on the
board's discretion.
In this respect, the SEC Report's recommendations to reform the
Corporate Fund, if adopted, would markedly streamline and improve the
current corporate structure. However, even as amended, the Corporate
Fund Model would still place too much reliance on the effectiveness of
the board of directors and shareholder voting. For instance, without
specific decision-making rules, the authority of directors (including
independent directors) to terminate the advisory contract could lead to an
abuse of the board's power. With respect to shareholder voting, although
issue voting may be desirable in some situations (e.g., to vote on
proposals that significantly alter the nature of the mutual fund), election
voting serves little practical purpose in the mutual fund context.
To summarize, the board of directors of the Corporate Fund functions
not only as the Monitor but also as the Coordinator of the mutual fund.
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As a matter of institutional design, this active model can both undermine
organizational efficiency and put the legitimacy of the corporate
democracy into question. Admittedly, the mutual fund market has
"practiced around" many of the Corporate Fund's undesirable legal
constraints.479 However, because the Corporate Fund represents a poor
allocation of coordinating and monitoring functions among the trilateral
parties, its structure might still be economically inefficient. Therefore,
we should take off the "corporate governance blinders" and look afresh
at alternative models.
In the case of the Contractual Fund Model, a conceptual analysis
suggests that its structure is fundamentally sound. Combining the
functions of the Sponsor, the Advisor, and the Investment Manager can
coordinate a mutual fund's essential operations without going through a
pre-approval mechanism such as the board. To minimize post-
contractual opportunism, the contractual governance regime adequately
motivates the Investment Manager with economic incentives and enables
investors to evaluate mutual fund performance more effectively. To the
extent there are contractual failures (e.g., serious conflicts that are not
readily monitored by the Investors), the Contractual Fund interposes
depositaries or trustees to perform more limited monitoring functions,
which may result in lower transaction costs.
This Article also considered two Contractual Fund proposals-the
Unitary Investment Fund (UIF) and the Unified Fee Investment
Company (UFIC). The UIF proposal should be rejected because it
provides no effective substitute for the oversight of the board of
directors. On the other hand, the UFIC proposal has merit, not only
because competitive forces would provide adequate discipline with
respect to its simplified fee schedule, but because the Investment
Manager would be better motivated to coordinate a mutual fund's
operations than the board would be. Because governance protection
would still be retained for matters other than fees, the UFIC is an
efficient hybrid between the Corporate Fund and the Contractual Fund.
The UFIC proposal can be improved in the following ways. First,
since the performance of a mutual fund is a unitary concept, investors
should be allowed to evaluate for themselves not only unified fees but
also quality of services. Second, because risk assessment is an essential
479. As Romano argues, the most important lesson to be drawn from comparative institutional
study is that "private parties are quite resourceful in adapting their affairs to minimize the adverse
effects of regulation." Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative
Corporate Law, 102 Yale. L.J. 2021, 2022 (1993).
1047
Washington Law Review
element of mutual fund investment, the Investment Manager should be
required to disclose the risk level of the mutual fund. Third, in light of
the significant role that the Investment Manager plays in a UFIC, it is
desirable to establish a regulatory scheme that focuses on the Investment
Manager's conduct and financial soundness. Finally, if we look beyond
the current regulatory framework and obtain further guidance from
Contractual Fund Models, alternative monitoring arrangements should be
considered. One possibility is to replace the UFIC's board of directors
with institutional monitors such as a trustee.
The most important consequence of a collective investment fund
being subject to the Act is the requirement that it adopt a corporate form
of governance. As the experience in the European Community
demonstrates, this "one structure fits all" system is open to challenge.
Admittedly, whether the UFIC proposal is more efficient than the current
Corporate Fund Model is an empirical question which cannot be
answered without putting the UFIC proposal into actual practice. Given
that the Corporate Fund incurs significant transaction costs, alternative
structures should be considered. The Contractual Fund offers a fitting
alternative because it is conceptually sound and has been successfully
implemented in many jurisdictions. Therefore, as a modified version of
the Contractual Fund, the UFIC proposal should be implemented to
promote organizational competition with the Corporate Fund.
1048
Vol. 69:927, 1994
